

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-4 Small Wars

CSC 1996

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

**Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-4
Small Wars**

Executive Summary

- Defines Small Wars and Provides an Historical Overview
- Describes Complexity, Clausewitz, and the Edge of Chaos
- Discusses Non-State Actors and Small Wars Characteristics and Categories
- Presents Seven Principles of Small Wars
- Describes Types of Small Wars within Categories
- Presents Ten Operational Functions for Planning Small Wars
- Discusses Multinational Operations
- Discusses Planning Considerations for Small Wars
- Discusses Training for Small Wars

Intent. The purpose of this master's project was to write the coordinating draft for Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-4 on Small Wars or, as the Joint community refers to them, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). To do this, I was to provide information regarding the definition and historical foundation of, the conceptual basis for, and the planning, training, and conduct of small wars. In addition, historical examples were to be included to illustrate various points throughout the publication. My target audience is Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanders and staff officers and their subordinate elements. The scope of this publication is to provide a capstone doctrinal manual for the Marine Corps on small wars

that can later be supported in more detail by tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals on specific types of small wars.

Product. The majority of this coordinating draft is a synthesis of material presented in Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW*; the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for *Peace Operations*; the Army's Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*; FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*; and FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*. The personal flavor added to the draft that was not found in any current doctrinal publications involved the choice of the use of the label "Small Wars" over "MOOTW," the historical overview small wars (taken from the C&SC Syllabus by Dr. Fitz-Simons); the discussion of Complexity, Clausewitz, and the Edge of Chaos; the proposed three categories and slight modification of the 16 types of small wars; the proposed revision of the Principles of small wars (added Impartiality), the proposed ten small wars Operational Functions, the proposed framework for analysis of small wars, and the overall choice to pattern the manual after FMIFM 1, *Warfighting*.

Recommendations. The scope of this project was immense considering the time and resources available and the experience of the writer. If this draft is accepted as a viable first step in the production of the Marine Corps' doctrinal manual on Small Wars, I recommend the following issues be considered:

1. Use the term "Small Wars" vice MOOTW. The military community has fluctuated over the years through numerous names to describe operations short of total war. Other terms like Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Operations Other Than War (OOTW), unconventional warfare, expeditionary operations, and now MOOTW/ have been utilized. As of March 1995, the Army's doctrinal publication on OOTW is titled "Support and Stability Operations." Few Marines relate to any of these names (with the exception of maybe "expeditionary operations"). However, most are familiar with the Marine Corps historical participation in operations once called "small wars." When names like Haiti, Nicaragua, and Santo Domingo are recalled, Marines experience an almost visceral reaction of familiarity and warrior satisfaction. Those were some of the best days for our Corps. Like amphibious operations, small wars helped mold the unique identity of

the Marine Corps. Marines still refer to the 1940s *Small Wars Manual* with a sense of wistful pride. Operations short of war conducted today may in many ways be more complex, joint, and multinational than they were in the old days, but when all else is stripped away, they are still small wars. Marines work best when they can connect with tradition. The term "small wars" honors Marines' past, preserves their warrior spirit, and reflects the true essence of what Marines do in MOOTW.

2. Create two publications on small wars; one a capstone manual similar to FMFM 1, *Warfighting* to describe a philosophy of *small warfighting*, and one to discuss the details of types of and planning for small wars. Unfortunately, I realized this too late in the process; thus my draft reflects the second requirement more than the more important first. Small wars have long been considered an aberration and thus received little attention by theorists. Even Clausewitz only devoted one short chapter to the subject. Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and other "small warfighters" have made written contributions to this unique category of war, but what non-revolutionary, impartial theorist has fully addressed the subject? Only one doctrinal publication, the Marine Corps' 1940 *Small Wars Manual*, discusses military operations other than war in any kind of detail. Yet even it fails to capture and describe the theory and nature of small wars. The Marine Corps made a major contribution when it published FMFM 1, *Warfighting*. By embracing the tenets of maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps paved the way for the smart, economical, and successful conduct of military operations. However, though small wars are technically included in FMFM 1, they are, like in most publications, addressed only peripherally.

Perhaps the time has come to acknowledge that small wars are more than a deviation from the norm; that they are in fact *fundamentally distinct* from war and need a doctrinal philosophy of warfighting all their own. Aspects like the role of time, terrain, and violence; the concepts of enemy, victory, center of gravity, critical vulnerability, legitimacy, fog of peace, maneuver warfare, non-decisive battle, and hit-and-run tactics; the primacy of politics; the organization of forces and military command structure; and the influence of popular support all make small wars unique. They should not continue to be buried under theories describing

warfare that concentrates overwhelming firepower at a decisive time and place.

Because participation in these types of operations dominates the agenda of all US forces now and for the foreseeable future, the Marine Corps can make a profound and timely contribution to all armed services by either modifying or creating a parallel manual to FMFM 1 that discusses the theory, nature, preparation, and conduct of small wars.

3. Organize a team of officers to write the *next* draft of Small Wars Doctrine. Suggest students attending Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, or War College. A team of officers with experience in all the pertinent functional areas should research, organize, and write this doctrine. Just as Marines developed Amphibious Doctrine during the interwar years before World War II, Marines properly organized and supervised should be able to capture the essence of Small Warfighting within an academic year. A topic of this significance deserves no less than such a concerted effort and would validate one of the most important missions of the Marine Corps University.

4. Additional Suggestions. Write a chapter on the "Conduct of Small Wars" like in FMIFM 1; flesh out the theory and nature discussions in Chapter 1; include a section on the psychology of small wars; and provide historical examples (suggestions for possible topics included in parentheses throughout the draft) and quotes as is the custom these days with doctrinal manuals.

Chapter 1

The Theory and Nature of Small Wars

Small Wars Defined -- Historical Overview -- Complexity, Clausewitz, and The Edge of Chaos -- Non-State Actors -- Characteristics of Small Wars -- Categories of Small Wars

*"The most important reason why the Marine Corps should prosper in the post-Cold War world is... the unfolding nature of that world [The Gulf War of 1991] and the continuing threat of major conflict on the Korean Peninsula should not obscure mounting evidence that we are entering an era of small wars, many of them intrastate, and of operations other than war--an era for which the Marine Corps is by experience, doctrine, organization, and force structure better prepared than the other services."*¹

-- Jeffrey Record

To understand the Marine Corps' philosophy of small warfighting, we first need an appreciation for the history, nature, and theory of small wars. A common view of these areas is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive doctrine. In the Marine Corps' FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, it is acknowledged that "absolute war and peace rarely exist; that in fact, most nations relations with each other fall somewhere between the two extremes."² FMFM 1 goes on to say that "conflicts of low intensity are not simply lesser forms of high-intensity war...A modern military force capable of waging a war of high intensity may find itself ill-prepared for a 'small' war against a poorly equipped guerrilla force."³ This manual will fill in the gaps left by FMFM 1 by describing more fully the theory and nature of small wars, distinguishing them from major wars, and identifying the unique aspects of identifying, planning for, training for, and conducting small wars.

Small Wars Defined

According to the original Marine Corps doctrinal publication on small wars, NAVMC

2890, *Small Wars Manual*, 1940, the term "Small War" is a

"vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As applied to the US, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation... Small wars vary in degree from simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war... The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does not involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power may be termed a small war."⁴

The Army prefers to categorize small wars as *conflicts* that offer an "alternative to war." "They are not," Field Manual 100-20, *Support and Stability Operations*, states, "merely the road to war nor a cleaning up afterward. They are a way to achieve national policy objectives without entanglement in an unplanned, undesired, and unnecessary war. They are used in peacetime and in the political-military state of conflict, a middle ground that is neither peace nor war, either because no other means will work or because the values threatened, while important, do not justify the high cost of war."⁵

Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)*, describes these operations as those that "encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.. .These actions can be applied to compliment any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after, war."⁶

The Marine Corps prefers to define these operations within the realm of war because experience has shown us that the Western concept of war and peace denies the reality of what is actually happening in these foreign lands. We recognize that insurgencies, ethnic rivalries, and civil unrest are actually states of war to the people involved. This non-Western war environmental state can be viewed as a means by which the "militarily weak can challenge the militarily strong."⁷ In many cases, a state of war based on non-Western political conditions-- tribal and religious dominance or conflict between subnational and local groups--already exists.

Because the warfare is not between states, such conditions are often overlooked. Marines understand that non-Western warriors can easily neutralize the West's superior information-based systems, high technology, and heavy firepower by using the populace for information and support, dispersing in urban and rural terrain, exploiting the media to gain popular support, and utilizing terrain, time, and casualties to equalize the military forces between West and non-West.

The Marine Corps may thus choose to define the expeditionary operations called small wars as "those military campaigns undertaken short of major Western-type conventional or nuclear war for specific political-military purposes, usually limited in scope and requiring unconventional means, with little or no advanced warning or planning, and involving the use of rapidly deployed forces from outside the theater of operations."⁸

Small Wars have been called Unconventional Warfare, Irregular Warfare, Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Support and Stability Operations (SASO), Gray Area Phenomenon (GAP), Partisan Warfare, Insurgencies, Guerrilla Warfare, Expeditionary Operations, Peacekeeping Operations, and most recently, MOOTW. These terms all describe a distinct warfighting environment. The types of small wars range from humanitarian assistance (largely noncombat environments) and peace operations to enforcing sanctions and countering insurgencies. As in all levels of warfare, the threat must be engaged and defeated, and as in conventional warfare, discipline, training, and courage are prerequisites for victory. On the other hand, there is a unique way in which wars on this level are waged, and traditional concepts like enemy, victory, firepower, intelligence, and combat operations take on different meaning.

For example, guerrilla strategy in small wars utilizes the elements of time, space, terrain, surprise, retreat, and perhaps most importantly, the civilian population. Moreover, insurgencies are more political than conflicts on the mid- and high-intensity levels. Political objectives drive operations even on the tactical level, and the party cadre is the heart of the insurgent or clan organization. "Talkers" are more important than "gunfighters" because they are more difficult to replace. Political indoctrination of guerrilla forces often takes precedence over military training, and the ultimate victory is political in nature, the winning over of the civilian population. The

center of gravity in guerrilla strategy is political opinion in the opponent's homeland, not decisive defeat on the battlefield. Thus guerrillas may lose every battle but still win the war politically. Indeed, the co-option of political legitimacy from the ruling government is the ultimate objective of guerrilla warfare.⁹

Historical Overview¹⁰

Conducting small wars, or MOOTW, is not a new activity. The great philosophers of war, Sun Tsu and Clausewitz, both referred to guerrilla warfare in their works, and Roman cohorts, the most feared and disciplined troops in the ancient world, were cut to pieces by barbarians in the forests of Germany and the narrow alleys of Judea. Russian Cossacks and Spanish peasants inflicted horrendous losses on Napoleon's Grand Army, while the Zulus decimated British conventional forces at Isandhlwana, and Custer's 7th Cavalry suffered a similar fate at the Little Big Horn. Indeed, some of the greatest names in the annals of unconventional warfare are found in American history, including Francis Marion (the "Swamp Fox"), Nathan Bedford Forrest, Oceola, John S. Mosby, Crazy Horse, Geronimo, Pancho Villa, Sandino, and Lewis "Chesty" Puller. Nevertheless, unconventional warfare was viewed as a minor distraction; an aberration which would soon be rendered obsolete with the advent of sophisticated force structures. During World War I, however, the Bolsheviks utilized partisans in conjunction with the conventional Red Army, and T.E. Lawrence's Arab legions emerged as a potent ally in Allenby's drive against the Turks. Unfortunately, many lessons learned in colonial small wars before World War II were ignored or forgotten with the exception of the US Marines who incorporated their experiences in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti into the *Small Wars Manual*.

During World War II guerrilla warfare returned with a vengeance. German Panzer divisions were soon bogged down fighting Soviet partisans or Tito's guerrillas in the mountains of Serbia. Urban guerrilla warfare was also perfected by the French *Maquis* against the Nazis. In Burma, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaya, insurgents harassed and pinned down Japanese forces, while Mao Tse-tung's guerrillas attacked Japanese lines of communications in China. Yet after World War II, these successes were once again forgotten by western military commands

preoccupied with the threat of nuclear war. Moreover, western materialistic culture created an orthodox mentality which concentrated on speed, maneuverability, firepower, and high-tech weaponry while ignoring abstract concepts like time, space, and local civilian support. Consequently, when western conventional forces deployed to Third World regions where heavy-mechanized units and close air support were rendered less effective by mountains, jungles, or underdeveloped transportation infrastructures, they were often surrounded by local populations who supported their guerrilla opponents. All the guerrillas had to do was survive and inflict casualties; time would take its toll on impatient western public opinion. Western conventional forces gradually learned that they were extremely vulnerable, and that if they were not winning a low-intensity conflict, they were losing it.

In the bipolar, asymmetrical power structure that emerged after World War II, Third World insurrections proliferated and losses to insurgents became perceived as losses for the West and to communism." Internal struggles erupted in Vietnam, Malaya, Burma, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Oman, Uruguay, the Philippines, Cuba, Laos, and the Sudan. When the use of transnational terrorism by Palestinian groups and threats to oil interests in the Arabian gulf developed, international involvement against or supporting insurgents continued into the 1970's in places like Oman, Iraq, Algeria, the Western Sahara, Angola, and the Middle East. Despite the French experience in Vietnam and Algeria, the United States and the Soviet Union painfully and personally learned the limitations of conventional military tactics in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Even so, American Presidents fearful of further Soviet expansion supported counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.

While guerrilla warfare is highly political, the US constitutional tradition intentionally divides the political from the military and punishes military meddling in political affairs. Thus, US forces have more often than not been trained to focus on the military side of guerrilla warfare while ignoring the more crucial political side. What insurgents lack in technology, they make up for in political organization, popular and external support, and the willingness to suffer unacceptable casualties by western standards to achieve their objectives. Thus, highly successful

programs like the Marine Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) used in Vietnam fizzled as conventional means were imposed on a people determined to regain their country or to die trying.

Nevertheless, the United States did learn from the successful British counterinsurgency models of Malaya and Oman. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) played prominent roles in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia during the 1960's, though they later "wallowed in a trough" as units were radically downsized after the withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Americans adopted a "no more Vietnams" attitude.¹² SOF units trained host-country troops and Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) units to mobilize civilian populations. Intelligence operations were also encouraged to target guerrilla political cadres. The British strategy of not escalating a conflict and keeping it at a lower, more manageable level, appeared to work in the Philippines and El Salvador, where US forces played a support role, allowing host-country forces to defeat the insurgents. The US also did extremely well on the insurgency side initiating successful covert assistance to guerrillas in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Fulda Gap scenario has been replaced by a number of mid- and low-intensity threats including terrorism, narcotrafficking, insurgency, counter-insurgency, and peacekeeping missions. Doctrinally, the new name for this old phenomenon is MOOTW, but new names do little to change the reality of small wars on the battlefields in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Chechnya, Northern Iraq, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, or dozens of other hot spots. While the decline of the Soviet Union has lessened the threat of conventional and nuclear confrontation between the superpowers, overall global stability has not increased. Instead, threats to national security have become more diversified. Famine, regional conflicts, drug wars, and ethnic struggles continue to threaten international stability. As a major player in national security strategy, the military is required to meet these complex challenges through joint and combined operations, particularly in Third World settings. US forces will continue to be called upon to respond to crises that may not be easily identified with national interests nor involve orthodox military response.

Unfortunately, conventional conflicts such as the Civil War and World Wars I and II

have overwhelmingly influenced US strategy and doctrine. The American Way of War, a term coined by Russell Weigley, and echoed by many other commentators, is usually defined by as stockpiling as much weaponry and firepower as possible and subsequently throwing it at the enemy's weakest point, while US forces engage and destroy the enemy as quickly as possible on the battlefield. While this strategy worked in Europe, Korea, and Iraq, it often ignored the more likely scenarios such as Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, and Haiti. The emphasis which conventional doctrine places on high technology warfare is not always appropriate in low-level conflicts where the enemy refuses to engage and cannot be easily targeted or even defined. In small wars, firepower, air superiority, and artillery support are no substitute for sound, imaginative infantry tactics. This principle applies to foreign as well as US planners, as conventional Russian forces fighting Chechen insurgents recently discovered. As the Ranger raid in Somalia and the Russian offensive in Chechnya illustrate, unconventional warfare still poses a major problem for conventional combat forces. Beirut and Mogadishu remain as sad reminders of the real and ever present threat to US forces in unconventional scenarios and of the urgent need to adapt doctrine, strategy, and tactics to deal successfully with small wars.

Complexity, Clausewitz, and the Edge of Chaos

Small wars are fundamentally political in nature, and thereby subject to the lively interaction of a vast array of complex activity. The population at large, the belligerent groups, outside interests, the layers of internal support or disaffection, the governmental response, and the actions of the state's armed forces all interplay with each other in convoluted, intricate, and many-faceted ways. Small wars are not easy to analyze, fight, or win because of this complex nature. Today, post-Cold War global instability (and the proliferation of small wars) has nurtured a growing feeling amongst nation-states that the global community is descending towards chaos and threatening to spin out of control.

However, in one area of science, discoveries are being made that may offer profoundly innovative solutions to political and military systems trying to avoid anarchy. With growing excitement and -a feeling that mankind is very close to epochal breakthroughs, philosophers,

economists, biologists, physicists, politicians, and military leaders alike are earnestly studying the emerging science of complexity and life at the edge of order and chaos.

The science of complexity studies how single elements, such as a species, a stock, or a group of people, spontaneously organize into complicated structures like ecosystems, economies, or states; almost as if these systems were obeying a hidden yearning for order. Complex systems, like conventional armed forces, for example, interact and naturally self-organize. They adapt to events to turn them to their advantage and possess a kind of dynamism that makes them alive, spontaneous, and disorderly while at the same time exhibiting extraordinarily intricate behavior. Complex systems somehow have the ability to bring order and chaos into a special kind of balance -- *the edge of chaos*.

At this tenuous point -- the edge of chaos -- the components of a complex system never quite lock into place, and yet never quite dissolve into turbulence either. This small region is "the constantly shifting battle zone between stagnation and anarchy; the one place where a complex system can be spontaneous, adaptive, and alive."¹³ Those who can find and stay close to this edge (as warriors who thrive in the fog and uncertainty of war have long understood), know that it is a dimension ripe with opportunity and potential; that it is a place where creativity finds expression and possibilities spark into reality. Absolute control is unnecessary at the edge of chaos (think of a pile of sand on a table and what happens as one slowly adds more granules to the heap); tiny inputs and minor corrections are all that may be needed to maintain the balance.

This discovery has enormous implications for the military, an organization that is complex by nature and interacts continuously with other complex systems (other Services, coalition partners, belligerents, host nation leaders, the United Nations, etc.). Armed forces, however, especially those from the technologically advanced, more powerful nations, have traditionally been led by officers accustomed to linear tactics and rigid thinking (order of battle, forward edge of the battlefield, checklists, deep, close, and rear battle areas). While these approaches may have worked in major conflicts like the two World Wars, the proliferation of Third World "messy" wars in the past fifteen years has taught commanders that the reality of the

modern battlefield is nonlinear, chaotic, and highly unpredictable. Ironically, these same ideas were identified extensively by Clausewitz in spite of the geometrical and linear bent of his times.

Clausewitz, the most frequently quoted and perhaps most commonly misunderstood military theorist, realized long ago that war is complex, dynamic, interactive, and thus highly unpredictable by analytical means. He permeated *On War* with discussions on the ambiguity of war, the tangled dynamics between strategy and tactics, and the pervasive effects of friction, chance, and uncertainty in war.¹⁴ For many years, engineers, historians, scientists, and military officers who analyzed Clausewitz's essays missed the extraordinary prescience of his conclusions because their linear approach to problem solving often made the subtleties of Clausewitz's arguments transparent. Clausewitz was a realist who grasped the nonlinear character of war and the requisite need for adaptability and intuition on the battlefield.

Rather than digest fully Clausewitz's assertions about nonlinearity, especially those concerned with the dynamic relationship between war and politics, many linear planners chose instead to concentrate on his lists of principles, tactical maneuvers, and prescriptive strategies. Wearing analytical blinders, they developed fixed, inflexible, mechanical mentalities that often permitted events to overwhelm them.¹⁵ To be pure followers of Clausewitz, leaders in today's highly complex and tumultuous world must readily embrace rather than fight chaos; must explore rather than dismiss the kaleidoscope of complex mental, moral, and physical interactions; and must adapt intuitively "like a chameleon" to events as they unfold.

The interaction of politics, complex contingencies, and conventional military forces has made modern war far more complex and difficult to control. Order, logic, rigidity, and linear thinking especially find no harbor during the conduct of small wars. Enemies that avoid decisive battle, disengage, melt into the terrain, harass and wear down their opponents, and do so with time and the home advantage on their side, neutralize the heavy-handed methods of their conventional adversaries. Military commanders and politicians alike, rather than try and impose absolute order upon a situation, would do well to examine the situation fully in the context of the times and to make relatively small corrections. Rather than be overwhelmed by information and

events, intuitive commanders are freed from having to know, see, or understand everything that is happening before they can make decisions. Leaders who embrace nonlinear thinking do not have to have complete control. Instead, they "sense" bumps, gaps, and opportunities, and then react accordingly. In this dynamic environment of small wars, where the smallest changes may have great consequences, only flexible, creative, and adaptable leaders will find themselves thriving at the edge of chaos.

Non-State Actors¹⁶

For most of the twentieth century, war was waged exclusively by states, insurgents that were trying to take over existing states, or movements that were trying to create new states. One of the definite characteristics of the breakdown of order in today's world, however, is that war is increasingly waged by *non-state actors* organizations whose ties to states are loose, transitory, and, in some extreme cases, non-existent.

The category of non-state actors includes, but is not limited to, street gangs, religious and ethnic movements, enterprises involved in illegal narcotics, militias formed to defend certain areas or rights, mercenary bands in search of an employer or a cause, and existing clans and tribes that, for one reason or another, have taken up arms. Examples drawn from the pages of newspapers include Hamas, the Medellin Cartel, and the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat organizations. In addition to "pure" non-state actors, there are organizations that have some, but not all, of the characteristics of non-state actors. These include groups that are sponsored by states and groups that intend to eventually create or take over states but, for the time being, use the tactics of non-state actors. These include revolutionary and separatist movements as well as governments in exile.

In the past twenty years, the US has been involved in wars against both states and non-state actors. While the US has been invariably successful when fighting against states (such as Iraq, Libya, and Panama), all of our defeats (Beirut in 1983 and Mogadishu in 1994) have been at the hands of non-state actors. Moreover, the only attacks on the Continental United States to

succeed in this century -- the 1992 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City -- were the work of non-state actors.

The aims of non-state actors vary greatly. Narcotics cartels aim at control over resources and the financial rewards that result. Ethnic organizations aim at driving competing ethnic groups out of a certain territory, and, as we have recently seen in Rwanda, may even attempt genocide. Religious organizations often try to create the conditions for the direct transformation of society.

Whatever their aims, non-state actors present a growing challenge to the US and other states. Non-state actors are strengthened by the fact that governments often fail to take them seriously. Free from the responsibilities inherent in government, non-state actors are free to move and act out their agendas in spite of the states they occupy. Non-state actors use many of the same methods as insurgents such as maneuver, deception, ambushes, and attrition. More horrifying is their adoption of terrorist activities to include, assassination, massacre, torture, and mutilation of the dead. Additionally, some possess precision-guided weapons, the means of mass destruction, and the will to perform acts of sabotage.

Although non-state actors present a complex, ambiguous, and frustrating challenge to government forces trained to fight in wars between states, they ought not be dismissed or ignored by state governments. Rather, as politicians and armed forces refocus and learn to wage small wars, the disorder and chaos caused by these emerging threats may well be more manageable than we think today.

Characteristics of Small Wars

Small wars encompass a wide range of activities where the military is used for purposes other than the large-scale conventional combat operations usually associated with war. Small wars are designed to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities in response to domestic crises.¹⁷ In addition, the conduct of small wars help promote regional

stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain United States (US) influence, interests, and access abroad, and provide humane assistance. Small Wars attempt to minimize the need for major combat operations by **defusing crises** and **nurturing peaceful resolution** of contentious issues. It is difficult if not impossible to describe a "standard" small war; however, there are characteristics which appear common over a large number of the conflicts typically described as small wars. These characteristics, generally speaking, are:

- Are multidimensional conflicts involving political, social, economic, cultural, and military dynamics often within a Third World, non-Western war environment.
- Often take place between non-state actors like tribal groups, clans, political factions, religious sects, or transnational criminal organizations.
- Are strongly driven by political objectives and sensitivities at every level.
- Are not readily resolved by "military" solutions; political concerns dominate.
- Often involve the United Nations (UN) either as a sanctioning or organizing body.
- Are typically joint, multinational, or coalition ventures.
- Can be dramatically influenced by Media coverage; especially their legitimacy.
- Often have other organizations besides the DOD as the Lead Agency.
- Require a high degree of Interagency Coordination.
- Are often dominated by Logistics requirements.
- Have more restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) than conventional wars.
- Rely heavily on Civilian Agencies and Local Populace for Intelligence and Information.
- May involve both combat and non-combat operations separately or simultaneously.
- May be conducted inside or outside the continental United States.
- Entail close communication with host nation (HN) infrastructure and civil authorities.
- Often require Negotiation skills with clan, village, and neighborhood leadership.
- May be conducted simultaneously with conventional war or other small wars.
- Often require rapid transition from one type of operation to another and from unilateral to UN-led or vice versa.
- May be of short or long duration depending on political shifts and fluctuating commitments.
- Are susceptible to "mission creep;" i.e., end states often change once operation has started.
- Have very different Concepts of the Threat, Center of Gravity, and Critical Vulnerabilities compared to War. Threat may be anarchy, disaster, chaos, or starvation. COG may be time or the popular support of the people. CVs may be logistics pipelines, external support, unity of organization, or popular support of the people (legitimacy).
- Necessitate disciplined forces, measured responses, extraordinary patience, and the acceptance that "Victory" often comes more subtly than in war.¹⁸

Categories of Small Wars

There are basically two distinct and one gray area categories into which the representative types of small wars can be grouped:

- **Combat Operations** -- Peace Operations (Peace Enforcement), and Retaliatory Actions (Strikes and Raids)
- **Gray Area Operations** -- Combatting Terrorism, Peace Operations (Peacekeeping), Exclusion Zone Operations (enforcing exclusion zones and enforcement of sanctions / maritime intercept operations), Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Protection of Shipping, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), and Recovery Operations
- **Non-Combat Operations** -- Show of Force Operations, Peace Operations (Support to Diplomacy), Support and Assistance Operation" to include Arms Control, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Humanitarian Assistance, Support to Insurgency, Nation Assistance / Support to Counterinsurgency, and DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations¹⁹

These categories, if portrayed graphically, would be listed on a continuum between combat and noncombat operations, with an overlapping gray area connecting the two that illustrates the fluid transition from one operational category to another as the situation develops. Operations, both war and small war are considered to be able to coexist and to occur simultaneously at times.²⁰ Commanders and staffs must always plan for self defense and combat operations regardless of the threat and prepare for rapid transitions. The categories and types of small wars will be discussed in detail in Chapter (3).

(Psychology.²¹ Chapter 1, pages 17-32, of the *Small Wars Manual* has an excellent discussion of the psychology of small wars. Recommend that this area be covered similarly in this manual. For example, consider the modern relevance of the following excerpts:

"The application of the principles of psychology in small wars is quite different from their normal application in major warfare or even in troop leadership. The aim is not to develop a belligerent spirit in our men but rather one of caution and steadiness. Instead of employing force, one strives to accomplish the purpose by diplomacy. A Force Commander who gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who resorted to the use of arms. While endeavoring to avoid the infliction of physical harm to any native, there is always the necessity of preventing, as far as possible, any casualties among our own troops."

"This mixture of combined peaceful and warlike temperament, when adapted to any single operation, demands an application of psychology beyond the requirement of regular warfare. Our troops at the same time are dealing with a strange people whose racial origin, and whose social, political, physical, and mental characteristics may be different from any before encountered."

"The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development."

"A failure to use tact when required or lack of firmness at a crucial moment might readily precipitate a situation that could have been avoided had the commander been familiar with the customs, religion, morals, and education of those with whom he was dealing."

"In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life. This requires recourse to the principles of psychology."

"In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population. There is nothing in this principle which should make any officer or man hesitate to act with the necessary firmness whenever there is contact with armed opposition."

The section discusses fundamentals, revolutionary tendencies, basic instincts, attitude and bearing, and the conduct of troops in small wars. All are important planning considerations for Marines anticipating operations in the small wars environment.)

Chapter 2

The Principles of Small Wars

Objective--Unity of Effort--Security--Restraint--Perseverance--Legitimacy -- Impartiality

*"...If historical experience teaches us anything about revolutionary guerrilla war, it is that military measures alone will not suffice."*²²

Captain Samuel B. Griffith, USMC

Quantico, VA
1940

Principles of Small Wars. Warfighting doctrine is based on nine well-established principles of war: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. In small wars, these principles still apply for operations that involve direct combat. For the noncombat operations that comprise many small wars, seven additional principles guide the actions of the commander²³:

- Objective
- Security
- Perseverance
- Impartiality
- Unity of Effort
- Restraint
- Legitimacy

Commanders must balance these principles against the specific requirements of their mission and the nature of the operation. Continuous application will keep commanders focused and planners on course. A brief description of each follows.

Objective: *Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.*

Commanders must understand the strategic aims, set clearly defined and attainable objectives, and ensure both contribute to *unity of effort* with other agencies. Leaders must have a precise understanding of the mandate, the terms of reference, the end state (the conditions that could terminate the operation), and those conditions which could yield failure. Military objectives *must* consider political objectives; therefore, commanders should conduct continuing mission analysis and be constantly vigilant for shifts in the political climate. Otherwise, *legitimacy* may be undermined, and force *security* may be compromised.

Unity of Effort: *Seek unity of effort in every operation.*

During small wars, commanders may have to answer to an ambassador, a civilian organization, or a multinational force under United Nations charter. Command arrangements may often be loosely defined and many times will not involve command authority as understood within the military. Thus, rather than attempting to direct and control, military commanders should cultivate partnerships based on a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect. Outside agencies should be viewed as force multipliers rather than stumbling blocks to mission accomplishment. Such actions will promote greater unity of effort and significantly assist the interagency coordination process.

Security: *Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.*

The presence of US forces in nations around the world may provoke a wide range of responses, from acts of terrorism to riots. Commanders must be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to their units or jeopardize their missions. The right of self-defense always applies. Units must be ready to use non-lethal force when appropriate, rapidly transition to combat, maintain operations security (OPSEC), and protect civilians.

Restraint: *Apply appropriate military capability prudently.*

In small wars, Rules of Engagement (ROE) will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence are needed as the use of excessive force could adversely affect *legitimacy* and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment.

Perseverance: *Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.*

Small wars may be of short or long duration. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. Commanders must balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the political restraints placed on operations. Plans and attitudes must be flexible and adaptable, though mission creep must be controlled with appropriate revised mandates, force structure, and political support.

Legitimacy: *Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.*

In small wars, legitimacy is based on the perception of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action; if not, the actions will not be supported and may be actively resisted. Factors which affect legitimacy include media coverage, degree of humanitarian aid, risk to American lives, and the perceptions of the local populace towards its government. In small wars, legitimacy is frequently *the* decisive element.

Impartiality: *Project an unbiased, nonpartisan, evenhanded attitude towards the people and elements for whom US forces are committed to assist.*

In small wars, volatile emotions and agendas simmer beneath the surface of tenuous peace agreements. Local perception of favoritism to one group over another may fuel tension, spark protest, and undermine the mission at hand. US forces cannot afford to erode popular support, to lose valuable HUMINT resources, or to aggravate complex situations with biased behavior. While combat operations imply the presence of an enemy, often this threat is ambiguous and difficult to find. US forces must guard their actions to avoid giving a false message of support for one group over another. When forceful measures are necessary, they should be exercised with strict fairness, in proportion to the violation, and without excessive emotion. Care should also be taken to ensure the populace understands actions taken.

Chapter 3

The Categories and Types of Small Wars

"This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins. War by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration instead of aggression; seeking victory by exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.. It requires in those situations where we must counter it... a whole new kind of strategy; a wholly different kind of force and therefore a new and different kind of military training.

--President John F. Kennedy
6 June 1962

Categories and Types of Small Wars

There are basically two distinct and one gray area categories into which the 16 representative types of Small Wars can be grouped:

- **Combat Operations** -- Peace Operations (Peace Enforcement), and Retaliatory Actions (Strikes and Raids)
- **Gray Area Operations** -- Combating Terrorism, Peace Operations (Peacekeeping), Exclusion Zone Operations (enforcing exclusion zones and enforcement of sanctions / maritime intercept operations), Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Protection of Shipping, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), and Recovery Operations
- **Non-Combat Operations** -- Show of Force Operations, Peace Operations (Support to Diplomacy), Support and Assistance Operations to include Arms Control, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Humanitarian Assistance, Support to Insurgency, Nation Assistance / Support to Counterinsurgency, and DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations

Despite the above categories, small wars should never be rigidly classified, as each is unique, subject to hostilities, and unpredictable in many respects. Marines most likely will conduct these operations as part of a forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable, MEU(SOC), which can expand into a larger Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as necessary. Inevitably, these operations will be politically focused and require joint and coalition collaboration.

Combat Operations

When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to **deter war** and to **return to a state of peace**. Such operations expect that US forces will become involved in combat operations, though such activity is kept at as low a level as possible. Operations in this category include:

- Peace Operations (Peace Enforcement)
- Retaliatory Actions (Strikes and Raids)

a. Peace Operations. (Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia) The objective of peace operations is to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties, primarily through diplomatic actions. Military operations may be necessary if diplomatic actions are insufficient or inappropriate. Involvement in peace operations is one of the most significant small wars and involves perhaps the greatest commitment in resources, personnel, and time by participating nations. The significant political nature of these operations often places extreme constraints on military units and can jeopardize mission success and safety of the forces. While peacekeepers must rigorously maintain their neutrality, military commanders must ensure that their forces are sufficiently robust in military capabilities and command and control to accommodate mission creep (change in end state) or escalation. Peace operations encompass three types of activities:

- **Support to Diplomacy** (includes the noncombat operations of Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace Building (see Non-Combat Operations))
- **Peacekeeping** (see Gray Area Operations)
- **Peace Enforcement.**

(1) The United Nations Charter and Peace Operations. Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and **Chapter VII** (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches

of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter are the basis for UN Security Council mandates or resolutions authorizing peace operations. Chapter VI operations are largely diplomatic and encompass the more traditional peacekeeping missions. Chapter VII operations, on the other hand, encompass the more military activities of peace enforcement. When peaceful means fail, Chapter VII is invoked by the Security Council and allows more forceful and unconstrained measures to maintain or restore peace and security.

(2) Other Sponsors. The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of classical peacekeeping activities; however, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League have also acted in similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions. US missions with these sponsors are received via mandates issued through international or regional treaties, accords, resolutions, or agreements.

(3) Critical Variables. Peace operations are conducted in a dynamic environment, shaped by a number of factors that strongly influence the manner in which operations can be conducted. The critical variables of peace operations are the **level of consent**, the **level of force**, and the **degree of impartiality**. The degree to which these three variables are present will play a major role in determining the nature of the operation and force tailoring mix. Commanders who are aware of these variables and the direction in which they tend to move may be more successful in influencing them and thereby controlling the operational setting.

(4) Peace Enforcement Operations (PEOs). PEOs are Chapter VII UN military intervention operations to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions that may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities. Peace Enforcement implies the use of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and desist from violent actions or to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. Units conducting PEOs, therefore, cannot maintain their objective neutrality in every instance. They must be prepared to apply elements of combat power. PEO missions include:

- Restoration and maintenance of order and stability
- Protection of humanitarian assistance
- Guarantee and denial of movement
- Enforcement of sanctions
- Establishment and supervision of protected zones
- Forcible separation of belligerent parties

b. Retaliatory Actions. Normally called **Strikes and Raids**, these actions are punitive measures to destroy an objective for political or military purposes. The reason for the new title is that current definitions are indistinguishable and are sometimes used interchangeably. Doctrine developers carefully vet definitions in classifying an operation as a strike or a raid but still confuse the two. For example, Operation El Dorado Canyon (against Libya in April 1986) is termed a strike or a raid in Joint Pub 3-0. For clarity these terms should be combined.²⁵

Strikes are attacks by ground, air, and naval forces to damage or destroy high-value targets or to demonstrate the capability to do so. **Raids** are usually small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, seize an objective, or destroy targets. Examples of these operations include support to rescue or recovery operations or to counterdrug operations by destroying narcotics production or transshipment facilities. Strikes and raids are normally planned and executed at the unified CINC level and end with a planned withdrawal.

Gray Area Operations

Operations in the Gray Area are those that, depending on the situation, may or may not involve combat. Therefore, personnel must be ready to conduct combat operations quickly. If combat is unavoidable, US forces will have both the right equipment and the appropriate mindset. Operations in this category include:

- Combating Terrorism
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overnight (and Protection of Shipping)
- Exclusion Zone Operations (Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Sanctions)
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
- Peace Operations (Peacekeeping)
- Recovery Operations

a. Combating Terrorism. Terrorism is designed to influence public support for a stated policy or program by successful attacks against citizens and property. Terrorist attacks may reduce the credibility of a government or diminish the ability to influence international events. (Example: Middle East, US bombings, IRA)

(1) The **lead agency** for combating terrorism overseas is the Department of State (DOS); within the US, the Department of Justice (DOJ) (specifically, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) or, in the case of incidents aboard aircraft "in flight" within the special jurisdiction of the US, the Department of Transportation (DOT) (specifically, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)).

(2) **DOD** is responsible for providing technical assistance and/or forces when directed or requested by one of these lead agencies. Since terrorism can be international in scope and, in some instances, aided and abetted by state sponsors, the threat posed to US citizens and security interests abroad may require a US military response. The two levels of response are categorized as counterterrorism and antiterrorism.

(3) **Counterterrorism** is the offensive portion of combating terrorism and involves the employment of forces to directly address terrorist situations including preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The extent of MAGTF participation depends upon location, type of incident, the degree of force required, and the impact of legal and political constraints.

(4) **Antiterrorism** is the deterrence of terrorism through active and passive measures. These measures include the collection and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of information awareness programs, personal training, and coordinated security plans. Protective plans and procedures are based on the threat and should strike a reasonable balance between protection, mission requirements, the criticality of assets and facilities, and available manpower and resources. The MAGTF may provide antiterrorism assistance to foreign countries as part of the overall US military foreign internal defense (FID) and development programs. This support may include training in bomb detection and disposal, physical security,

and the detection, deterrence, and prevention of acts of terrorism.

b. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight and Protection of Shipping.

These operations are also similar and should eventually be combined. For this draft, they will be discussed separately.

(1) Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. (Done by Navy and USAF mostly, though Marines on ARG provide a presence at sea that is deterrent in nature). These operations are conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes. Freedom of Navigation and Overflight is a sovereign right according to international law.

(a) Sea. In times of peace, international law accords the right of "innocent" passage to ships of other nations through a state's territorial waters. Passage is "innocent" as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The territorial sea concept, embodied in customary international law, indicates that except for limited territorial sea claims, the seas are free for the reasonable use of all states.

(b) Air. Freedom of Overflight by aircraft through international airspace is assured through international law. Aircraft threatened by nations or groups through the extension of air space control zones outside the established international norms will result in legal overtures to rectify the situation.

(2) Protection of Shipping. In this mission, US military forces protect US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked on US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. This protection may be extended to foreign flag vessels under international law. In addition to operations on the high seas, protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, and countermine operations. Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of area and escort operations. If threats to shipping cannot be neutralized by area operations, then escorts, usually in the form of

convoys, are used to deter the threat. Countermining operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations.

c. Exclusion Zone Operations. These operations consist of what is known as *enforcing exclusion zones* (prohibiting specified *activities* in given geographic areas) and *enforcement of sanctions* (stopping movement of designated *items* into or out of given areas). The operations are similar, and often confused. For clarity they should be combined. However, for the purposes of this draft, they will be discussed separately under the overall heading of exclusion zone operations.

(1) Enforcing Exclusion Zones. (Iraq) A sanctioning body can establish an exclusion zone in the air (no-fly zone), on the sea (maritime), or on land to prohibit specified activities in a specified geographic area. Noncompliance results in continued imposition of sanctions or the use or threat of force. Exclusion zones often follow collective outrage of the sanctioning body over flagrant breaches of international law or abuse of human rights. The sanctions may create economic, political, military, or other conditions where the intent is to change the behavior of the offending nation. Examples include Operation Southern Watch in Iraq initiated in 1992, and Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia, initiated in 1993.²⁶

(2) Enforcement of Sanctions / Maritime Intercept Operations. (Libya, Iraq, Cuba, Haiti) These operations employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.²⁷ They consist of port denial and vessel board search and seizure (VBSS) intercept operations. Port denial is the act of prohibiting access to specific ports to prevent the import/export of contraband, This type of activity usually involves some combination of air and surface forces. Vessel interceptions are based on international law associated with maritime visit and search. Boarding parties exercising the right of visit and search may be placed on merchant ships to examine ship's documents, bills of lading, and cargo, and to search for evidence contraband. The MEF may be tasked to provide forces to conduct boarding operations or support to naval special warfare units conducting the intercept.

d. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (Liberia, Grenada, Lebanon, Saigon, etc). One of the most frequently conducted small wars operations, NEOs are conducted to support the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from a hostile environment or as a result of a natural disaster. NEOs may include the evacuation of selected citizens of the host nation (HN) & third country nationals (TCNs). Non-permissive NEOs usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission. Ideally, there is no opposition to an evacuation and the host country will support it.

(1) The command and control structure and the degree of political influence involved make NEOs different from other military operations. During NEOs the US Ambassador or the Chief of Mission, vice the military commander, is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the INFO and the safety of the evacuees. Often the timing of the mission will be determined more from a political angle than that best suited for a military operation.

(2) Because Rules of Engagement (ROE) are often driven by political vice tactical requirements, military commanders should review them as soon as possible upon arrival in country to ensure US forces have maximum flexibility in the use of force. Commanders must also correctly appraise and understand the political and military environment in which they will operate and subsequently prepare the evacuation force for a situation that may rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile. Alternate plans for these various environments, as well as for contingencies where NEOs rapidly turn into peacemaking or peacekeeping operations, should also be developed.

e. Peace Operations (Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)). PKOs are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (truce or cease-fire) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. They are usually conducted under the provision of Chapter VI but may escalate quickly to Chapter VII operations. PK activities include observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires and supervision of truces.

Tasks peacekeepers may perform under the above two mandates include:

- Reporting and Monitoring of withdrawal or demilitarized zones
- Supervision of cease-fire lines, borders, buffers, the execution of treaties, the exchange of prisoners, refugee camps, and elections
- Investigation of Complaints and Violations
- Negotiation and Mediation
- Supervision of Peace or Cease-Fire Agreements
- Maintenance of Law and Order
- Provide Humanitarian Assistance
- Supervise Demobilization and Demilitarization Measures
- Provide a measure of Law, Order, and Stability until competent civil authorities can resume such tasks²⁸

Differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. PKOs and PEOs take place under vastly different circumstances involving the variables of consent, force, and impartiality. A force tailored for PKO may lack sufficient combat power for PEO. On the other hand, a force tailored for PEO can accomplish PKO missions, provided belligerent parties accept their presence. Generally, a contingent that has been conducting operations under a PEO mandate should not be used in a PKO role in that same mission area because the impartiality and consent divides have been crossed during the enforcement operation.²⁹

f. Recovery Operations (O’Grady Rescue). Clandestine, covert or overt, these operations are sophisticated actions requiring precise execution. They may include rescue of US or friendly foreign nationals, and the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive equipment or items critical to US national security. Hostile forces can oppose recovery operations; therefore stealth, surprise, speed, and the threat of overwhelming force are used to minimize the threat. Because these operations require timely intelligence, detailed planning, deception, swift execution, and extraordinary security measures, they usually involve highly trained special operations units. Marines forward-deployed with the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable MEU(SOC) are particularly suited to respond to this type of small war.

Non-Combat Operations

Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations

below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to defend themselves and to respond to a changing situation. They can occur both outside and inside the continental United States. Such operations include, but are not limited to:

- Peace Operations (Support to Diplomacy)
- Show of Force Operations
- Support and Assistance Operations:
 - Arms Control
 - DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations
 - Humanitarian Assistance
 - Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)
 - Nation Assistance / Support to Counterinsurgency
 - Support to Insurgency

a. Peace Operations to Support Diplomacy. This type of peace operation has become increasingly important in furthering US interests abroad. It takes advantage of the forward presence of military forces stationed or deployed overseas. The components include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. They may take place in peace or conflict but are *conducted to prevent conflict*. Military actions are subordinate to the diplomatic process and consist of many typical, day-to-day operations normally performed by the military as part of its peacetime mission.

(1) Preventive Diplomacy. These are primarily diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. In more tense situations, military activities may support preventive diplomacy through preventive deployments, other shows of force, or higher levels of readiness. The objective is to demonstrate resolve and commitment to a peaceful resolution while underlining the readiness and ability of the US to use force if required.

(2) Peacemaking. (MEUSOC presence, exercises) This is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that end disputes and resolve issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military relations and security assistance Operations. Other military activities, such as exercises and peacetime deployments, may enhance the diplomatic process by demonstrating the engagement of the US abroad. These activities contribute to an atmosphere of cooperation and

assistance with allies and friends, thus demonstrating the resolve of the US with regard to its commitments.

(3) Peace Building. (Kuwait, N. Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, Cambodia) These operations consist of post-conflict actions, primarily diplomatic and economic, that strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions in order to avoid a return to conflict. Military as well as civilian involvement is normally required. Peace building activities include restoring civil authority, rebuilding physical infrastructures and roads, reestablishing commerce, schools, and medical facilities, reestablishing or creating governmental entities, assistance in the conduct of elections and plebiscites, demobilization of former belligerent parties, and the training of constabularies or defense forces.³⁰

b. Show of Force Operations (Bosnia, Iraq, Libya, Korea). In this mission, US forces deploy to defuse a situation, demonstrate US resolve, lend credibility to US commitments, and increase regional influence. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect US interests and international law.

(1) They can take the form of combined training exercises, aircraft and ship visits, rehearsals, forward deployment of MEU(SOC)s, or the introduction and buildup of military forces in a region. Although actual combat is not the goal, the appearance of a credible military force can underscore national policy interests and commitment, improve host nation military readiness and morale, and provide an insight into US values.

(2) An effective show of force must be demonstrably mission-capable and sustainable. Additionally, the political will to actually employ a force--should the show of force fail--should be present as it is vital to the success of these operations. The force should coordinate its operations with the country team and certify that it understands the national purpose, ROE, and inherent risks of the operation.

c. Support and Assistance Operations. The intent of this sub-category of operations, as the term suggests, is the provision of military support and assistance for domestic and

international purposes. Support to insurgency is included since military advice, training, and logistics are provided though forces do not normally actively engage in insurgencies. In non-combat operations, the military is used in so-called non-typical or nontraditional military roles.³¹

(1) **Arms Control.** Although Arms Control may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play a vital role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; may seize weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--NBC or conventional--may escort authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or may dismantle or destroy weapons with or without the consent of the host nation.

(2) **DOD Support to Counterdrug Operation (JTF 6, C2, MACCS, Air).** Military efforts in this area principally support law enforcement agencies, the counterdrug efforts of other US agencies, the states, and cooperating foreign governments to interdict the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution.

(a) **Foreign.** Support to host nations includes assistance to their forces to destroy drug production facilities; collaboration with host nation armed forces to prevent export of illegal drugs; and nation assistance to help develop economic alternatives to production, exportation, and distribution of drugs. Support to interdiction efforts centers on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit as well as integrating C31 systems. US forces may well assist host nation forces at war while they are in an operation other than war posture.

(b) **Domestic.** Support for domestic counterdrug operations includes military planning and training assistance for domestic law enforcement agencies, equipment loans and transfers, use of military facilities, and other assistance as requested and authorized.

(3) **Humanitarian Assistance (HA).** These operations include programs to relieve or reduce the results of complex emergencies involving natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation. HA provided by US forces

is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation, civil authorities, or agencies that may have primary responsibility. for providing HA. Normally limited in their scope and duration, HA programs will be conducted simultaneously in almost every peace operation. US military forces can move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims, provide emergency communications, medical support, and maintenance, maintain law and order, and provide civil engineering support. Forward-deployed MEU(SOC)s can quickly respond to HA requests because of their inherent flexibility and logistics capabilities.

(4) Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) (LA Riots, Hurricane Andrew, Refugees in Florida, Oklahoma bombing). While the Department of the Army and the National Guard (NG) are the primary agencies that respond to domestic civil needs, appropriate governmental authority can direct the Marine Corps to assist domestic emergencies and to provide support to civil authorities within the continental United States (CONUS). Domestic Support Operations divide into four primary categories:

(a) Disaster Assistance. This includes those humanitarian and civil defense activities, functions, and missions in which DOD has legal authority to act. DOD may provide disaster assistance to states, the District of Columbia, territories, possessions, and foreign governments. Civil authorities must request assistance, usually as a result of disasters such as hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, or massive explosions.

(b) Community Assistance. The most frequently conducted domestic support operations involve community assistance. DOD resources may be used to support civilian organizations and to promote the community's general welfare. Operations include public works, education, training, participation in minor construction projects, and providing color guards for local events. Per existing regulations and directives, DOD and local communities may establish mutual support agreements concerning medical, police, and emergency services.

(c) Environmental Assistance. As a result of ever-increasing public concern and demands for the restoration, conservation, and protection of the environment, DOD has

become increasingly involved in providing resources to meet environmental challenges. Typical missions are responding to hazardous material releases, restoring contaminated land and water, and conserving the nation's natural and cultural resources. DOD support in these areas may be initiated under disaster assistance or executed under separate authority.

(d) Law Enforcement. Acting under Constitutional provisions, DOD has on many occasions been used to quell civil disturbances and restore order. Operations include assistance in counterdrug operations, civil disturbances, special security operations, combating terrorism, and explosive ordnance disposal. Some, by their nature, may become international in scope due to a linkage between domestic and international operations. Constitutional and statutory restrictions limit the type of support provided in this area.

(5) Nation Assistance / Support to Counterinsurgency (Honduras, MTTs in Latin America to teach riverine ops, etc.). These operations support a host nation's efforts to promote development, ideally through the use of host nation resources. In UN terms, nation assistance equates to *peace building* operations.

(a) Nation assistance goals are to promote long-term stability, develop sound and responsive democratic institutions, develop supportive infrastructures, promote strong free-market economies, and provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress. These goals can only be accomplished through education and the transfer of essential skills to the host nation.

(b) Support to counterinsurgency operations usually occurs in the context of **foreign internal defense (FID)**. FID involves action programs taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The US ambassador, through the Country Team, provides the focal point for interagency coordination and supervision. MAGTF participation in FID may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of security assistance, and combat operations.

(c) **Security Assistance**, an activity of Nation Assistance, is a group of programs by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. Public law prohibits personnel providing security assistance services from performing combatant duties. Some examples of US security assistance programs are:

- Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
- Foreign Military Financing Program (FMIFP)
- International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)
- Military Assistance Program (MAP)
- Economic Support Fund (ESP), and
- Commercial sales licensed under the Arms Export Control Act.

(6) **Support to Insurgency**³². Since the inception of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, the US has accepted the paradox of having an organization capable of undertaking operational activities that the US government would prefer not to acknowledge, while legally recognizing that the organization exists. These operations have, in some cases, supported movements against governments hostile to the US or to American interests. Examples include:

- Operation AJAX (August 1953) focused on the overthrow of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh who had, in a coup, seized control of the Iranian military.
- Operation SUCCESS (June 1954) led to the resignation of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman after he disclosed his intentions to create a communist state.
- Operation PLUTO, more commonly known as the "Bay of Pigs," was designed to overthrow the then infant Castro regime in 1961.
- Support for the Kurds in Iraq from 1972-1975.
- Support for the Contra rebels in their fight against the communist Nicaraguan government of the Sandinista party.
- Support of the Muhajideen rebels in their fight against Soviet occupation.

Covert action can range from low-level placement of propaganda to full scale support against a government deemed to be hostile to US interests. Covert action provides a "shortcut" with which an administration can get things done. Still, it must be emphasized that the primary instruments of American policy are the State Department, its Foreign Service, and other overt agencies of the federal government. Whenever the US Government's participation in an international affair can be revealed and acknowledged, open or diplomatic channels are appropriate and preferred.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are the least intrusive form of action in support to insurgency. Examples of PSYOPs campaigns include the multi-year program of subsidies for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, whose broadcasts were aimed at Communist Europe and Cuba.

Training in support of covert actions can be as little as teaching military skills (intelligence collection techniques, for instance), to training a paramilitary force as was the case with the Cuban exiles of Brigade 2506 (Bay of Pigs) and the Contra rebels who attempted to overthrow the communist Sandanistas in Nicaragua.

Those tasks that may potentially be assigned to US forces in support of an insurgency include, but are not limited to, the following: liaison, intelligence, security, communications, logistics, plans and organization, finance and administration, PSYOPs, training, escape and evasion, infiltration / exfiltration, subversion / sabotage, and combat operations.

The US may support insurgencies that share US values and counterinsurgencies of friendly governments *against* insurgents that proclaim support of an ideology incompatible with US national interests. Since most insurgencies are covert, MAGTF support may be limited to supporting the efforts of special operations forces. This will principally involve training and advising insurgent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Chapter 4

The Ten Operational Functions for Small Wars

Intelligence and Information Gathering; Maneuver; Fires and Protection; Mobility /
Countermobility / Survivability; Logistics; Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
Support; Aviation; Interagency Coordination; Media Operations; Legal Considerations

"He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious... There are circumstances in war when many cannot attack few, and others when the weak can master the strong. One able to manipulate such circumstances will be victorious."³³

-- Sun Tzu

"You no longer can be only the pure, narrow, military thinker and just worry about fires and maneuver. Fires and maneuver are just two relatively simple battlefield activities that underlie a vast, ever-increasing number of other battlefield activities."³⁴

-- Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC

The Ten Small Wars Operational Functions. A variety of operational functions (also called battlespace or battlefield functions) help Marines plan missions. Commanders integrate and coordinate these functions to synchronize activities in time, space, and purpose. In war, the effect sought is combat power applied decisively at the right time and place. In small wars, the effect may require more subtlety, less emphasis on battle and combat power, and greater attention to a multitude on nontraditional activities. According to FMLFM 2-1 (draft) and the Marine Corps Staff Training Program (MSTP), Marines use eight operational functions to plan for combat: intelligence, maneuver, fires, protection, mobility / countermobility / survivability, combat service support, command and control, and aviation.³⁵ However, the unique characteristics of small wars call for a revised and enhanced set of operational functions specially tailored to address unconventional requirements. These ten Small Wars Operational Functions are:

- Intelligence and Information Gathering
- Maneuver
- Fires and Protection

- Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability
- Logistics
- Command, Control, and Communications (C³) Support
- Aviation
- Interagency Coordination
- Media Operations
- Legal Considerations

Intelligence and Information Gathering

Situational awareness (SA) and intelligence needs are as important in small wars as they are in more traditional combat environments. However, some differences stand out and should be carefully considered by commanders in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). First, small wars often require non-traditional, low-level, "police-type" intelligence to support the command.³⁶ Human intelligence (HUMINT) is usually the most important and productive source of intelligence. The best HUMINT may come from civil affairs, public affairs, and psychological operations personnel, military patrols in local villages, military engineers, truck drivers, NGO/PVO civilians working with the-local populace, UN military observers, special operations forces, and the local populace including clan and village leaders.

Second, the term "intelligence" should be replaced by "information gathering" when dealing with relief organizations and non-military personnel to allay fears of losing their neutrality or being used as spies. Third, since small wars are often a coalition effort, careful consideration must be given to establishing a multinational intelligence system that maximizes contributions while protecting operational security. And finally, in small wars, the importance of Area Assessments is vital since most deployments will occur in regions where little is known about the infrastructure, terrain, customs, and local population. Unlike for combat operations, area assessments for small wars require far more focus on questions concerning refugees, village hostilities, food and water availability, contractible services, medical conditions, local leadership, and civilian relief agency presence.³⁷

Maneuver

In combat operations, maneuver involves the advantageous movement of friendly forces versus the enemy, with the attack of the opposition's hub of power, or center of gravity through indirect or direct means as the primary goal. In small wars, maneuverists aim for the disengagement of belligerents, not their defeat.³⁸ Though often constrained by rules of engagement (ROE), agreements, and demilitarized or buffer zones, maneuver elements can play significant roles in the conduct of small wars.

Infantry, armor, mechanized, and aviation forces will often become enablers, or supporting elements, to a focus of effort in civil affairs, psychological operations, transportation, refugee camp operations, or engineer support. Rather than movement against enemy flanks or rear, maneuver forces in small wars may concentrate more on security missions, patrols, information gathering, quick reaction forces, or peace enforcement. Maneuver, in the small war sense, rarely involves positional advantage for combat operations; rather, it encompasses the mutually supportive deterrent, security, and peace-encouraging actions taken by combat units under constraints of ROE, demilitarized zones, and political agreements.

Fires and Protection

In combat operations, firepower focuses on the integration and synchronization of fires and effects to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces, combat functions, and facilities.³⁹ It is an offensive-spirited function that emphasizes the maximum generation of firepower and the neutralization of targets at a decisive time and place. In small wars, firepower is more defensive in spirit, with the aim being more to show might than to necessarily use it. Often, limitations imposed by ROE and the need to limit collateral damage in urban areas also constrains the use of offensive firepower. Moreover, in small wars, there is a pervasive need to protect military and civilian forces against an often ambiguous or ill-defined "enemy." These realities create a situation where fires and protection functions can be combined to both show force (and have it if you need it!) and protect our forces with imaginative use of existing capabilities. Fires and protection properly blended can become, as President Reagan called it, the "humanitarian glove backed by a steel fist of military force."⁴⁰

Ideally, both lethal and nonlethal firepower (infantry, riot control agents, artillery, mortars, howitzers, attack aircraft) is employed in a manner that shows credible force capabilities without its actual use. For example, firing mortar illumination over the heads of belligerents combined with effective negotiations demonstrates to the militant that he is targeted and may cause him to withdraw.⁴¹ Additionally, through the use of precision munitions, the demonstration of effective targeting (firefinder radar, observation aircraft), and the display of lethal force capabilities (attack helicopters, AC-130, artillery, howitzer, and mortar visibility) and the *will to use them*, the military can maximize combat readiness and force protection.

Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability

Mobility operations involve the use of combat engineering to reduce obstacles that restrict maneuver of friendly forces. Counter-mobility involves the use of obstacles to restrict or deny the enemy mobility. Survivability operations use all resources and means to limit the effectiveness of enemy fires.⁴² During small wars, land mines are the major mobility threat to participating forces. Because they are inexpensive, easily procured, and deadly effective, landmine usage has proliferated throughout Third World nations. Other obstacles may involve poor road and rail infrastructure, festering, overpopulated, underdeveloped urban areas, and harsh, rugged desert, mountain, or jungle terrain outside the cities. Combat engineers will be needed to improve roads, ports, airfields, and bridges, to dig wells, harden facilities, and fortify checkpoints and unit positions. Explosive ordnance personnel and their associated equipment will be needed in significant quantities to clear the landmines.

Logistics

Logistics in small wars is just as important as in war, and in many ways, is more critical to success.⁴³ The absence of an "enemy" to fight, the frequent paucity of logistics infrastructure, the participation of coalition forces who do not have adequate logistics capabilities, and the humanitarian requirements that often characterize small wars all push logistics forward as a

decisive element in the conduct of successful small wars operations. Combat forces often support and enable logistics forces rather than the other way around. Strategic lift, engineering, financing and contracting, base support, camp medical, and specialized personnel capabilities all take on vital importance in small wars.

One of the most vital operational functions in small wars, logistics considerations include all the decisions, actions, functions, capabilities, and tasks necessary to sustain deployed operating forces. Critical issues concerning water, fuel and other supplies; theater maturity and infrastructure; time flow criteria; UN capabilities and requirements; advance team deployment; contracting; coalition support; sustainment engineering (construction of billeting, port, airfield, logistical, base camps, MSRs, bridges); environmental restrictions; and medical needs must be thoroughly addressed and planned for, Logisticians must be in on the planning early and make maximum use of all sources of sustainment to include host nation, sister Service, United Nations, and contracted logistics support.

Commanders and their logistics planners in small wars must also anticipate the potential for "logistics mission creep." Because US logistics resources often far exceed the capabilities of the host nation or civilian agencies responding to crises, the expectation, fueled by media and public outcry, that US forces should provide more support will often arise. Commanders must be aware that this service may not be reimbursable if assistance exceeds the official mandate. To maintain positive control over funding, contracting, multinational / civilian / and UN logistics contributions, and coordination of the overall logistics effort, commanders and their staffs may benefit from an "operational logistics" approach to planning which stresses unity of effort, disciplined control of resources, and maximum use of local capabilities.

Command, Control, and Communications (C³) Support

Commanders and their Marines will participate in small wars usually as part of a larger force; e.g. a Joint Task Force, Combined Force, or UN mission. Non-military US agencies, such as the State Department or an Ambassador appointed for a specific operation, may have the lead in setting the overall parameters of the operation. Establishing early, clear, and simple command

relationships with other US services and between coalition partners will facilitate the complex planning, coordination, and execution required to command and control small wars operations.

The exercise of authority and the support thereof in small wars requires the commander to refocus his thinking from "warfighting" to peace operations. Small wars have uncertainties than require a different view, and commanders with the vision and total understanding of the "big picture" will be more apt to be successful in the conduct of small wars than those who are narrowly focused on conventional warfighting.⁴⁴ Since combat is always a possibility, however, command and plans must reflect appropriate preparation and the mindset to deal with such escalation.

Short of direct combat though, the C³ goal is unity of effort amongst all the political, military, and civilian elements involved. In small wars, commanders may find themselves wearing many more hats than they would in more typical combat operations. Commanders might, for example, have to act as local mayor (resolving disputes in a relief camp or in a town without a functioning civilian political structure); negotiator (mediating problems between belligerents); educator (helping establish school systems); police chief (running the local police or using military forces to maintain public order); diplomat (dealing with VIPs, both US and foreign); city planner (deciding what infrastructure work the city needs to keep running); relief administrator (deciding on where to provide relief assistance); or even talk-show personality (to communicate the intentions and methods of the military force).⁴⁵

Success in small wars largely depends on the commander's ability to promote diverse coordination, harmonizing strategies, and consensus and compatibility at all levels. As much as possible, command structures should be simple, liaison officers used extensively, capabilities shared (airlift, intelligence, and logistics), and mutually agreed upon terminology used. Additionally, communications equipment interoperability and availability are paramount concerns that must be managed and resolved. This may be especially difficult in the widely dispersed, multinational, austere environment of many small wars. Off-the-shelf communications

suites, embassy communications equipment, frequency management databases, other Service capabilities, and contracted support may provide assistance in filling communications needs.

Aviation

Unlike the other Services, Marines separate aviation into its own operational function to protect Marine aviation assets and to facilitate the coordinated and efficient exploitation of aviation's diverse capabilities. This distinction may actually be more appropriate in the small wars arena because aviation units are often the forces of choice for initial commitment in developing scenarios. Viewed as a lower threshold response, aviation assets can give the political process time to work while fulfilling numerous missions from showing presence, conducting reconnaissance flights, providing logistics support, and delivering humanitarian aid, to escorting convoys, enforcing sanctions and exclusion zones, showing force, and executing retaliatory strikes. Aviation units can also provide assault support for infantry forces and artillery, close air support for ground units, illumination during night operations, and target acquisition. Mobility through strategic fixed wing lift and tactical helicopter support round out the many capabilities aviation brings to the small war. Aviation planners must anticipate the joint collaboration that will probably be required through a Joint Force Aviation Component Commander (JFACC) in theater. Additionally, being first in the area of operations may generate requirements for aviation personnel to begin intelligence and logistics preparations of the battlefield (IPB / LPB) for potential follow-on units.

Interagency Coordination

Small wars require a high degree of interagency coordination between political, military, and civilian organizations. Commanders would do well to seriously embrace this responsibility and plan for ways to keep all necessary parties informed. As a start, liaison officers with the requisite rank, knowledge, language skills, and judgment should be liberally employed at all levels to establish a basis for understanding and communication. In addition to their chains of command, commanders will also be expected to establish personal relationships with individuals

like the Presidential Envoy, the Ambassador, United Nations envoys, other component and coalition commanders, local village chiefs, clan or faction leaders, and heads of major businesses and relief agencies in country. The bewildering array of nongovernmental, private voluntary, and international humanitarian organizations (NGO/PVO/IO) present in the area of operations will require close coordination, sensitivity, and consideration to maximize the efforts of civilians and military alike.

Often a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) or similar organization, formed by the military commander in country, can serve as the primary interface between all humanitarian organizations, federal agencies, local populations, and the media. Town meetings held by political and military leaders with clan elders, religious figures, women, and local political leaders can also prove very helpful in this coordination process. Serious efforts to maximize interagency coordination during UNITAF operations in Somalia in large part made that phase of US involvement a resounding success. As such coordination channels were dismantled or bypassed in UNOSOM II, operations were set up for failure before they had barely begun.⁴⁶

Media Operations

There is an emerging realization by most military commanders that media operations in small wars can be a primary determinant of success or failure. Layers of command, huge bureaucratic organizations, and complex operations all pale in impact to the 30 second story on CNN that shows an individual Marine in crisis. Since Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the importance of the media has been driven home time and again. Media outrage forced UNITAF forces in Somalia to advance operations far more rapidly than planned to meet the humanitarian emergency. Media coverage of dead Marines in Beirut and dead soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu prompted US withdrawal from both operations. Media cooperation in Haiti was possible largely because commanders engaged them fully in every phase of the campaign.

Media Operations need careful planning and high priority consideration from the very beginning of any participation in small wars. Cooperation with the press is essential to projecting a strong, positive image. The best approach is to be proactive and to plan public communications actions as carefully as military operations are planned.⁴⁷ In that light, Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) should be integral, active parts of operations from preparation to execution to retrograde. They should have access to every section, be tapped often for training opportunities, and be available to advise commanders on probable media interests. *All* Marines from the commander to the last Marine on the flight line, in the fighting hole, on the tractor, or in the supply warehouse, must understand what is happening and be ready to articulate it appropriately to the press. Media training, rehearsal, and interviews all require foresight, preparation, and the right mindset to make media operations a force multiplier and to give units the attention they deserve. Media operations should also be closely coordinated with civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOPS).

Legal Considerations

Small wars can place great demands on commanders and their legal advisors. The joint, combined, multinational, and often United Nations flavor of these operations multiplies the legal complexities dramatically. Legal officers should be part of the planning process from the start. Their first duties may involve reviewing the mandate, terms of reference, status of forces agreements, memorandums of understanding, and any other international agreements that may be in force. They will also be invaluable in assisting commanders in the development of rules of engagement (ROE) and handling infractions by military personnel. Small wars offer some unusual challenges to the legal officer. For example, running civilian societies (such as the refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay, Northern Iraq, and Panama) required the assistance of legal officers to determine appropriate policies for camp structure and organizations. In many disaster relief situations, the donations that flood the affected region will create heavy demands on contracting expertise. Loans of equipment, running of camps, provision of sustainment, and processing of personnel requesting protection all require extensive legal attention.⁴⁸

Chapter 5

Multinational Operations in Small Wars

*"No other nation on earth has the power we possess. More important, no other nation on earth has the trusted power we possess. We are obligated to lead. If the free world is to harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that our great victory in the Cold War has offered us, America must shoulder the responsibility of its power. The last best hope of earth has no other choice. We must lead."*⁴⁹

-- General Cohn L. Powell, USA Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
1992

Multinational Operations. Most operations in which the Marine Corps has been involved in the past fifty years have had some flavor of multinational participation. In some, MAGTF headquarters have formed the nucleus of an ad hoc coalition command element. In others, Marine units have taken operational or tactical control over contingents from other nations, as happened in Korea, Vietnam, and Operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. Multinational operations bring with them many special considerations. Marine Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, in a speech made at the Naval Institute, had these comments about multinational operations:

"And you can't always go in with a force ideally tailored for this operation. What happens is that everybody comes running to the scene, and not necessarily with the ideal force composition. Coalitions are formed. In Operation Provide Comfort, we had the forces of 13 nations; in Restore Hope in Somalia, the forces of 24 nations made up our combined task force; in United Shield, I had the forces... of seven nations. Always the best? No. Always exactly configured right for the operation? No. Always there to operate with the same objectives as you? No. Always completely interoperable with your command and your way of doing business and your doctrine and your tactics and your techniques? No. Always technically and procedurally the same as you? No. They come from the Third World; they come from a world that grew up in a different doctrinal system; they come with different political motivations; they come with different rules of engagement--which makes it interesting when the shooting begins. And yet you've got to pull these kinds of forces together and get a mission accomplished and make sure everybody goes home feeling good about what they did."⁵⁰

While Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, is the definitive reference on this subject, the following points should get planners started:

a. Organization. Multinational operations are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition. Either may also take place within the United Nations framework. **Alliances** involve formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Western European Union (WEU), and the United Nations (UN) are examples of formal alliances. **Coalitions**, on the other hand, are usually ad hoc, temporary arrangements formed between two or more nations on short notice for common action.

b. Command Relationships. To be successful in multinational operations, it is imperative that sound and effective command, relationships are developed. As with the US, most other nations are not willing to relinquish command of their forces to other countries. The challenge will be to arrange the best possible working relationships with multinational forces. Emphasize consensus building and compromise. Focus on finding political, military, and cultural compatibility. In developing this relationship, it is important to remember that multinational operations do *offer political legitimacy*, especially in peace operations.

c. Unity of Effort. Multinational operations require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

d. Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting them will vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members. Alliance members will typically have common national and economic systems. Coalitions often bring together nations of diverse

cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participations as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point where national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.

e. Sovereignty Issues. Most of our coalition partners will come with some strings attached by their own nation. These issues should be recognized and dealt with early. Some will be required for their political use to the operation to show solidarity, as were the Syrians during Operation Desert Storm. Others will accept only limited missions. For example, Sweden traditionally provides hospital units to UN missions. Some will come combat ready with a full logistics kit. Others will show up virtually empty handed.

f. Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations.

(1) Be prepared to operate under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations--often as important as leading. However, US forces will often be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect, common objectives, and shared support.

(2) Remember: Different nations have different national goals. Some countries cannot participate in small wars with equal zeal because of political constraints that exist in their countries. The US commander should strive to understand each nation's goals and restraints and how these can affect the operation. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives.

(3) Consider national honor, pride, and prestige when assigning missions and look for opportunities to showcase member contributions.

(4) Involve all member nations in the decision-making process. Seek member opinions and recommendations continuously,, especially during the development of courses of action and ROE, assignment of missions, and establishment of priorities of effort.

(5) Issue separate "mission-oriented" orders. These type of orders yield the best results, give members a more positive sense of national pride, and best support each country's national objectives. Do not force certain missions. It is critical that we do not ask a coalition partner to perform a particular mission that he is forbidden, by his own nation's restraints, to undertake. Some countries may shy away from offensive operations, but will still want to participate in some way. Logistics, security, reserve, and duty in less hostile areas are alternative missions that can involve everyone. Coalition partners should also not be tasked with assignments that are beyond their ability in terms of equipment and training. Such acts may embarrass both the national contingent and the coalition commander as well as lead to ill feelings.⁵²

(6) Establish a working rapport with leaders of other national forces. Personal, direct relationships between commanders can often overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. Private discussions allow each commander to express his nation's view, fosters mutual respect and trust, and encourages compromise. Consider conducting a leaders' reconnaissance on all US and multinational commanders to evaluate their leadership, self-discipline, moral commitment, knowledge, and capabilities.

(6) Seek to optimize the contribution of member forces, at times compromising or modifying operational concepts in order to maintain a strong coalition. Improve contributions through training assistance, sharing of resources, and the conduct of joint and multinational exercises. Implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate matching missions with capabilities.

(7) Strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity. Minor differences can have great impact. Also, do not assume that English will

automatically be the predominant language spoken by coalition forces. Linguists and area experts should be sought and utilized extensively to facilitate understanding and communications.

(8) Evaluate sustainment capabilities. Member nations may join with varying degrees of support available to sustain themselves and may look to the US for equipment and supplies. Quickly evaluate what each nation brings to the theater in terms of staff, equipment, supplies, maps, intelligence capability, ammunition, and other logistical sustainment to avoid major difficulties and mission degradation. Be aware that the US can offer airlift; special operations; intelligence collection; command, control, and communications; security; and logistics to offset shortfalls and enhance overall operational capability.

(9) Be aware of political chains of command. Some member nations may receive guidance directly from their political chains of command that may differ from the alliance or coalition objectives. Be prepared to diplomatically address these variances. Also, set up a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership that may include bypassing intermediate points in the chain. Be aware that the actual process of communicating may be more difficult in the multinational environment because of incompatible communications equipment. To combat this problem and enhance unity of command and effort, utilize liaison officers (LNOs) who have communications equipment compatible with the JTF.

(10) Develop and Refine Rules of Engagement (ROE) so they can be employed by all member forces. Realize that complete consensus or standardization may be impossible. Make ROE simple and tailorable by member forces to their particular situation.

(11) Embrace the Media. Seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations by working closely with leaders of member forces and their national press elements and developing an open and collegial environment, Establish simple ground rules at the earliest possible moment to avoid incidents that could jeopardize the operation or detract from coalition cohesion.

(12) Consider Local Law Enforcement. US forces will often not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. Seek clear guidance from the alliance or coalition political leadership. Also, optimize contributions of indigenous law enforcement personnel.

(13) Be aware of the potential adverse effect of US forces' presence on the local economy. Resist developing elaborate base camps and support facilities. Consider prevailing wages when hiring local civilians. Consider economic factors in the leave and liberty policy. Balance differences in disposable income among national contingents by regulating the amount of US dollars American personnel are allowed to convert to local currency. Consider establishing a rest and recreation program outside the area of conflict.

(14) Use "common sense" when faced with an unusual situation where no absolute rules apply. Keep plans simple. Get to know the nation's commanders personally. Use operationally proficient, innovative, tenacious, diplomatic, and sensitive liaison teams. Seek each nation's opinions and involve them fully in the planning process. Cultivate the media as an ally. The keys are **respect, trust, and the ability to compromise**. Treating these forces as **partners** who are each important to the alliance or coalition will go a long way towards building a successful team.

Chapter 6

Planning for Small Wars

Dr. O'Neill's Framework for Analysis -- Mission Analysis -- Force Mix -- Intelligence and Information Gathering -- C³ -- Public Affairs and the Media -- Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations -- Interagency Coordination -- Legal Responsibilities and Rules of Engagement (ROE) -- Logistics -- Transition Planning -- Negotiation and Mediation

*"It may not be war, but it sure as hell ain't peace."*⁵³

--Major General S.L. Arnold, USA describing
Somalia to visitors in Mogadishu, January 1993

Planning for Small Wars

The multiple array of missions, complex environments, and multinational and political dynamics present during small wars heighten the imperative for commanders and their staffs to be proactive, flexible, and innovative during the planning process.

Political Primacy. Awareness of the political climate and goals should guide all military decisions. Relationships with political counterparts should be fostered and nurtured at all costs. The expenditure of human and material resources by anything less than a mutually supporting, philosophically harmonized, political-military team will negate success from the outset.

Center of Gravity (COG). A key difference between small wars and conventional wars lies in the area of strategic and operational centers of gravity. In contrast to conventional operations, where the operational COG is normally the enemy or enemy capabilities, in small wars, the strategic *and* operational COG is generally found within the civilian population. From the very beginning of planning through the execution of all operations, this reality should shape military activities. In close concert with political leaders, military commanders should aim operations at gaining or maintaining the popular support, thereby granting legitimacy to the intervention and wresting the initiative from the belligerents.

Planning Techniques. Considering the joint nature of most small wars, commanders and their staffs should be well versed in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for both deliberate and crisis action modes. Planning should be as detailed as the situation will permit with maximum use of lessons learned, SOPs, playbooks, wargames, and rehearsals. Staffs should also be adept at planning across the analytical to recognitional decision-making spectrum. Finally, planners should give particular attention to synchronizing operational

functions in the areas of intelligence and information gathering; maneuver; fires and protection; mobility / countermobility / and survivability; logistics, command, control, and communications support; aviation; interagency coordination; media operations; and legal considerations,

Planning Overview. This section highlights those aspects of planning that are unique to small wars or deserve special attention:

- Mission Analysis
- Intelligence and Information Gathering
- Command, Control, and Communications
- Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
- Legal Responsibilities and ROE
- Transition Planning
- Force Mix
- Multinational Operations
- Public Affairs and the Media
- Interagency Coordination
- Logistics Support
- Negotiation and Mediation

Mission Analysis

a. General. One of the most important tasks in preparing for small wars is to conduct a detailed mission analysis in conjunction with the Department of State and other participating federal agencies, coalition partners, political leaders, and NGOs. Each operation will be conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. US participation will be based on the current national policy and parameters set by the lead agency. Normal procedures can be used by the staff in analyzing the mission (METT-T-SL, MSTP, operational functions) with the following adjustments.

(1) Framework for Analysis. For some small wars, a useful tool in assessing the mission might be an adaptation of Dr. Bard E. O'Neill's framework for analysis on insurgency and terrorism.⁵⁴ Dr. O'Neill works from the premise that appropriate strategy, missions, and tactics to combat insurgencies (or in our case, small wars) cannot take place unless intervenors understand the essential characteristics of the insurgency at hand. With this understanding, courses of action

begin to emerge that otherwise might have eluded the planner. In brief, Dr. O'Neill suggests analysts start the planning process by doing the following:

- Review the nature of the insurgency by examining the political communities, systems, and authorities; determining the type of insurgency (anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, preservationist); identifying the insurgent's goals; and looking at the insurgent's means (political and violent forms of warfare).

- Understand and evaluate the insurgent strategies (conspiratorial, protracted popular war, military-focus, or urban-warfare).

- Evaluate the physical (terrain, climate, transportation-communications infrastructure) and human (demographic, social structure, economic, political culture, political system) environments.

- Assess the insurgency's popular support by looking at the types of popular support (passive, active, intellectual, and the masses) insurgents have and the techniques they use for gaining popular support (charisma, esoteric, exoteric, terrorism, provocation of government repression, demonstrations of potency, and coercion).

- Examine the insurgency's organization and unity by looking at the scope, complexity, functional success or failure, cohesion, causes and effects of disunity, and the quest for unity.

- Evaluate external support by considering its global context, the types of support given (moral, political, material, sanctuary), and the precariousness of that support.

- Evaluate the local government's response to the insurgency.

(2) Clearly Defined, Focused Mission. Understanding the mission is the key to the successful planning and execution of small wars. In assessing higher headquarters mission,

commanders might ask: What is the political and military intent? What are my mission, end state, and requirements for transition? Is the UN involved and what is my relationship to it? How much time do I have and is it sufficient? What forces are available, both US and multinational? What tolerance do I have for violence? Can I protect my force? What means are available to accomplish my mission? What are the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination? If the commander cannot adequately answer these questions, he or she must seek clarification and guidance from higher headquarters.

(3) Initial Decisions. As early as possible, decisions must be made on the composition of the staff the size and composition of the force; how to employ the force available most advantageously; the proportion of the combat, supporting arms, and service support forces; and the requisition and distribution of special weapons and equipment (Non-Lethal) which are not included in the normal organization but which are considered necessary. Also, the roles of the media and multinational partners must be considered, as well as a concept for transition to combat or non-combat and for termination of the operation.

(4) Assessment Team. Early deployment of an assessment team to the projected area of operations may help clarify the mission by deciding what actually needs to be accomplished, what type of force is required, the proper sequence for deployment, the availability of in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are being conducted by organizations other than military forces. The assessment team can validate the mission analysis process, develop or refine the ROE, and reduce duplication of effort. Whenever possible, the members of the assessment team should be part of the task force that will participate in the actual operation.

b. Review ROE, Mandates and Agreements. All legal documents must be reviewed thoroughly in order to conduct effective mission analysis. These include mandates, status of forces agreements (SOFA), terms of reference (TOR), and rules of engagement (ROE). The mandate should express the political objective and international support for the operation and define the desired end state. Commanders with unclear mandates should take the initiative to

redefine, refine, or restate the mandate for consideration by higher authority. Mandates and TORs should clearly address the ROE, force protection, limitations of a geographical nature, limitations on the duration of the operation, relationships with belligerent parties, relationships with others such as NGOs or PVOs, and financing and personnel resources. Overcomplicated or unclear ROE must be addressed up the chain of command ASAP.

c. Develop Own Mission Statement. A means available to commanders to influence a rewrite of unclear mandates is to develop their own mission statements and coordinate them with higher authority. This process may clarify force structure requirements, end state(s), and "commanders intent" with the supported combatant -commander.

d. Establish Indicators of Success. As with any mission, commanders at all levels must have a common understanding of the conditions that constitute success prior to initiating operations. In small wars, relief of suffering, avoidance of conflict, and settlement -- not "victory" in the traditional military sense -- may be the ultimate measures of success. Military action must complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in the pursuit of an overarching political objective.

e. Identify an Attainable End State. Simply put, end state is where the National Command Authorities (NCA) want the situation to be when operations conclude.⁵⁵ The end state should describe the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic and political objectives or pass the main effort to other national or international agencies to achieve the final strategic end state. From the end state, the implementing and supporting tasks and drawdown, handover, and departure data can be determined. Military commanders must strive to ensure that the end state is clearly defined and attainable. Once operations are underway, end state refinement is a *continuous, formal process* that should reflect shifting missions and political objectives.⁵⁶

f. Beware of Mission Creep. The political situations in small wars can alter dramatically or subtly overnight. Situational awareness is key. Commanders must be constantly vigilant for

these shifts and assess how they might affect their overall mission. If mission creep sets in (i.e., the end state changes), then a formal process for updating the mandate, refining the force structure, and receiving additional resources to handle the new missions must be sought. While the ambiguous nature of small wars may result in unanticipated needs, especially in logistics support, *unsupported mission creep must be minimized to protect the safety of the forces involved and the legitimacy of the operation as a whole*. The analyst must consider all factors affecting mission accomplishment, using assumptions in the absence of facts and replacing them with facts when they become available.

g. Keep in Mind Competing Dynamics. Commanders and their staffs must consider the constraints and restraints that may cause their missions to shift, change, or expand. They should look at neighboring forces, civic needs, religious practices, culturalism/tribalism, and possible effects of warlords or paramilitary groups. Assessments of competing agendas, local agreements, police force availability, and requirements for emergency relief should also be made.

h. Recognize When the Mission is Not Achievable. Commanders must speak up if mission analysis indicates that successful mission accomplishment is seriously jeopardized without restructuring or commitment of additional assets and resources. The political and civilian chains of command must be informed so they can make appropriate adjustments. These are not the kind of operations commanders should embrace with the usual "do or die" mentality. Loss of valuable resources, especially human, due to the reluctance of commanders to say they cannot perform an assigned mission is unacceptable, unwarranted, and certainly unwise given the importance of legitimacy by the American public.

i. Political Issues. Normally, political issues are beyond the military commander's scope of authority, but when possible, he or she should try to influence them if they affect mission accomplishment. Also, commanders should give due consideration to the fact that other types of operations that may have major impact on their mission accomplishment may be in progress in their projected area of operations. Various federal agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (IOs) will be on scene, pursuing their own missions. These organizations, most

having been in the country long before arrival of military forces, can help the commander and should be pulled into the planning process as soon as possible.⁵⁷

j. Regional Strategies. In further analyzing the mission, commanders should consider the regional strategy for the projected area of operations. Regional strategy can be obtained from the supported combatant commander or the State Department (DOS). DOS can also provide an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. (JTF 13/14) Multinational force strengths and national agendas--often subtly different from US interests-- must be understood before these forces can be employed where they can contribute the most to mission success.

Force Mix. Commanders and their staffs must consider several personnel issues early in the planning cycle:

- staff organization
- size and composition of the force
- active and reserve mix
- force security

Since Marines participating in small wars will usually do so as part of a joint task force (JTF), this paragraph addresses the broad aspects of joint staff organization. Other sections will cover specific topics such as PSYOP, CA, interagency coordination, public affairs and media, and intelligence. In addition, this paragraph does not reflect all possible staff organization options. It does, however, highlight options and recommendations gleaned from former JTF commanders and staff officers. Whatever the organization of the staff, members must avoid "stove-pipe" thinking. Rather, the staff requires an integrated view of the small wars operational functions.

a. Staff Organization. The JTF staff is normally formed from existing headquarters, usually not below the level of Army Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, Navy Fleet, or Numbered Air Force. JTF staffs need key players for responsible positions from the service components to make the staff representative of the force and fully capable. As much as possible, the commander should integrate political, civilian, and military representatives into the planning

process.⁵⁸ Composition of the staff at the JTF or MEF level will vary, but the following individuals should be considered:

- Commander/Deputy Commander
- Personal Staff (political advisor, public affairs, legal advisor, chaplain ministry team, CIA representative, historical writer)
- Special Staff (comptroller, engineer, medical, transportation)
- Interpreters
- J-1/G-1 Personnel
- J-2/G-2 Intelligence
- J-3/G-3 Operations, WWMCCS/GCCS/JOPEs, and LNOs
- J-4/G-4 Logistics (engineering, transportation, contracting, and medical personnel)
- J-5/G-5 Plans & Policy
- J-6/G-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
- Multinational (coalition and/or alliance) representatives
- Federal Agency representatives (DOS, DART, FEMA)
- NGO/PVO/IO representatives
- Media representatives
- Embassy Liaison Officer
- Civil Affairs (CA) personnel
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel
- Special Operations Forces (SOF) planners

(1) Staff Augments. Needs for augments to the staff should be immediately identified to the combatant commander. In turn, the Services must support requests for augmentees to enhance the JTF's capability to plan and execute operations. The requirement for units and personnel that are found mostly in the reserve component establishment should be identified early to hasten their availability.

(2) Personal Staff Group. The public affairs officer (PAO), legal advisor, political advisor, and chaplain ministry team become the focus of small wars operations more than in conventional combat operations. Given the exceptional influence of the media, the dominance of politics, and the power of religious forces in countries involved in small wars, commanders should bring these staff members into the "inner circle," affording them direct access and preventing their functioning in isolation. Other augments to the personal staff group, such as a historical writer or a CIA representative, may also assist the commander in coordinating and tracking the myriad events and issues that characterize small wars.

(3) Interpreters. Interpreters are critical to mission success. Not just literal translators, they must be able to understand the *context* of the discussions held and be able to transmit that meaning. Their requirement should be immediately identified to shorten the often extended lead time to actually find and deploy these individuals. Without adequate interpreters, communication with the local population and multinational partners will be severely hindered.

(4) Intelligence. As human intelligence (HUMINT) will be critical to the successful conduct of small wars, the intelligence officer should cultivate widely diverse sources. Understanding the affected country and its people through cultural and anthropological studies can provide critical information. Ties with the local populace and civilian HA organizations will pay off in terms of information about what the public knows and thinks.

(5) Liaison Officers (LNOs). LNOs are critical to successful coordination with external agencies or forces; often with the use of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). LNOs should have sufficient rank and authority appropriate to their level of liaison, be identified early in the planning process, have the language qualifications (or be provided with an interpreter), and have thorough knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities, procedures, and culture of their organization.

(6) Automated Information Systems Representatives. The small wars staff should include experienced operators for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System

(WWMCCS), the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). These individuals will be major contributors in assisting with deployment and redeployment of forces and managing the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).

(7) Contracting Officers. As part of the logistics organization, experienced and capable contracting officers should be included on the staff. Significant host nation or foreign nation support will usually be required to facilitate in-country operations. Contracting officers should be deployed to the projected area of operations as early as possible *with the funds and authority* to execute immediate contracts with foreign entities.

(8) Civil-Military Staff Relations. Civilian organizations, political representatives, and the military must be integrated in the overall planning, development, and training process. Personnel from NGOs, PVOs, and IOs can provide the civilian representation, while political members can come from the State Department, embassy, or local governments. Active coordination with political representatives may help operational requirements reflect political objectives and ensure consistency in military and political press statements, news releases, and agreements.

(9) The Media. Media relations are key to successful small wars. The media *can* help--plus, commanders cannot operate outside their scrutiny. Thus, commanders should consider media representation on the staff and actively foster a cooperative relationship with them. Within the boundaries of operational security, the media should be afforded maximum access to the forces, plans, and locations as possible. A solid, trust relationship with the media may greatly influence the cooperation received from them at critical moments and may ultimately serve as a force multiplier to the operation.

(10) Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB). This organization can schedule distinguished visitors, a frequent and necessary requirement in small wars that requires full time operation, senior leadership, protocol experience, all service and multinational representation, and a separate charter from the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) or public affairs office. Given the

preeminence of political concerns in small wars, the savvy commander will recognize the importance of the JVB, staff it, and empower it to appropriately care for distinguished visitors.

(11) Coalition Forces Support Team (CFST).⁵⁹ The formation of this team enables efficient and effective processing of all incoming multinational forces. The CFST can provide such things as prearrival planning, briefings, initial billeting, and deployment within country. Coalition forces arrive in theater with a broad spectrum of capabilities and mandates. Some have little or no logistic or sustainment support. Some cannot perform combat functions. Some will only participate until their own national interests are met. The sooner a US commander can learn of coalition capabilities, intentions, and needs, the sooner he or she can integrate them into the operational and logistics planning process. The CFST can significantly assist in shortening the learning curve and streamlining the response to their requirements.

(12) Multinational Representation. Multinational members should be treated with trust and respect and be invited to participate in the planning process. By doing so, commanders may gain valuable insight into the capabilities of their respective forces early in an operation.⁶⁰

b. Size and Composition of the Force. A force mix will be identified in the initial order. During the mission analysis, the commander determines whether or not the force provided is adequate to ensure mission success. Detailed analysis of actual unit strengths, military occupational specialty (MOS) and rank shortages, and readiness levels must occur early. Identified shortages must be reported up the chain as soon as possible to give the commander and his staff ample opportunity to respond. Commanders must factor in force security requirements when determining adequacy of the force mix.

c. Active/Reserve Mix. Small wars may require units not found in the Active component, or may require deployment of more units possessing a capability than are available in the Active component. Because the Marine Corps CSS structure is not optimized for extended, long-term or open-ended commitments, policy makers often have to call upon Army reserve

component elements, where the preponderance of Army Combat Service Support units are located, for assistance. Examples of these types of units include, but are not limited to, civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOPS), airlift, medical, and engineers. Mobilization of any Reserve component units may be difficult if war is not imminent or declared. If time permits, planners should determine what Reserve component capabilities are required and how long it will take for the units to be trained and ready for deployment. Planners should also review personnel and equipment authorizations for Reserve component units to ensure compatibility with Active forces.

d. Force Security. Force protection and security functions affect every aspect of small wars and must be prevalent "from top to bottom" (unit through individual). Commanders should anticipate the threat of terrorism and other hostilities towards US forces and develop plans to counter these threats. Commanders should ensure that sufficient assets are available to protect the force even when the political environment declares the operation nonhostile. Rules of Engagement (ROE) require immediate review, refinement, and dissemination to the lowest levels. Force security enhancement measures like secure communications networks, sensors, night stalker, nonlethal systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and body armor should be identified and acquired. Additionally, commanders should anticipate the needs to ensure operational security (OPSEC) and to protect NGOs, PVOs, the media, and parts of the local population and plan accordingly.

Intelligence and Information Gathering. Intelligence needs during small wars are in some ways more demanding than those during war. Besides the hostile/nonhostile continuum, small wars are often conducted in a joint, and most probably in a multinational or UN operational environment. Also, the intricacies of interagency coordination, complexity of multidimensional factional conflicts, and shifting political objectives, create real challenges for the Intelligence staff.

a. Situational Awareness (SA). In small wars, SA depends upon accurate assessments of political, cultural, economic, and demographic factors. Assessing the threat may require

evaluation of multiple belligerent parties, terrorists, and local nationals nursing a wide range of grievances as well as of friendly or neutral forces that may become hostile.

b. Information Gathering. In small wars, the term "information gathering" should be used rather than "intelligence." Non-military organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence. They may perceive that US forces are seeking to recruit informants or spies, or to turn them into unknowing accomplices in some covert collection effort. By using the term "information gathering," military forces may be able to foster better communication with other agencies, and thereby benefit from their valuable knowledge.

c. HUMINT. The primary source of intelligence in small wars is normally human intelligence, or HUMINT. Primary information gathering techniques include low level source operations, elicitation, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling. The best sources of information may be Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel, military patrols in local villages, military engineers, truck drivers, NGOs/PVOs, UN military observers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF).

d. Intelligence for Multinational Small Wars.

(1) Develop a Common Intelligence System. Multinational members normally operate separate intelligence systems that may vary widely in sophistication and focus. Also, they may not have capabilities similar to the US to collect and process intelligence. Establish a system early that optimizes each nation's contribution and provides member forces a common intelligence picture, tailored to their requirements, and is consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

(2) Issue Policy and Dissemination Criteria for Sharing Intelligence.

Determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. This may involve sharing intelligence with nations with which we have no intelligence-sharing agreements or sharing intelligence that is not covered by existing

agreements. In some cases, the US may have existing agreements that discriminate among allies within the multinational force. Also, situations may exist where intelligence should be shared with NGOs and PVOs outside usual political-military channels, In the absence of sufficient guidance, share only mission essential, lower-level, perishable information,

(3) Adjust for national differences. Commanders should be flexible enough to facilitate required adjustments to national concepts for intelligence support to make the multinational action effective, For example, a single director of intelligence should be designated in-theater with intelligence and information being exchanged.

(4) Strive for unity of effort to achieve a common mission. The mission should be viewed from a national as well as multinational perspective and a threat to one element of the force by a common adversary should be considered & threat to all members. Seek full exchange and sharing of intelligence when possible. Also, consider establishing a multinational intelligence center with representatives from all participating nations.

e. Counterintelligence (CI) Operations. Counterintelligence operations are as important in small wars as they are in war. Even though there may not be a well-defined threat, protection of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded.

(1) Countering belligerent HUMINT efforts. Members of NGOs/PVOs working closely with US forces may pass information (knowingly or unknowingly) to belligerent elements that enables them to interfere with the mission. Members of the local populace often gain access to US military personnel and their bases by providing services such as laundry and cooking. (Remember Beirut!) These personnel may provide information gleaned from interaction with US forces to seek favor with a belligerent element, or they may actually be belligerents.

(2) Compromise of Operational Information. Even in perceived nonhostile environments, commanders must recognize that certain secure aspects of military operations are open to compromise and take actions to counter this threat. Commanders should also note that

the *UN prohibits* the collection of signals intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and the collection of intelligence on friendly forces. This may not directly affect US-only operations, but will definitely affect the way a commander does business in a multinational, UN-mandated environment.

f. Operational Considerations. There are no standard templates for structuring intelligence support to small wars. Commanders should generally use the same approach for small wars as they would for conventional wartime operations. Intelligence organizational resources, methodologies, and products should be established, flexible, exercised regularly, and applicable in any type of military option or scenario. The original *Small Wars Manual* devotes considerable space (pages 19-32) to describing the duties of the intelligence officer and is still largely a valid reference for planners. As an example, the SWM lists the following duties as being of special importance in small wars operations:

(1) The names and descriptions of leaders, areas in which they operate, and the methods and material means which they employ in combat.

(2) Hostile propaganda in occupied territory, adjacent territory or countries, and our own country; and the methods, means, and agents used for its propagation.

(3) Liaison with government and local officials of the occupied country or areas, and with civil representatives of our own and foreign governments therein.

(4) Close liaison with the commander of aviation in arranging for aerial reconnaissance.

(5) Maintenance of cordial relations with the local, American, and foreign press, and censoring of all press releases.⁶¹

Command, Control, and Communications (C³). In the multinational, interagency small wars environment, US forces should be flexible in modifying standard C³ arrangements to promote unity of effort. Whether inside or outside the United States, military leaders should be prepared to establish communication links with local civil authorities, international and federal agencies, NGOs, PVOs, multinational forces, and the national chain of command as applicable.

a. Command Options. In multinational small wars, there are three Command options:

(1) Lead Nation Command -- Here, one nation, usually the one that provides the preponderance of forces and resources, takes the lead. The lead nation retains its Command and Control structure while other nations place their forces under its control. Subordinate nations augment the lead nation's staff. This option simplifies unity of command and allows the lead nation to set military objectives in cooperation with other military forces, approve the composition of the force, and assure mutual understanding of the international mandate by all partners.

(2) Parallel Command -- Here, nations may retain autonomous control, or they may give operational control to a force commander selected by the mandating organization. Generally, this force commander will have control to a lesser degree than that exercised in the lead nation option. Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice.

(3) Regional Alliance Command -- This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. Which forces lead may hinge on the influence exerted by a nation in a regional leadership position or the existence of established alliances.

b. C³ and United Nations Operations. (Somalia UNITAF vs. UNOSOM) Small Wars under UN control increase the complexity of command, control, and communications dramatically. Consensus within the UN is painstakingly difficult to achieve, and solutions are often national in character.

(1) Command. UN-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a single commander appointed by the Secretary-General (SYG) with the consent of the UN Security Council. The military force commander usually reports to the **Special Representative of the Secretary General**. This SRSYG will normally be the head of mission of a UN conducted operation and acts as the UN's "power broker" much as the US ambassador does in a US run

operation. While the force commander may have wide discretionary powers in the conduct of day-to-day operations, he refers all policy matters to the SYG or his representative.

(2) Staff. The staff will be--multinational with its national membership often based on the percentage of troops provided to the operation. It is normally composed of a personal staff, a military staff, and a civilian component.

(3) US Command. The commander of US forces may not always be "dual-hatted" as the UN force commander. If not, his authority and influence in a UN operation will have to be tempered as a member of a UN team. However, the US commander retains command over all assigned US forces. The chain of command, from the President to the lowest US commander in the field, remains inviolate. The US geographic commander should always have combatant command (COCOM) over US forces assigned. Subject to prior NCA approval, a non-US multinational force commander may exercise appropriate and negotiated operational command (OPCON) over US units in specific operations. The US contingent commander, who is the senior US officer, provides the link between US units under OPCON of the non-US commander and the US geographic combatant commander who provides national support as required for the US contingent of the operation. A foreign UN commander *cannot* change the mission or deploy US forces outside the area agreed to by the NCA; nor can he separate units, redirect logistics and supplies, administer discipline, promote individuals, or modify the internal organization of US units.

(4) National Contingent Commanders. A nation's units and staffs form the national contingent, Each national contingent commander is ultimately responsible for accomplishing his mission, is responsible to the force commander, and is responsible to his national chain of command. Each commander sets up a direct line of communication to his appropriate national headquarters and is responsible for his own disciplinary action according to his nation's codes of military law. Authority to carry out national laws in the host nation's territory should be included in the UN mandate.

c. Interagency and Political Coordination. (Example: Somalia Ambassador Oakley and General Johnson). The military commander must actively cultivate the political-military relationship in small wars at home and abroad. This process requires extraordinary patience, a commitment to the principle of unity of effort, and a willingness to be a team player. Personal relationships should be nurtured with the political advisor, the Ambassador, Special Envoys, UN Special Representatives, members of local governments, village leaders, clan or faction leaders, and members of major participating federal and private agencies. Running a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the theater of operations and staffing interagency working groups with knowledgeable liaison officers are proven methods of integrating efforts and fostering trust and respect amongst these many organizations.

(1) Strive for a political policy that can be supported by the military.

Often political issues and concerns influence military operations without considering the military aspects of an operation. The military commander's ability- to "bridge this gap" may significantly affect the force's opportunity for successful mission accomplishment. Attendance at Country Team meetings at the embassy and the exchange of liaison officers with the ambassador will help in this endeavor.

(2) Note cultural differences within the Department of State (DOS).

Military commanders must realize that there are cultural differences within the State Department. At times, officials will see issues from the perspective of broader regional or other foreign policy concerns vice military requirements. Failure to recognize these differing perspectives may negatively affect the operation.

(3) Understand the differences between the Country Team, the Defense Attach6 Office (DAO), the Security Assistance Organization (SAO), and the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).

(a) Country Team -- The Country Team concept denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The composition of the Country Team varies widely depending on the

desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. The principle military members are the Defense Attache and the chief of the SAO. Although the US area military commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the Country Team.

(b) Defense Attach6 Office (DAO) -- Service attaches are military members that comprise the US Defense Attache Office (USDAO). The defense attache is normally the senior Service attache assigned to the embassy. These attaches serve as valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. They also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters, The attaches assist the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program by exchanging information with the combatant commander's staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions.

(c) Security Assistance Organization (SAO) -- The SAO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the Ambassador. The SAO assists EN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance (SA) program. SA offices also help the Country Team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the US Government. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to assist the FIN. The SAO is limited by law from giving direct training assistance that is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to do limited tasks for specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, quality assurance teams, etc.).

(d) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) -- A DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills to assist US Embassies and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) missions with the management of the US Government response to disasters. DARTs coordinate their activities with the affected country, PVOs, NGOs, international organizations, the UN, other assisting countries, and US military

assets deployed to the disaster. DART teams work directly for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

d. Communications. The military commander who wants to communicate will bring the capability with the US forces when they deploy to the projected area of operations. Because nations where small wars are conducted often have bare infrastructure, limited telephone, power, and satellite capabilities, and require dispersal of military units to rural or widely scattered, underdeveloped regions, communication support requirements may far exceed those anticipated in conventional contingencies. Besides acquiring the communication hardware and quantity of gear needed, planners should also consider the following:

(1) Ensure access to JOPES via a deployable WWMCCS/GCCS capability. The force cannot deploy, sustain itself, or redeploy without it, Include sufficiently trained operators and the means to use satellite communications..

(2) Develop the ability to communicate early with all military forces, NGOs, PVOs, UN agencies, FIN agencies, religious organizations, and other organizations involved..

(3) Establish a policy concerning the use of military communications assets by nonmilitary agencies. Some may already have operational communications networks such as commercial leased circuits, commercial based satellite services (such as International Maritime Satellite Organization), and high frequency and very high frequency radios. Some civilian organizations, however, may want to use military communications assets once they are established.

(4) Address the need ,for secure communications and requirements to control cryptographic materials, and introduce a policy for the **release of classified communications information.**

(5) Identify communications requirements and evaluate in-country capabilities **during the** mission analysis. Consider: the requirement for cellular phones; the availability of

commercial capabilities to establish telephone service; the communication needs of special organizations like the Joint Visitor's Bureau (JVB); the funding source for the purchase of additional communications equipment; whether the US will be expected to provide communications capability to other military forces, civilian organizations, US political agencies, and the news media; and what the plans are for expansion.

(6) Identify and plan for Frequency Management. Consider frequencies already in use by NGOs, PVOs, UN agencies, HN agencies, religious organizations, and others. Ensure Automated Data Processing Software Compatibility to facilitate transfer of files. Develop a system of interoperability that satisfies communications requirements from the NCA to the lowest information exchange requirement. Maximize Compatibility, commonality, and standardization. In a multinational operation, these requirements may prove particularly difficult. Plan for Redundancy. Multiple assets must be available and used to ensure information flow.

e. Additional C³ Considerations

(1) Provide a forum for deconfliction and resolution for all involved members.

Keep in mind that some personnel, to include commanders of multinational forces, will not have a working understanding of the English language. The potential for misunderstandings is high. Consider the use models in the form of "sand tables" to overcome language deficiencies when describing operational requirements.

(2) Develop a lexicon of mutually agreed terminology to ensure enhanced operability and maximum understanding by all participating members. Ensure widest distribution.

(3) Maximize use of liaison officers (LNOs). At the earliest opportunity, identify the requirement for liaison personnel, linguists, and foreign area specialists to the supported combatant commander, Equip LNOs with communications equipment compatible with the JTF.

Use LNOs stationed at the UN as a valuable source of information and planning assistance. When practicable, integrate multinational LNOs into the JTF staff.

(4) Position the military commander for easy access to both the political and military sides of the operation. Having the headquarters in close proximity to the US Diplomatic Mission may provide the potential to enhance military operational capability.

Public Affairs and the Media. Small Wars are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. Cameras are rolling and stories are filed before forces even "hit the beach." The relationship US forces involved in small wars develop with the media will be critical to both the operation as well as to the story being accurately told. The legitimacy of an operation and the achievement of political and diplomatic goals can be made or destroyed based on media coverage alone. The media **CAN BE AN ALLY** and an additional source of information--how much of an ally may well depend on the attitude of military commanders and their staffs..

a. Public Affairs. If possible, establish coherent media policies and working relationships with the media BEFORE deployment. View the public affairs officer (PAO) as a force multiplier. Make him or her part of the operational planning. Upon arrival in country, be prepared for a tidal wave of media. Execute an active, on-scene public affairs program throughout the entire operation.

(1) Rehearsal. Commanders and their staffs, especially the PAO, should rehearse what will be said to the media prior to arrival in the area of operations. Conduct a predeployment media relations "refresher" to enhance each spokesperson's ability to address varied interests and agendas of the international media.

(2) Public Affairs in the Command Group. To help in handling the media and providing maximum coverage of all important events, deploy public affairs assets as part of the command group. Because small wars tend to be so political in nature, their conduct is more open to the public and more information is expected to be released. Plan accordingly!

(3) Public Affairs Officer (PAO). The PAO should:

- Establish information goals based on the commander's guidance.
- Conduct training to help the force talk to the media.
- Establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the US forces and other US government agencies in their conduct of small wars.
- Consistent with operational security (OPSEC) and personnel safety, **support open, independent reporting and access** to units and individual military personnel.
- Prepare **public affairs handouts** (or seek them from higher level PAO staffs) for use by US forces and the media covering the operation.
- **Coordinate with participating PAOs** at all levels.
- Coordinate closely with the PSYOP and Civil Affairs staffs. (NOTE -- PSYOP can use public affairs announcements and releases; however, public affairs cannot employ PSYOP). A continual exchange of information between these staffs must exist during execution. Although each has a specific audience, information will overlap, making it crucial that messages are not in conflict.

(4) Joint Information Bureau (JIB). Establish a JIB and encourage a JIB representative to be present at all meetings and briefings. A JIB representative should also attend civil-military operations center (CMOC) meetings to keep informed on NGO, PVO, international organization, and other non-military organization activities.

(5) Classification. Make as much of the operation unclassified as possible; this may enhance the flow of information and minimize the impression that the military is hiding important facts from the media.

b. Media Survival Guide. Some rules and procedures for dealing with the media are as follows:

- Establish a **coordinated media policy** as early as possible.
- **Promulgate these rules** to the military and the media.
- Deal with the media in an **honest, accurate, and timely** manner. All media **interviews will be "on the record."** If the military does not play, it surrenders to its critics who will be eagerly at hand.
- **Familiarize the media with your mission** through frequent briefings and reasonable access to units. Often reports will be more accurate and positive with education and action.
- **Understand the media's obsession with speed**, and through daily contact, keep working to win the battle of the first media perception. Conduct regular briefings to keep information flowing to and from the media. Be aware of the media's filing times for their reports and time your briefings accordingly.
- Ensure the **US speaks with one voice**, politically and militarily. Do so by coordinating with the combatant commander, DOD, and DOS (the Country Team) and forwarding a daily summary of public affairs activities to the combatant commander and other participating agencies.
- Show the media an **identifiable end state** and **progress** in moving toward it.

- Aggressively **counter inaccurate information** with subject matter experts.

• **Play the media "game."** In the extremely political environment of small wars, the public does have a right to know. Understand that there are times for a low profile, but more often, a media opportunity to tell the military's story should not be lost because of fear. The military needs to tell people, through the media, what they are about.

• Leaders must learn to take time to articulate their positions to the media using **short, simple language** that the media will use and the public will understand.

• Understand that the news is almost always **skewed toward the side of those willing to talk** to the media, and against those who say "No comment."

• **Allow the media to talk to the troops.** Informed junior troops can be honest, accurate, forthright, and insightful spokespersons. Guidance for the troops should be simple:

- You are free to talk to the media.
- Stay in your "lane" (within your area of expertise).
- Do not speculate.
- Do not comment on policy.

• **Avoid staged "dog and pony" shows.** Most experienced media will immediately spot them. Keeping in mind the need for OP SEC, get reporters out to the fleet or the field and let them "look around" themselves.

• **Provide support** when possible (e.g. transportation, meals, billeting, emergency medical treatment, liaison personnel, etc.). Coordinate with combatant commander to authorize media embarkations on US ships and aircraft participating in the operation. **If the media chooses to accompany the military, they will be under military protection and rules.** If they choose to leave, they are on their own.

- **Do not put the media into a position of appearing as agents of the force**

commander. The media will normally go to great lengths to be impartial; however, some individuals may have their own agendas and biases.

- **Facilitate media coverage of successful NGO or PVO operations.** Such operations are often good yardsticks to measure success or failure with the media.

- **Expect a wide range of competencies among the media.** Most are very professional, courageous, highly ethical, and dedicated. Many do not have a military background; however, they will usually work to gather the facts and present an accurate story. Treat them with the respect you expect and never underrate their capability to gather information. They can be tenacious and may have sources of information not available to the military.

- Be aware that countries other than America will be interested and following the operation. The media dispatched to cover US military activities will have an **international makeup and will report from a widely diverse perspective.** Some journalists may be politically aligned with an opposing or unsympathetic view of the military's position. Do not be thin-skinned. While the military may not win every "media battle," maintaining professional, calm, open, timely, and honest communication with all media will minimize friction and may well foster an atmosphere of mutual, albeit grudging, respect.

- The US command has an important story to tell. US force activities are "news" to both international and national audiences. **The US military commander is the most believable spokesperson to represent the US force.** Preparation and practice on his part will result in newsworthy, informative articles and programs that may be read and seen by millions of readers and viewers.

- **Market the military's good works** to the media. News travels fast and rumors travel faster. Commanders should be aggressive and proactive in their media and public affairs activities. Facilitating coverage of military activities is a good media control measure.

- **Do not shy away from or take offense to honestly told stories of operational setbacks.** The media, and subsequently the public, may trust and ultimately support the military's efforts more if they feel they are getting the whole story, good and bad.

Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). CA and PSYOP actions can dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of small wars. The civilian population's perception of foreign military involvement in their country can be favorably enhanced with projects to coordinate with village leaders, improve local facilities and services, provide medical care, and reaffirm the positive intentions of the US. Civil affairs actions should reinforce (and be reinforced by) PSYOP themes and actions. PSYOP themes and actions should be coordinated with PAO initiatives to avoid creating any contradictions. The quality of relationships developed between the military, the local population, and the civilian relief organizations that may be present will also significantly impact the success or failure of the military's efforts.

a. Force Multipliers. CA and PSYOP are force multipliers and should be an essential part of mission planning. CA and PSYOP supporting operations are developed by the respective staff officers on the JTF staff and approved at the NCA level. Implementation of these plans rests with the US force commander.

(1) CA and PSYOP units are special operations forces (SOF) and as such must be requested from the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Active component CA personnel are "generalists" who provide a quick response CA capability to the JTF. They may require augmentation by CA specialists from the reserve component who may not be immediately available for deployment or employment. PSYOP capabilities within the active component include both planning and execution assets that are regionally oriented and immediately deployable.

(2) Planning for CA actions should include the conduct of an initial situation assessment by the CA or civil-military operations (CMO) staff officer. Civil-military operations

should be integrated into the overall mission execution plan. They require tactical and administrative support in the same manner and degree as any other military operation.

(3) Information gathered by CA personnel from various civilian entities greatly enhances the overall intelligence effort and should be shared between staffs regularly.

(4) Civil-military operations complement the overall PSYOP theme and may be used by the PAO in releasing information concerning mission success.

(5) CA, NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations should strive to work closely together, preferably within a committee like a civil military operations center (CMOC). Additional information on this subject can be found in the Civil-Military Relations and Interagency Coordination section.

b. Civil Affairs (CA) provides the commander with the link between US forces and the civilian government, populace, and various international organizations, NGOs, and PVOs operating in the area. CA, in conjunction with the staff judge advocate, may apprise the commander of legal and moral obligations with respect to the civilian populace and thereby enhance the mission's legitimacy. CA units are designed to perform a variety of functional area skills to include assessments of civil infrastructure, assistance in the operation of temporary refugee and displaced persons camps, and liaison between the military and various NGO/PVOs. CA personnel have expertise on factors like the local culture, social structure, economic systems, language, and host nation support capabilities. They may also provide assistance to the populace normally the responsibility of local or indigenous governments.

c. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) convey the commander's voice to targeted populations in the affected nation. PSYOP ensures that the impact of US force's actions on those populations are what the commander intended. PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,

and individuals. In small wars, PSYOP are directed toward populaces in friendly areas of operations or in territory occupied by friendly military forces. Their objective is to facilitate operations and promote maximum cooperation in the populace to support US goals in the area. With PSYOP, the commander can influence hostile or potentially hostile personnel through the employment of appropriate media, language(s), and symbols. Judicious use of PSYOP can help preclude escalation of a crisis to a nonpermissive environment and can be essential to building credibility and maintaining impartiality.

(1) **PSYOP Capabilities.** PSYOP can explain US action to counter disinformation, false expectations, confusion, hostile propaganda, and rumor. PSYOP capabilities include projecting a favorable image of the United States; informing audiences in denied areas; overcoming censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communications systems; giving guidance or reassurance to isolated or disorganized audiences, and influencing local support for insurgents.

(2) The decision to employ PSYOP should be coordinated **with the Ambassador** and appropriate members of the embassy staff. DOS personnel will be able to provide PSYOP personnel with valuable information about the target audience and any programs similar to PSYOP they may be conducting.

(3) PSYOP forces can advertise commander's mission and objectives through print, photographic, audio, visual, and audio-visual products. PSYOP efforts are directed towards **communicating with the local and regional audience**, unlike PAO efforts which are focused towards the international and US media.

Civil-Military Relations and Interagency Coordination. Close, continuous, and cooperative civil-military relations are vitally important to successful small wars. Conducted properly, they can reduce mission interference, minimize friction and misunderstandings, secure local support, create stability, and synchronize efforts. Commanders and their staffs need to understand what national and international agencies are out there, learn what they do, and then determine what they will do for or with the military during small wars. They should actively develop and nurture

civil-military relationships and establish a viable mechanism to coordinate their activities. This paragraph will discuss the following:

- **Interagency Coordination I**
- **US Federal Agencies**
- **International Organizations**
- **Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations (NGOs/PVOs)**
- **Local Populations**

a. Interagency Coordination. Small wars require a high degree of interagency coordination, both within and outside the US Government. In every operation, some agency or department, often NOT DOD, will be designated the lead agency to coordinate all activities associated with the mission. Interagency coordination and planning conducted by the military will usually be done at the joint headquarters level. For certain missions, the joint headquarters may delegate authority to the component for direct coordination with other agencies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the joint staff coordinate interagency operations at the strategic level. This coordination establishes the framework for coordination by commanders at the operational and tactical levels.

(1) Lead Agency. Effective liaison with the lead agency enables the commander to effectively support the political objectives of the operation. Generally, lead agency assignment will fall into one of the following categories:

(a) Small wars outside the US. The lead agency will normally be the Department of State (DOS). A Special Presidential Envoy may be designated who would then direct the operation.

- **When no US Country Team is present.** Operations will be directed by the department designated as the lead agency.
- **When US Country Team is present.** The Country Team will normally be the primary

coordinating agency. The Ambassador determines which agencies are on the Country Team and integrates the action of all US departments (including DOD) and agencies in that country. (Although not an official member, the combatant commander is normally invited and represented.)

(b) Small wars inside the US. Lead agencies for military support to civil authorities (MSCA) are assigned under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) under 12 emergency support functions (ESFs):

- ESF 1 – Transportation. The Department of Transportation (DOT).
- ESF 2 – Communications. The National Communications System (NCS).
- ESF 3 -- Public Works/Engineering. The Department of Defense (DOD)
- ESF 4 – Firefighting. The Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- ESF 5 – Information and Planning. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
- ESF 6 – Mass Care. The American Red Cross (ARC).
- ESF 7 – Resource Support. The General Services Administration (GSA.)
- ESF 8 – Health Services. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
- ESF 9 – Urban Search / Rescue. The Department of Defense (DOD).
- ESF 10 – Hazardous Materials. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
- ESF 11 – Food. The Department of Agriculture (USDA).
- ESF 12 – Energy. The Department of Energy (DOE).

(c) DOD Roles and Responsibilities for MSCA inside the US.

- **The Secretary of the Army (SA)**, designated by the Secretary of Defense, is the DOD executive agent for providing DOD domestic support operations. The SA has authority to task

DOD components to plan for and to commit DOD resources in response to requests for military support from civil authorities. Any commitment of military forces of the unified commands must be coordinated in advance with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

- **Director of Military Support (DOMS).** The DOMS, a general officer appointed by the SA, is the DOD primary contact for all federal departments and agencies during periods of domestic civil emergencies or disaster response. On behalf of the DOD, the DOMS and his supporting staff, serving as a joint staff ensure the planning, coordination, and execution of many domestic support operations.

- **Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).** Appointed by a CINC, the DCO serves as the DOD single point of contact to the federal coordinating officer (FCO) for providing DOD resources during disaster assistance. The DCO should collocate with the FCO and coordinates all Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mission assignments for military support. The DCO usually has operational control of all DOD forces deployed to support the federal effort. A defense contracting element (DCE) will be organized to provide a support staff for the DCO in the disaster area. The size and composition of the DCE is situation dependent.

- **National Guard Bureau (NGB).** The NGB is the federal coordination, administrative, policy, and logistical center for the Army and the Air National Guard (ANG). It serves as the legal channel of communications among the US Army, the US Air Force, and the National Guard in the 54 states and territories. The Chief, NGB has executive responsibility for planning and coordinating the execution of military support operations.

- **US Army and Marine Corps Reserves.** These units are capable of extensive military support to civil authorities. This assistance may include the use of equipment and other resources, including units and individuals.

- **Major Commands (MACOMs).** MACOM commanders may provide military support per authorized agreements they have reached with civil authorities in their surrounding

communities or as directed by higher headquarters. Specifically, they may provide disaster relief upon request, generally placing these resources under the operational control of the military commander in charge of relief operations.

- **Continental US Army (CONUSA).** CONUSA commanders provide regional military support to civil authorities by planning for and conducting disaster relief operations within their areas of responsibility. They also establish and maintain disaster relief liaison with appropriate federal, state, and local authorities, agencies, and organizations.

- **US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).** The USACE is organized into geographically dispersed (CONUS and OCONUS) division and district subordinate commands. The USACE's mission is to provide quality, responsive engineering service to the nation. The command applies substantial expertise to the areas of operation and maintenance of the national waterway infrastructure, environmental restoration and remediation, project planning and management, coordination of complex interagency or regional technical issues, and disasterplanning and response.

- **US Army Material Command (USAMC).** USAMC may organize and deploy a logistics support element for domestic support operations. It provides supply, maintenance, technical assistance, and other services to the units. In addition, the logistics support element (LSE) may organize a humanitarian depot to receive, store, and distribute relief supplies. The USAMC is the Army's executive agent for chemical and nuclear accidents and incidents.

(2) Interagency Coordination Mechanisms. The US force commander and his staff must be aware that every agency has its own idea of how to best coordinate interagency activities. While some mechanisms may exist at-a much higher level than a service component commander might deal with on a regular basis, awareness of their activities may prove invaluable in the planning and ultimate execution of the operation.

(a) National Security Council / Interagency Working Group

(NSC/IWG). National and strategic level working groups employed by the NSC to facilitate multi-agency coordination.

(b) Interagency Action Group (IAG). An ad hoc policy-implementing

group created to expedite and facilitate the interagency process and adjudicate action-level implementation issues much as a JTF under a CJTF facilitates performance of a supported CINC's mission. Operates under the sponsorship of a designated lead department or agency which would maintain executive authority and oversight.

(c) Joint Operations Center (JOC). For the single mission JTF, the 24-

hour operation run at the JOC provides the best location for external agencies to coordinate time critical information. Allowing these agencies to have access to the JOC can facilitate overall operations by promoting information flow through a centralized location accessible to all involved agencies,

(d) Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). An agency formed by

the JTF commander of a multi-mission JTF to serve as the primary interface between all humanitarian organizations (NGOs/PVOs), US federal agencies, local populations, military personnel from participating countries, and United Nations and other international organizations (IOs) or agencies. Specific points to consider when establishing a CMOC include:

- The CMOC becomes the heart of small wars much as the combat or fire-support operations center is in combat operations. Establishment of the CMOC will promote unity of effort with CA activities without adversely impacting JTF organizations heavily involved in other portions of the mission.

- Key members should include selected JTF and Service component staff members and DOS representatives to include the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and disaster assistance response team (DART) representatives.

- Relationships with nonmilitary' agencies are based on mutual respect, communication, and standardization of support.

- Members of the CMOC should meet frequently to discuss problems and coordinate actions (both short-term and long-term). NGOs/PVOs can be briefed on the current military situations, while NGOs can review ongoing humanitarian actions for the military.

- When established, the CMOC becomes the single point of contact for IO/NGO/PVO interaction with the JTFI

b. US Federal Agencies. The following United States Government (USG) agencies provide support during complex emergencies and international crises. A basic awareness and understanding of these organizations' primary roles and responsibilities will enhance the coordination process during multi-agency operations. (See Appendix A for more detailed discussions of each.)

- National Command Authority (NCA)
- National Security Council (NSC)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
- Department of State (DOS)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
- United States Information Agency / Service (USIA / USIS)
- Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- Department of Energy (DOE)

- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
- Department of Interior (DOI)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Department of Labor (DOL)
- National Communications System (NCS)
- National Weather Service (NWS)
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- Public Health Service (PHS)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Department of the Treasury (DOTT)

c. International Organizations (IOs). IOs are organizations like the UN with global influence that have well-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and are equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex emergencies including disaster relief, refugee assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance around the world. IOs share responsibilities for the conduct of humanitarian relief operations with many NGOs, PVOs, US Governmental, civil, and military authorities, as well as other governments. Strategic plans and goals of these organizations may not always be completely compatible with military objectives during small wars. Effective US or multinational action in such an interagency, political environment requires strong central coordination, leadership, and understanding of the goals, plans, and procedures used by all participants.

(1) The United Nations (UN). The UN is involved in the entire spectrum of operations ranging from prevention to relief, through reconstruction and rehabilitation, to development. While not absolute, most UN-sponsored operations will be launched under the auspices of an approved resolution from the Security Council or the General Assembly.

(a) **Organization.** The UN organization for complex emergencies normally includes headquarters and field components. The UN **Under-Secretary for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)**, as the **UN Emergency Coordinator**, serves as the headquarters component. Field level organization currently relies on the **Resident Coordinator** system administered by the UN Development Program. The Resident Coordinator mobilizes and manages the UN country team and provides direction for the field relief effort. In most serious emergencies, the UN Secretary-General may appoint a special representative who is dual-hatted, reporting directly to the Secretary-General on all matters, but also directly to the UN Emergency Coordinator (DHA) on humanitarian matters.

(b) **Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).** The DHA is the focal point for disaster management in the UN system. The appointed DHA emergency coordinator has a crucial role in providing leadership to the UN team at country level. He or she also coordinates locally represented NGO/PVO/IOs, as required. The emergency coordinator convenes the **UN Disaster Management Team (DMT)** at country level seeking unity of effort among all the various relief agencies. DNA is generally held responsible for coordinating humanitarian relief at the equivalent US military strategic level.

(c) **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).** The UNHCR has a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced persons. Except in special circumstances, its material assistance activities are conducted through national or local authorities of the country concerned, other organizations of the UN system, NGOs, or private technical agencies. Coordination with the UNHCR is critical for any humanitarian relief effort. Failure to do so or to meet UNHCR standards, may preclude the UNHCR from accepting transfer of equipment, supplies, and facilities as the military disengages.

(d) **Other UN organizations** include the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

(2) **Other International Organizations.** Outside of the UN, the primary international organizations participating in HA involve the three groups of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It is critical to note that these groups are distinctly different and have separate mandates and staff organizations. They should NOT be considered as one organization. The objective of the Movement is to coordinate their entire range of activities maintaining absolute neutrality. The protection of this neutrality is key for joint military planners and operators.

- **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).** Based in Geneva, the ICRC is essentially all Swiss. ICRC works for the faithful application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. ICRC is distinct from the rest of the movement in that it has a protection mandate in addition to its relief assistance work. It acts principally in cases of armed conflict including civil conflicts, insuring legal protection for the victims, and acting as a neutral, independent humanitarian player in the most complex emergency situations.

- **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.** This organization consists of the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of their own countries. The mandate of this organization is to provide humanitarian relief during disasters. Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations may provide assistance to other federation members through their international alliance provisions.

- **International Organization for Migration (IOM).** The IOM performs three primary missions: (1) processes and moves refugees to countries offering resettlement opportunities; (2) provisions orderly and planned migration to meet emigration and immigration requirements of losing and gaining countries; and (3) transfers technology through the movement of qualified human resources to promote economic, educational, and social advancement of developing countries. The IOM also trains and prepares indigenous governments and NGOs to respond to complex emergencies through interactive workshops.

d. Nongovernmental and Private Voluntary Organizations (NGOs/PVOs). NGOs

and PVOs are private, non-profit citizen's organizations that range in size and experience from multimillion dollar organizations with decades of worldwide experience in humanitarian relief and assistance to newly created small organizations, dedicated to the particular emergency or disaster in question. They are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. Examples of NGOs and PVOs include, but are not limited to, religious, peace, disarmament, environmental, development, and human rights groups.

(1) The **number** of NGOs/PVOs that a US or multinational military force may find in an AO could be very large, For example, over 350 agencies, many of which are capable of responding in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, are registered with USAID. Some foreign-based organizations are not required to register in the US or with other NATO countries. USAID publishes a yearly report, titled **Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs**, that describes the aims and objectives of the registered organizations. It should be a part of the combatant commander's library.

(2) **Key elements** that military commanders and other decision makers should understand about the NGO/PVO community include:

- The characteristics, mission, and capabilities of individual NGOs/PVOs are **diverse**. All are involved in direct humanitarian aid with host populations. **Each organization operates individually.**
- NGOs/PVOs will **provide the bulk of humanitarian aid** at the grassroots level. The military structure can provide the logistical and security assistance to provide assistance to remote and unsecured areas.
- NGOs/PVOs may be **operating in areas of high risk**, where other organizations are hesitant to go. They are staffed with **dedicated, courageous personnel** and should be looked to as a resource with **vital experience** and accepted as **full partners** from planning through

execution of operations.

- NGOs and PVOs **will NOT be controlled by the military** nor allow themselves to be used as "spies" to provide intelligence. They may respond, however, to a sincere, cooperative, give-and-take approach based on mutual respect and positive recognition of one another's capabilities. Unity of effort is the goal.

- NGO/PVO assessments often are **excellent sources of information** of the emergency/humanitarian aid situation. They can also provide information on local customs, infrastructure, local government structure, procurement and pay scales, and relief assessments. Their technical expertise on disaster relief or development, feeding programs, agriculture, public health, water, sanitation, and local solutions can also be helpful.

- NGOs/PVOs are funded primarily by donations from the public as well as governments and the UN. They frequently have scarce resources, both at the donor level and in the field.

- NGOs/PVOs **will probably be operating in the affected area long after the military operation has ended and the military forces have left the area**. It is important that military commanders consider the implications of any military humanitarian assistance projects that they initiate while in the affected area. Programs that are started must be sustainable once the military withdraws.

- Prior to deployment, military commanders and forces should **know what agencies and organizations are in their assigned area**. With careful and proper coordination, these organizations can extend the military's civil affairs capabilities in the operational area. During coordination, military staffs must **evaluate NGO/PVO goals and objectives** and consider their effect on the military mission.

(3)NGOs/PVOs. Examples of NGOs/PVOs are:

- American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction)
- American Refugee Committee (ARC)
- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE)
- Doctors Without Borders/Medicins San Frontiers (MSF)
- Health Volunteers Overseas (FIVO)
- International Rescue Committee (IRC)
- World Emergency Relief (WER)
- World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. (WVRD)

e. **Responsibilities to the Local Population.**⁶² In small wars, commanders will be faced with difficult decisions in terms of their responsibilities to the local population. Commanders must consider what the limits are of US forces' responsibility to keep order, maintain essential services, and protect the local populace from acts of violence. Legal obligations to the local populace are much more limited in small wars than in armed conflict. They are generally tied to the mission, local conditions, and force capability to provide a secure environment within the area of control.

(1) Commanders should determine in advance what the limits are, and **promulgate the rules in a clear and concise format.** ROE should provide some guidance concerning the rules of deadly force to protect third parties/local citizens.

(2) The **media can complicate** issues of responsibility in spite of established ROE and published limitations. Commanders face a complex challenge when acts of violence on perceived innocents are carried out within view or near proximity to US forces. Sometimes this violence is conducted by local police or local government forces. This is where solid relations with the media and a detailed understanding of legal obligations and options is vital for commanders.

(3) Detention of local nationals and other lawbreakers is a sensitive issue.

This is especially true when there is no local law enforcement capability, or the law enforcement and judicial systems have been compromised by the political situation. Commanders will have to be prepared to detain local nationals per international standards. All detentions will be scrutinized by international and local groups.

(4) Questions may also arise **about humanitarian/civic action projects**, as well as **medical treatment for local nationals**. Subordinate commanders often may want to do things that help the local population, such as building an orphanage or conducting medical projects. Clear guidance on these subjects should be issued early in the operation. This may help to prevent mission creep and projects that might violate US law and regulations, even though these projects might be driven by good intentions.

(5) There may be **legal requirements to pay for services** including real estate and private property used by US forces.

(6) Commanders have a responsibility to provide **medical treatment to civilians that US forces may injure** in the area of operations.

Legal Responsibilities and Rules of Engagement (ROE). Small wars involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic, in addition to the normal constraints associated with deployments and operations. Regardless of the circumstances under which US forces are employed, international law obligates the commander concerning civilians, governments, and economics. Commanders must ensure that US personnel abide by the standards of international and domestic law, as well as by the provisions of the operation's ROE.

a. Small wars outside the US often have subordinate commanders involved with local governments or negotiations among competing factions. Legal personnel may be required to have expertise in areas including refugees; displaced and detained civilians; fiscal law; ROE; PSYOP and CA; medical support; local culture, customs, and government; international law and agreements; military and political liaison; claims; and contingency contracting.⁶³

b. Small wars inside the US involve sensitivity to laws governing the use of the military in domestic disaster relief, law enforcement, environmental assistance, and community relations operations.

c. Legal Advisor. JTF Commanders will usually need a staff judge advocate (SJA) legal advisor on the staff at the 0-6 command level. Subordinate commanders should acquire the most senior qualified legal advisor available. This "**operational lawyer**" should be immediately available to advise, not only on the legal restraints upon operators, but on the rights to employ force. A good legal advisor is a **force multiplier** and should be a **vital part of the planning team** before deployment.

(1) Responsibilities. The legal advisor can help with refugees; displaced and detained civilians; PSYOP and CA; claims; investigations; contingency contracting; weapons confiscation policy; the review of operations plans; and the development of policy guidance letters and negotiation strategy for the commander, He can also assist in the interpretation of and compliance with applicable US laws and relevant international agreements, draft a General Order to establish basic policy for prohibited and permitted actions, and provide details of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) considerations for the JTF.

(2) Negotiation with local governments may be necessary concerning a variety of issues, including procurement matters, property seizure for military purposes, and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction. A legal advisor can advise and represent the commander on all these issues, as well as ensure all adverse actions are administered properly.

(3) The legal advisor will likely become' a **primary command representative interfacing with interagency and international relief agencies.** Invariably, the International Committee of the Red Cross or other **IOs** will monitor US actions. The legal advisor should help establish liaison and coordinate the efforts of multinational and FIN attorneys early in the

operation. This might be accomplished through the staffing of a multinational task force law office designed to support the operations of many nations or the UN.

(4) Legal advisors can help ensure that US forces will be prepared to provide the proper **support to the local police** force to include developing a **judicial system to handle thieves and trespassers** that is more than a "revolving door." Commanders should be aware that US law places limitations on permissible support.

(5) **Detention of local nationals** or others who attack or otherwise disrupt the JTF or its personnel is often a sensitive issue in small wars. Commanders must be sensitive to apprehension and turnover procedures, especially when there are distinct cultural differences in the area of operations.

(6) **Claims.** Commanders must prepare for the likelihood that the force will injure people or damage property incidental to operations. The legal advisor must implement a claims system to pay for any incidents and to assist in good community relations. **International claims** are a subject of negotiation between the host nation and the US Government. In most cases, the USG will be immune from suit under host nation law. - Individual immunity will depend on the status of forces.

(7) **Fiscal constraints** involving activities that are not directly related to the mission may arise in logistics assistance to NGOs, PVOs, multinational forces, and others. Because they are often technical and statutory in nature, the legal advisor can be a major contributor in solving many issues if used to full advantage.

d. International Agreements. Standing UN resolutions or other international directives can form the basis for legitimate US action and can be very significant to the mission analysis. Before deployment, legal advisors should review all plans to learn and study any existing agreements. These agreements will cover such issues as host nation support, diplomatic

status/foreign criminal jurisdiction, use of deadly force, environmental matters, and medical treatment of civilians. Types of agreements include: UN Resolutions and Mandates, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), Terms of Reference (TOR), and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs).

e. Logistical Legal Considerations/Contract Concerns.

(1) For UN operations, contracting support includes accounting for support provided to US forces through UN forces, contracting, disbursing, and arranging for reimbursement. **Commercial vendor services (CVS)** support covers the immediate needs of the force that cannot be reasonably met by normal logistics such as cash payments covering day laborer wages and small quantities of supplies and services.

(2) Some operations may require the creation of **joint or multinational contracting elements**, staffed by personnel from all services and contingents operating in the theater. Joint contracting organizations promote cooperation and coordination among the service elements and **preclude interservice competition for local supplies and' services** to more effectively use scarce resources. In UN operations, contracting operations should be coordinated with the UN chief procurement officer. A budget officer should also be involved in early planning.

(3) **Request for Exception Authority from DOD.** USG requirements for establishing contracts under authority of DOD use of appropriated funds include required clauses that may be considered unlawful, insulting, or simply irrelevant to other countries with whom the US must contract, SECDEF authority can be sought for the use of non-standard USG contract authority. This avoids embarrassing and time-consuming negotiations and allows the JTF to buy what is needed immediately.

(4) **Contracting Considerations.** The most recent edition of "Contracting in Support of Contingencies," available through the CTNC SJA or J8 (Comptroller), should be

consulted. Consideration should be given to the possibility of having to lease real property for the establishment of a migrant or refugee camp. Also, contracting officers should have a warrant sufficiently high enough to procure whatever is needed locally, including fresh food, rental cars, living space, POL, local medical supplies, ADP equipment, etc.

f. Rules of Engagement (ROE). Often the most critical area of legal support is providing advice and counsel on the development and promulgation of ROE. In all cases in which use of force is contemplated, operational law specialists shall be consulted to determine the legal basis for intervention and use of force, review proposed ROE, and assess the legal risks or potential liabilities entailed under international law.

(1) Considerations for ROE.

- ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that **delineate the circumstances and limitations which US forces initiate and/or continue the use of deadly (or nonlethal) force.** ROE impose political, tactical, and legal limitations upon commanders but *really* delineate how the commanders intend to use force and maneuver to protect their forces and to prosecute their missions.

- ROE should be based upon **international law, operational** (mission requirements) **concerns, commander's intent** (both CJTF and higher headquarters), **tactical capabilities of the proposed force, host nation law and agreements, US policy** as evidenced from directives and guidance from UN Resolutions or international agreements, and **the threat.**

- ROE must emphasize **the inherent right of self-defense.** ROE cannot interfere with the commander's right and responsibility to protect the force against an actual or imminent threat of attack.

- During small wars, **most ROE are "conduct-based,"** that is, military force actions are based on a situation or threat that indicates a hostile act or intent. The threat may be a variety of groups or individuals, but are not usually an "enemy" in the "warfighting" sense.

- ROE **may remain constant** throughout the operation, or more than likely, they **may need to be changed** or refined. The JCS-issued **Standing ROE (SROE)** contain the basics. They apply to all commanders through the chain of command and remain in effect until specifically modified or superseded. They may be modified by the combatant commands and commanders may request supplemental measures as necessary.

(2) Development of ROE.

- The commander and his staff **analyze the mission** and the **anticipated threat level**, and then **determine if the applicable ROE are adequate** for the situation. The JCS SROE, any ROE in effect in the operational area, mandates, SOFAs, and mission ROE are scrutinized carefully.

- The US force commander's legal advisor can help subordinate commanders and their staffs develop ROE that do not improperly constrain actions but are still consistent with national command policy.

- In determining **ROE adequacy**, the commander must ask: Do the ROE protect the force? What is the higher headquarters commander's intent? Are the ROE **clear, concise, understandable** at the individual Marine ("trigger-puller") level, and **unclassified**? Are the ROE printed on cards that can be distributed to every participant?

- If the ROE are **not adequate**, the commander seeks approval of supplemental measures through the supported combatant commander.

(3) Training for ROE. It is critical that *all* military personnel involved in small wars be thoroughly trained in the ROE. ROE must be understood, remembered, applied,

reinforced, and practiced. A single uninformed breach of ROE during a tense moment by an individual Marine or soldier could change the entire face of an operation. In small wars, military aggressiveness must be tempered with greater restraint.

(4) Promulgation of ROE. Normally, ROE are distributed through the chain of command via an operation plan or order. In multinational operations, it is important to develop ROE that can be promptly distributed to other nations. The coalition forces support team (CFST) can assist in distributing current ROE and teaching it to multinational forces. It is important that **all** forces have the same understanding of the ROE.

(5) Legal responsibilities if ROE carried out. Commanders should conduct a formal investigation in all questionable cases of the use of deadly force. Deployment of investigative agencies such as the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) is absolutely essential. Media attention can be expected; thus a prompt and accurate record of the facts should be gathered as soon as possible. Legal advisors will obviously be of great help during this time. Additional information on ROE can be obtained from the Joint Electronics Library (JEL) peace operations database under the title "Operational Law Handbook."

g. Domestic Legal Considerations.⁶⁴ The Constitution, statutes, and regulations strictly govern the relationship of the military to civilian authorities. The basic rule is that the military plays a subordinate and supporting role to civilian authority. Questions of *posse comitatus*, use of force, disaster assistance, and federalization of troops raise issues that require timely legal advice. Commanders should scrutinize each request for aid, whether it be for equipment, personnel, or training, ensure that they are appropriately advised by competent legal counsel, and act accordingly.

(1) Support to Civilian Law Enforcement -- *The Posse comitatus Act.*

Generally, federal military forces may not give law enforcement assistance to civil authorities without running afoul of *The Posse Comitatus Act*. However, Constitutional and statutory

exceptions to this prohibition do exist. The recent emphasis on drug interdiction has led to an increase in those exceptions.

(a) *The Posse Comitatus Act* prescribes criminal penalties for use of the US Army or Air Force to execute the laws of or to perform civilian law enforcement functions within the US. DOD policy extends this prohibition to the US Navy and Marine Corps. Military personnel may not participate directly in arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles; in surveillance or pursuit; or as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.

(b) **Constitutional Exceptions.** Under its inherent authority, the US Government is responsible for preserving public order and carrying out governmental operations within its territorial limits, by force, if necessary. Under the Constitution, two exceptions allow the use of the military to execute or enforce the law: **when necessary to protect civilian property and functions** and **when necessary to protect federal property and functions**. In the latter, the President may order the armed forces to aid state civil authorities who are suffering from an insurrection or civil disturbance. The President must act personally by first issuing a proclamation calling upon insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably within a limited time (10 USC 331-333; 10 USC 3500; 10 USC 8500). Note: Not one of these authorities, in and of itself, provides sufficient legal basis to order the reserve components to active federal service.

(c) **Statutory Exceptions.** Other statutory exceptions (10 USC 371-380) allow military personnel to provide limited support to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) indirectly. Under these laws, the military may share certain information and provide equipment, facilities, and other services to LEAs. The annual *DOD Authorization Act* also contains exceptions concerning military support to civilian authorities fighting illegal drugs. DOD policies for providing support to LEAs are contained in DOD Directive 5525.5. AR 500-51 contains related US Army policies.

(2) Support for Domestic Disaster Relief -- *The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act.* *The Stafford Act*, 42 USC 5121, *et seq.*, as amended, is the statutory authority for federal domestic disaster assistance. It empowers the President to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response, which the President has delegated to FEMA. *The Stafford Act* provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, as well as the type and amount of federal assistance available. *The Act* authorizes the President to provide DOD assets for relief once he formally declares an emergency or a major disaster. He may also provide DOD assets for emergency work (like clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and temporary restoration of essential public facilities and services) for no longer than 10 days prior to the declaration. DOD policy for providing domestic disaster assistance is contained in DOD directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*. Army policy is found in AR 5 00-60, *Disaster Relief*.

(a) The Federal Response Plan (FRP). Once a state requests aid, the President may declare an emergency or a major disaster, enabling FEMA to act under the FRP. The FRP is a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between FEMA and other federal agencies, including DOD, to provide domestic disaster assistance. Under the FRP, a single federal agency is assigned primary responsibility for each of the twelve emergency support functions (ESFs)(transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy). FEMA orchestrates disaster relief through these ESFs. Each primary agency orchestrates the federal effort within its sphere of responsibility and may, if authorized by FEMA, task other agencies for support.

(b) DOD has primary responsibility for **ESF 3, Public Works**, and **ESF 9, Urban Search and Rescue**, and is a supporting agency for the remaining ten. The FEMA reimburses DOD for the incremental costs of providing the tasked assistance. Without specific FEMA tasking, DOD units lack authority to provide domestic disaster assistance and, if provided, risk not being reimbursed for its costs. If in doubt, commanders should seek clarification from the FEMA through the defense coordinating officer.

(3) Circumstances Concerning Elections. US law (18 USC 592) prescribes criminal penalties for US troops being at or near polling places. Commanders should determine if elections are scheduled during disaster assistance operations. For example, during JTF Andrews operations, FEMA asked DOD, at the request of Florida election officials, to erect 66 tents to serve as temporary polling sites. The Department of Justice (DOJ) opined that so long as DOD personnel did all they could to respect the integrity of the sites, they would not violate USC.

(4) Combatting Terrorism, Aircraft Piracy, and Other Operations. Various DOD directives outline the policies for maintaining security and combatting terrorism. Because DOD retains responsibility for protecting its resources, DOD domestic actions to combat terrorism do not always fall within the category of providing assistance to civilian authorities. OPLAN GARDEN PLOT contains DOD procedures for assisting the FBI in combating terrorism on and off US military installations.

(a) Combatting Terrorism. The **FBI** has overall jurisdiction at the scene of a terrorist incident wherever it occurs, including military installations. Commanders are responsible for the maintenance of law and order on their installations. DOD components are authorized to respond to reasonable requests from the FBI for military resources for use in combating terrorism. Without Presidential approval, military personnel may not be used in a law enforcement role outside of a military installation. With that approval, military personnel may perform missions designated by the FBI during a terrorist incident. However, command and control of the military always remain with the military chain of command.

(b) Aircraft Piracy. The **Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)** has exclusive responsibility for directing law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons on board in-flight aircraft involved in aircraft piracy. DOD is required, upon request of the FAA, to provide necessary assistance to carry out the air piracy laws. DOT and DOD have an MOU that covers DOD aircraft, regardless of location, and any non-DOD aircraft on military installations.

(c) Other Operations. DOD support to civilian agencies for other emergencies, such as hazardous substance cleanup, radiological threats, emergency evacuation, and flood control, may be under specific authority, for example, *The Flood Control Act*. Such support may also be executed in conjunction with other laws, policies, procedures, or regulations too numerous for this chapter. Legal advisors should be well-informed of military responsibilities in the commander's local area of operations. Several statutes permit the President, the SECDEF, or the service secretaries to use portions of the reserve components. For domestic disaster assistance, generally only two apply:

- **10 USC 672(b), The 15-Day Rule.** The secretary concerned may order reserve component units, and personnel not assigned to units, to active duty for a period not to exceed 15 days per year. Activating NG units and personnel requires the governor's consent. If a reserve unit uses this authority to perform annual training, the authority is no longer available until the next fiscal year.

- **10 USC 672(d), Volunteers.** The secretary concerned may order to active duty reserve component personnel who volunteer to serve no more than 30 days.

(5)Reimbursement. In addition to the authorities mentioned above, *The Economy Act* (31 USC 1535) permits federal agencies to provide goods and services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Stafford Disaster Relief Act requires reimbursement to DOD for the incremental costs of providing support. OPLAN GARDEN PLOT contains procedures for reimbursing DOD for assistance during civil disturbances. Other statutes permit federal agencies to seek waiver of reimbursement if support is provided in the normal course of military training or operations or if support results in a benefit to DOD that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise result from military training (10 USC 377). DOD usually makes this determination.

Logistics Support. Logistics in small wars is just as important as it is in war, and in many ways, it is more critical to success. Because some participating countries may be unable to do much more than contribute manpower, the US should expect to be in the lead for providing logistics support to a multinational effort. Logistics systems supporting either US or multinational forces operate within the constraints of existing SOFAs and the legal and political restraints governing US involvement. Particular care should be exercised in limiting adverse effects on the host nation economy by exceeding its capability to accommodate the required logistics support. Logistics units should be capable of self-defense, particularly those that deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.

a. Logistics Considerations. Logisticians will need to build a flexible operational support plan. Where multinational forces are involved, logistics planners must clarify guidance, funding, and support early to determine if the desire and capability to support other forces is present. Logistics personnel should keep in mind the following issues as they develop their plans.

(1) Fundamental logistics principles apply across the range of military operations, to include small wars. Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics in Joint Operations*, and FMFM 4, *Logistics* give specific guidance regarding these principles. The application and adaptation of these logistics principles (responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability, and survivability) is essential to establishing effective support.

(2) Logistics Mission Creep. Small wars are particularly susceptible to "logistics mission creep" due to the significant role logistics plays in most operations and the corresponding high visibility imposed by the media. Deployed US logistics resources often far exceed the capabilities of the host nation or civilian organizations responding to crises. Even if these assets are actually needed to sustain the military force in the accomplishment of the mandated mission, the uninformed public, fed by a critical media, may form harsh views hurtful to American interests if some of these "excess" resources are not utilized to support urgent humanitarian needs. Thus, while the actual end state (mission) may not officially change,

commanders may often find themselves reacting to logistics mission creep to avoid the perception that the US is heartless to human suffering. Commanders must also be aware that this same mission creep may result in unreimbursable expenses if not agreed to officially by the international community. Logisticians *must* anticipate the unexpected, conduct continual mission analysis, press for mandated mission refinement, and plan accordingly.

(3) Mission Termination. Even while they are planning for and executing the operation, logisticians should be planning for mission termination. This will include the consideration of what logistics infrastructure, material, and equipment will remain in-country, and what is required for redeployment of forces, material, and equipment.

(4) Multinational Logistics Organizations. Since small wars are usually joint, and often multinational, in flavor, US forces may be required to participate in UN or multinational logistics organizations. These may include a multinational deployment agency (MDA) or theater logistics command.

(5) Service Logistics Policies and Procedures. Joint logistics should use existing individual Service policies and procedures whenever possible. If this is not possible, the commander should identify the differences to the supported combatant commander for resolution.

(6) Funding. This may be one of the most complex and time-consuming tasks for the commander and his staff. For success, it is essential that a policy be developed for **funding** the small wars. The question of reimbursement involves many legal gates that may have to be met in order to qualify. Commanders should scrutinize all existing regulations, mandates, statutes, and agreements to maintain maximum situational awareness in this area.

(7) Logistics will have to support both military and nonmilitary humanitarian operations, especially with large-scale catastrophes. Organizations in the relief and development business may call on the military for logistics support in extraordinary

circumstances. They may need manpower, equipment, expertise, transport, and communications capacities that only the military can deploy. Military commanders should establish close liaison with the major organizations operating in-country to anticipate needs, plan response, and prioritize support between military and civilian agencies.

b. Logistics Organization. The J-4/G-4 organization should be tailored to respond to the anticipated operation. To accomplish this, it should include specialists from the various logistics areas: fuels, water, supply, transportation, medical, engineering, logistics plans, maintenance, and services. Logistics responsibilities follow single-Service command channels; it is therefore critical that the J-4 staff have representatives or liaison personnel from each Service involved in the JTF.

(1) Logistics Readiness Center (LRC). Commanders should consider establishing an LRC to serve as their logistics command centers, The LRC can provide the link to interface with JCS, the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and other supporting commands and agencies. The LRC manages the combatant commander's directive authority over logistics and provides the coordination required to resolve logistics issues and problems. It acts as the commander's agent for requesting additional resources, deconflicting demands on common use resources (when demand exceeds capabilities), and coordinating logistics with other multinational forces at the DOS and JCS levels. It also monitors and coordinates theater force movement, provides distribution management by overseeing the movement of material and the subsequent resupply and sustainment of the operation, and maintains total asset (TAV) and in-transit visibility (ITV) oversight.

(2) Staff Billets. The following staff billets require personnel experienced in joint and multinational operations and should be part of the J-4/G-4 organization.

- (a)** Postal officer(s) to coordinate transportation of bulk mail.
- (b)** Supply/contracting officer(s) with appropriate warrants,
- (c)** Explosive ordnance disposal personnel (civil war = mines!).

- (d) Preventive medicine and veterinarian support teams.
- (e) Transportation officer(s).
- (f) Customs official(s).
- (g) Engineer(s) or facility manager(s).
- (h) Embarkation officer(s)/specialist(s).

(3) Logistics Coordination and Communications Links. It is critical that the commander and his staff establish effective coordination and communications links with the RN, NGOs, PVOs, and multinational forces.

(4) Liaison Officers (LNOs) and Interpreters. LNOs and interpreters will be essential in dealing with the FIN, multinational forces, and the civilian populace.

(5) Logistics Situation Report (LOGSTAT). One officer should be assigned whose primary duty is the preparation of the LOGSTAT for the supported combatant commander. This single point of contact for the supported combatant commander builds confidence and becomes the expert for JTF logistics status and issues. This has proven to be a significant advantage in past peace operations.

(6) LOGSTAT and NGOs/PVOs. The LOGSTAT should attempt to incorporate the capabilities of all the NGO and PVO logistics organizations. The LOGSTAT should clearly identify what shortfalls exist, what actions are being taken to resolve the issues, and if any assistance is required from DLA or any other organization.

d. Logistics Considerations.

(1) Coordination. Operations and logistics are inseparable; neither can claim primacy. The J-3/G-3 and the J-4/G-4 must become a team with a logistics representative working in the future operations cell (FOPs), if one is established.

(2) Forward Impetus. Forward Impetus requires a system of continuous replenishment, either automatic (push) or requisitioning (pull). Services use different methods for different classes of supply; commanders should define their requirements during the assessment process and pass these requirements to their Service component commanders. The process of defining requirements should be reviewed periodically and refined if required. The Service component commanders will determine the best method of continuous replenishment.

(3) Balance of Forces. Commanders should consider not only US combat and combat support forces, but also multinational requirements. Regardless of any prior agreement, other nations tend to look to the US for support; therefore, US support forces may have to be larger than initially planned. The J-4 should pass JTF logistics requirements to the Service components, which then can best determine logistics force structure.

(4) Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistics operations in both joint and multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services, but also among governmental departments and agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and multinational forces.

(5) Apportionment and Allocation. Apportionment is a prioritization for planning, while allocation is a grant of a commodity or service. Failure to maintain a system of apportionment and allocation can cause inflation of priorities (the ultimate breakdown of the priority system) and loss of control over the logistics system.

(6) Logistics Discipline. Excess stock or unwise use of priorities decreases flexibility and drains transportation resources from other operational priorities.

(7) Reserve Component Force Requirements. Identification of requirements for reserve units and personnel augmentation is essential as it may determine how fast an operation can proceed and the lead times for obtaining support. Once identified, reserve requirements should be made known to the supported combatant commander.

e. Transportation. Transportation by air, land, and sea, is the "linchpin" of small wars, and the J-4/G-4 must understand the roles and functions of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the JTF.

(1) Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The commander needs the capability to monitor and track movement of forces, equipment, and supplies in-country.

(2) Commanders must prioritize their transportation; if surface delivery is available, it should be used. Shipping everything immediately by air should be avoided, and will not probably be possible due to the chronic shortage of strategic airlift. Requirements and priorities should be provided to USTRANSCOM. The **Defense Transportation System (DTS)** will effectively move those requirements.

(3) USTRANSCOM. The commander's logistics team should develop a good understanding of and working relationship with USTRANSCOM since it will be providing the **strategic air, land, and sea transportation** to move US forces. USTRANSCOM also:

- Procures commercial transportation services through component commands and activates (with SECDEF approval) the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Aeromedical Evacuation, Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and Sealift Readiness Program.
- Provides representatives to the commander's assessment team to help evaluate seaports, airports, and inland transportation system requirements.
- Provides representatives through its Transportation Component Commands (TCCs) for continued support at airports, seaports, and movement control centers.
- Monitors movement data and maintains the JOPES database. Coordinates critical movement phases and access to JOPES via GCCS/WWMCCS.

(4) Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated as operations progress. Establishment of an in-theater hub or **Joint Movement Center (JMC)** maximizes cargo throughput. Commanders do not want material arriving before equipment is on hand to offload it or personnel deploying too far in advance of their equipment. Commanders should integrate intratheater and intertheater movement requirements. Transportation assets, such as pallets and containers, should be returned to DTS as quickly as possible.

(5) Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). USTRANSCOM will normally assign the DIRMOBFOR from its air component, Air Mobility Command (AMC), to the JTF. The DIRMOBFOR may deploy with an Air Mobility Element (AME), which brings all the necessary functional experts to support, plan, monitor, and execute the theater air mobility mission (air refueling and airlift). The DIRMOBFOR has dual responsibilities:

(a) Coordinates and monitors the strategic airlift flow into theater. In this capacity, the DIRMOBFOR serves as a liaison between USTRANSCOM and the CJTF.

(b) Controls and directs all theater air mobility forces through the AME, which deploys as the DIRMOBFOR's planning and operation staff. Note: In the event that a JTF organization includes a joint force air component commander (JFACC), the DIRMOBFOR will become a part of the JFACC and the AME will integrate into the air operations center. If the JTF does not include a JFACC, the DIRMOBFOR and the AME are administratively attached to the JTF staff.

f. Logistics Planning. Logistics for small wars is complex due to the interdependence of Service components, DLA and other agencies, FIN, and multinational forces. Early involvement of the logistics staff is critical to success of the operation and ensures that sustainment requirements are balanced with capabilities.

(1) Logistics Plans. Logistics plans should be integrated with component commands and other organizations and agencies, as well as FIN and multinational forces, to ensure success.

(2) JTF Assessment Team Logistics Representatives should:

(a) Review lessons learned databases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas.

(b) Work with transportation specialists from USTRANSCOM and the TCCs to evaluate airports, seaports, and inland transportation systems' capabilities and requirements. These specialists can determine personnel augmentation requirements and equipment for mission support. Additionally, early receipt of basing rights and diplomatic clearances is critical to the mobility success.

(c) Evaluate HN health services, preventive medicine requirements, medical logistics support, and infectious disease risks (e.g., the quality of the water sources). They should also determine the requirements for an entomologist for vector control, and resolve the JTF medical equipment and supplies requirements (as medical items frequently require long lead times and special handling).

(d) Assess HN capabilities to provide support services, storage, and materials. (Maximum use of FIN support and services can lesson the number of military personnel required and support subsequent efforts to reestablish national infrastructure).

(e) Determine the capabilities of existing infrastructure using an engineer or facility manager. They can provide critical information on the availability of existing permanent and semipermanent facilities (e.g., water treatment plants, bulk and retail fuel storage).

(f) Obtain funding codes from the supported combatant commander or Service component commanders and then determine what methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures.

(g) Consider the funding requirements for renting facilities and contracting services from the host nation to support the operations.

(h) Plan for Sustainment; it will not take care of itself.

(3) Requirements and Sourcing. Planners should identify requirements and pass them to the Service components for sourcing. Working with the Service components, the J-4 can determine whether the JTF support should be provided from military (Services), civilian sources, HN, UN, or other nations.

(4) Resupply Method. Planners should determine the JTF resupply requirements and make recommendation to the Services on the best resupply method, e.g., the "push" or "pull" resupply method.

(5) Medical Considerations. The commander must be sensitive to the critical need for **disease prevention**. Medical specialists should deploy early to identify infectious disease risks. Additionally, US forces must receive adequate immunizations and other forms of prophylaxis. Medical personnel must work on controlling how disease travels, provide input to the water support plan, and monitor field sanitation and hygiene efforts.

(6) Water is Critical. Determine the best method for providing potable water: (1) land-based reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs), (2) ROWPU barges, or (3) bottled water. Each has its own advantages and drawbacks. Bottled water may have an added advantage of enhancing troop morale. It is essential that the JTF has an **effective water support plan**, to include inputs from engineers, medical personnel, and other staff officers.

(7) Sanitation and Waste Facilities are also critical, especially in more rural, under-developed nations where modern plumbing, water supplies, and waste treatment facilities are unavailable. Adequate numbers of waste facilities must be established before the arrival of major units to avoid disastrous overflow or overburdening of the system, environmental crises, health problems, and serious morale deterioration. The JTF's waste storage and disposal plan should include inputs from engineers, medical personnel, and contracting officers.

(8) Intelligence Support for the operation can be enhanced by information provided from logistics personnel such as truck drivers, engineers, medical personnel, etc. Drivers have the best information on the road conditions, attitude of the local populations, locations of checkpoints, and the ability to get through. The J-2/G-2 and J-4/G-4 should establish a system to gather such information.

(9) Security. Adequate security must be provided for logistics assets. Combat service support units should be prepared to provide their own local (base) security.

(10) Support to Local Population. Logistics plans need to be specific and address the tailored requirements of the local population being supported to ensure relief supplies are applicable (correct sizes, types). Early determination of the support required to aid the civilian populace will assist in developing a supporting plan. This may include providing medical care, and thus will require consideration of the mix of care-provider skills, instrument sizes, drugs, and supplies to support pediatric, geriatric, and obstetric problems.

(11) Interagency Logistics Challenges. The UN, NGOs, PVOs, and IOs, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, can cause transportation "choke points" en route to and within theater. Seaport and airport facilities may have to be shared. Planners should consider setting up a Multinational Deployment Agency (MDA) to deconflict movement of all forces and agencies in the JOA.

(12) Diplomats and Distinguished Visitors. Planners should establish procedures for providing support (transportation, housing, messing, etc.) to diplomats and distinguished visitors. A Joint Visitors Bureau (JVB) can assist in satisfying this requirement.

(13) Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. The J-4/G-4 needs to continually assess all logistics requests, requirements, and actions to ensure they pass a "sanity check" and are valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the JTF.

(14) Exchange Facility. Commanders should consider establishing a common "exchange" for the JTF. A well-stocked exchange will not only provide personnel support items, but will also serve as a morale booster.

(15) Mortuary plans should include procedures and policies for US forces, local civilians, and multinational forces, and need to be coordinated with DOS.

(16) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) can provide a myriad of services such as well drilling, laundry, power generation, portalets, cranes, and port support. Requests for LOGCAP support should be made to the supported combatant commander. LOGCAP can be expensive; funding guidance is required. The LOGCAP program can be used to transition from military to civilian-controlled operations. In addition, it can be used to manage limited logistics resources, i.e., hire contractors instead of the call-up of military reservists.

(17) Contracting Considerations (supported by the legal advisor) should include civilian labor, barge usage, storage/refrigeration trailer requirements, commercial vehicles, warehouse space availability, facilities (chapel, kennel, post office, fuel depot), administrative needs, printing needs, ADP requirements, telephone service, fuel storage, manufacture of crates, signs, and similar objects, messing for the advanced party, and initial mortuary processing and disposition as appropriate to the operation.

(18) Miscellaneous but by no means extraneous. Planners should also consider the requirements for adequate personnel support and accountability, religious support, band support, finance operations, legal services, and recreation.

(19) The Joint Electronic Library (JEL), Joint Pubs 3-0, 4-0, and **5-03.2** can provide further planning guidance and areas to consider when developing the logistics plan.

g. Multinational Logistics. The US logistician, as part of a multinational staff will confront differences in terminology, procedures, cultural attitudes, and preferences related to all aspects of logistics. Multinational commanders or staffs may place demands on the system without understanding the capabilities and limitations of logistics elements. They may also require results not attainable through the logistics system or give directions that may conflict with established policies or procedures. Thus, **it is to the US commander's advantage to attain as much control over logistics as possible** through diplomacy, knowledge of multinational forces' doctrine, and good relations with military commanders and civilian leaders.

(1) Standardization. The chief logistics officers of the small wars forces must ensure that standardized logistics procedures are based on mutual understanding. Potential problems can be avoided by identifying early the differences among the nations' and Services' **logistics doctrine, stockage levels, interoperability, and accountability.** Additionally, the logistics staff should consider the **cultural differences** (language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks) which may have an impact on logistics support to multinational forces.

(2) Support to Multinational and Civilian forces. Sustainment of forces is each nation's responsibility; however, some nations do not have deployable logistics capabilities and become totally dependent on the US or the UN for support. The JTF should be prepared to support forces from other nations and/or civilian organizations to include sustainment, airlift to move supplies, and development of their logistics structure.

(3) Multinational Deployment Agency (MDA). Logisticians may establish a Multinational Deployment Agency (MDA) to deconflict the movement of other deploying forces into the JOA. The MDA would be an expansion of the Joint Movement Center (JMC) and would be responsible for creating a combined multinational time-phased force and deployment list that would deconflict initial movement plans and the actual deployment.

(4) Single Theater Logistics Command. Some nations will not relinquish directive authority over their logistics forces, assets, and systems. The creation of a single theater logistics command provides economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if multinational participants insist upon maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort.

(5) Funding Guidance. Commanders must ensure that funding lines are clearly identified and procedures are developed to ensure there will be no adverse impact on operations.

(6) Consensus. The commander should form early consensus on multinational logistics issues and requirements. The commander may not be able to direct or demand action, but rather, will have to tactfully request action.

(7) Medical Treatment. A policy for providing medical treatment to multinational forces should be developed.

(8) List of Current Agreements. A list should be developed of current agreements with other participating nations that provide for logistics support.

(9) Quality Controls amid Compliance. The J-4 should establish quality controls and monitor compliance for all multinational-provided services and supplies such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), water, food, etc.

h. UN Logistics. A small staff of military officers from member nations assists the UN's military advisor in logistics planning. UN support plans rely on member states to be **self-sufficient** at the unit level for **60 to 120 days**. This period allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) which will provide some logistics support for the forces involved in small wars. Funding for UN operations is only approved after establishment of the force and only for the period of the mandate. If events cause the nature or duration of operations to change, mandates will require amendment, and additional funding may be delayed. Participating forces must plan flexibility and alternate funding sources into their logistics plans to anticipate fluctuating funds availability from the UN.

(1) UN assessment or survey teams deploy to the projected operations area to evaluate the operation requirements, refine force size and composition, and develop logistical planning data for force deployment and sustainment. When participating in UN missions, US commanders should send logistics and engineering representatives with the UN mission survey team. US efforts to participate or coordinate with UN forces will improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts for facilities or resources. To ensure standardized logistics procedures are understood, logisticians should pay particular attention to the *Guidelines for Contributing Nations*, published by the UN.

(2) Once established, the **UN logistics support structure** will normally provide a measure of continuing support through a system of Lead Nations, civilian contractual **arrangements, a UN Force Logistics Support Group**, or a combination of the above. A Lead Nation is a nation assigned to provide the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement.

(3) The UN normally coordinates such logistics areas as **bulk supplies** (water, fuel, and rations of common user items, i.e., UN clothing, domestic consumables, batteries, some vehicle spares, etc.) and **services** (waste disposal, laundry, and bath).

(4) For UN operations, the **US commander should determine what standards are to be followed in regard to support.** US standards tend to exceed UN standards (e.g., consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels). US military equipment and systems sophistication may be different than the standards of support the UN has agreed to provide or is willing to fund. UN standards must be clearly understood in regard to level and quality of support provided and funded. Logistics support that is significantly more extensive than what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable.

(5) The JTF must be prepared to **bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient,** especially in critical areas such as medical.

(6) **Funding.** The UN will reimburse contributing countries for the costs of operations per UN guidelines, aides-memoir, notes verbal, and specific and general letters of assist (LOA). If possible, the UN must approve all elements of national contributions prior to the actual deployment. Any costs incurred for activities not agreed to by the UN will not normally be reimbursed. US logisticians should track items that the UN agrees to reimburse. UN reimbursement is contingent on validation of requirements prior to obligation of funds and verification that supplies and services were rendered.

i. Host Nation Support. The US forces logistics staff should centralize the coordination of RN functions, i.e., requirement identification, procurement, etc. CA personnel can coordinate with EN support resources and provide valuable assistance to the logistics staff.

(1) **HN Support Negotiation.** To negotiate for FIN support, authority must be obtained through the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOS. FIN agreements should include the authority for the commander to coordinate directly with the HN for support and use of facilities.

(2) **HN Agreements.** The staff should develop a list of current FIN agreements, assess what types of support and supplies can be provided by the BIN, and determine how they can reduce the US forces logistics foot print. The legal advisor can be very helpful in the

development process for FIN agreements. Procedures and agreements should be developed for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire (wage scale), and customs regulations.

(3) Lead Agency. It is critical to determine a lead agency (UN, Service, or other agency) for contracting and negotiating for support. During the assessment process, the J-4/G-4 should determine and evaluate HN transportation, facilities, equipment, and capabilities. Distribution of humanitarian aid should be coordinated with the FIN, NGOs, and PVOs.

Transition Planning. US forces involved in small wars must be prepared to transition quickly from combat to noncombat, noncombat to combat, or to postconflict operations. In the multinational arena of most small wars, this process requires detailed planning in order to execute successfully. The mission analysis, end state, and political policy will all play an important role in the very situationally dependent transition process.

a. Combat to Post-conflict. The **objective** of these operations is to return to an environment of peace as expeditiously as possible, while also increasing the probability of sustained peace. US forces focus on restoring order, minimizing confusion, reestablishing the HN infrastructure, and preparing forces for redeployment. Under the guidance of the DOS and the JTF, US forces may be directed to help reinforce or reestablish formal institutions eliminated during combat operations and to improve postcombat population attitudes towards the US.

(1) Tasks. Many tasks not usually done by military forces may be required until FIN or USG agencies reestablish presence. These may include refugee control, transition to civil authorities, support to truce negotiations, civil affairs (CA) support to reestablish a civil government, psychological operations (PSYOP) to foster continued peaceful relations, public services, and health assistance.

(2) Realignment in joint force structure, The JFC's planning and continuous development of the situation will reveal the nature and scope of these activities and the forces

required. These forces may be available within the joint force or may be required from another theater or from Reserve components.

b. Noncombat to Combat. US forces involved in small wars must always be prepared to handle an escalation in the crisis, to include the environment going from nonhostile to hostile. Continual mission analysis and evaluation of shifts in the political climate may assist in anticipating this change. Since terrorist activity is always a possibility, US forces must at a minimum be ready to defend themselves and to provide adequate force security. Actual escalation to longer term combat operations will require NCA approval and, more than likely, new resolutions or mandates from the UN.

c. Termination of Operations. As in war, small wars operational planning includes actions to be taken once the operation is complete. These may include transition to civil authority, processing of enemy prisoners of war or detained foreign nationals, disarming the population, training FIN self-defense forces, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, and redeploying forces. The manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may heavily influence the perception of the *legitimacy*; therefore, careful planning is required. Additionally, proper accountability of both funds and equipment expended enables funds to be disbursed and reimbursed.

d. Planning Considerations. Planning and conducting the transition requires a variety of perspectives, expertise, cooperation, and assistance from governmental agencies, other services, and alliance or coalition partners.

(1) As the redeployment stage nears, the number one priority for commanders should be **force security**.

(2) Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning and mission analysis. The **future plans section (J-5/G-5)**, which plans the next MEF mission, should develop a transition plan as an initial step in the transition process. Planners should identify

issues and key events (past and present), analyze the work required to accomplish the transition, and acquire a thorough understanding of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

(3) Some **questions that may impact transition** include timing, funding, remain-behind issues (who and what will remain, what will the US command relationships be, what are their communications requirements, who will support them), intelligence sharing, ROE, effect on ongoing operations with NGOs and PVOs (will they be discontinued or interrupted), engineer project completion, and expectations for US communications support for the incoming force or organization.

(4) Planning should **link the departure of the US force with the anticipated arrival of the force or organization taking charge**. Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed. This is critical to maintaining readiness for future operations.

(5) The plan should be kept "**unclassified**" and use of military **acronyms should be avoided**.

(6) The **entire staff should provide input** to the transition plan. Nothing is "purely routine" when dealing with the UN, multinational military forces, or civilian organizations. Turnover files should highlight how staffs are organized, how they function, and recommend how the incoming staff should be organized.

(7) **Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount**. Dealing with the UN can be very frustrating. Funding can be a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Also, ensuring a sufficient number of UN staff and officers are deployed to help in the transition planning may be difficult.

(8) **The incoming headquarters should be collocated** with the US forces

headquarters. This may enhance the effort to truly incorporate the new staff with the old.

Negotiation and Mediation.⁶⁵ Because small wars often involve activities trying to deter war, resolve conflict, and keep the peace, military commanders and their subordinates may find themselves filling the role of negotiator, mediator, or even arbitrator. While not formally trained to fill this role, military leaders are well suited to conduct negotiations because of their backgrounds in problem identification and resolution. However, negotiation is no simple task, and there is no exact blueprint or formula for success. Leaders must prepare emotionally, intellectually, physically, and professionally to take on these ultra-sensitive discussions. Results of negotiations can have national and international implications and, if done improperly or ineffectively, can affect the legitimacy and unity of effort for the entire operation.

a. General. The following are guidelines for leaders anticipating participation in the negotiation, mediation, or arbitration process.

(1) Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: between US agencies and departments; between the multinational partners; between the JTF and UN agencies; and between the JTF and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations requires several traits to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open-mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

(2) Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. It is important to understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature. Maintain dialogue with **all** parties, friendly and opposition. Establish open lines of communications with all groups, organizations, governments, factions, and militias that may impact the operation.

(3) Do not allow any one incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied). Creating an atmosphere of hostility will not lead to resolution.

(4) Negotiation is an **exercise in persuasion**. It is a way to advance interests by jointly decided action. Parties need to cooperate with each other to solve problems; consider each other as partners more than adversaries.

(5) **Be attuned to cultural differences.** Within the various agencies and departments of the US Government, **organizational cultures** exist. Recognizing and respecting these internal cultures may assist in positively shaping the context of negotiations from the US side. Understanding **national cultural differences**, of course, is equally as important. Actions by different cultures can have different connotations. Verbal and body language can mean different things to different people. Before and during meetings, symbolic rituals, protocols, and even posture can communicate volumes, good and bad, and may dramatically affect the outcome if ignored or are done improperly.

b. Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation. Successful negotiations should be based on the following steps:

(1) **Establish communications.** Link up with the political or faction leader. Do not assume opposition to US positions without careful investigation. Fact-find before forming opinions. In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, navigate carefully in determining who the legitimate community leaders are that can make lasting agreements. If acting in the role of mediator or arbitrator, remain neutral and avoid being used by either side. Expect some of the belligerents to negotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist issues to their advantage to prolong negotiations while they continue to violate agreements.

(2) **Be prepared to be firm, fair, and polite.** In order to gain and keep the trust of all parties, be tactful, resourceful, objective, impartial, and patient; have a sense of proportion; and be painstakingly attentive to detail. On matters of principle, be insistent without being offensive, and be careful not to pass the confidences of one side to another. Simple acts to preserve a party's dignity may relax tension and defuse a crisis.

(3) Develop a strategic plan and diagram the results of analysis. Ask the following questions during the analysis:

- What are the main issues? Have any of them been raised before? If so, what were the outcomes?
- Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?
- What are these parties' publicly stated positions? Privately stated positions?
- What are the underlying interests behind these positions?
- What are their concerns? fears?
- Is there any historical baggage? To what degree might it affect them?
- What agreements or understandings exist that may have a bearing?
- What are the US policies on the issues? What is the higher commander's intent?
- What authority will the team have to negotiate?

(4) Set clear goals and objectives. Know the limits of authority for accomplishing the objectives. Plan the approach. Prepare to settle easy issues first, then settle issue by issue in some order. Create linkages between issues if it will help. Separate unrelated issues. Consider having details worked out in later negotiations with area experts.

(5) Work to find common ground on which to build meaningful dialogue. Expect to spend considerable time on deciding what the exact problem is. Be problem-oriented at this stage vice solution-oriented.

(6) Think what will happen if negotiation fails. Then educate and persuade the other party that negotiation will produce the most benefits for them. If a party perceives that NOT negotiating will yield a better outcome for them, it may NOT negotiate.

(7) Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.

(8) Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking.

(9) Assume the role of convener, facilitator, or mediator when necessary. Attempt to gain and keep the confidence of the parties involved. Negotiations can be exhausting, time-consuming, and frustrating; however, they can prevent unnecessary loss of life and offer the best long-term prospect for a final peaceful settlement. Be patient. Maintain neutrality. Be courteous. Avoid being used.

(10) Identify the right participants for the negotiating team in advance. Will it include ambassador/JTF commander-level, mid-level, or working-level personnel? Who are the appropriate representatives to interface with the various interested parties? Do they possess the status, ability, and authority to deal with the leadership representing all involved parties? Also, consider the culture when constructing the team: What role do women play in their society? How is status defined in their culture? Include appropriate experts such as legal advisors, political representatives (e.g., DOS, UN agencies, or others), military staff (J-3, J-4, J-5), and other civilian representatives from the JTF or NGOs/PVOs.

(11) Speak with one voice. Members of the negotiating team should understand the broad issues (as well as their own areas of expertise) and speak with one voice. This will require prior preparation within the US delegation to ensure no major conflicting views will be aired at the negotiating table. All must understand and support the policy and direction from higher authority. Ensure negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their authority. When unable to resolve a conflict, they should not hesitate to refer problems to the next higher level.

(12) Ensure all decision-makers who will determine whether or not an agreement reached is implemented are represented in the US delegation. Negotiations can be time-consuming and frustrating, especially if the right people are not effectively represented.

(13) Develop a supportive climate for the decision-makers. Use informal liaison and get to know the people who support the decision-makers. Attempt to learn from them how to help their superiors reach agreement. Sincerity, genuine interest, and professional conduct during this liaison will help foster trust and promote dialogue.

(14) Establish the venue. What is the manner in which meetings can be called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should the US representatives go to the factional leader's location, or will this send the wrong message? Consider the details such as the seating arrangements or specific settings traditionally used in the culture. Ensure the security of all involved parties, and arrange for accessibility, interpreters, availability of communications facilities, and comfort. Establish the rules for the media: Will the sessions be open or closed? Will there be free access by all media, or will a pool provide coverage for all?

(15) Share information relevant to negotiations with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances. All information generated from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision will depend on the nature of the talks, If publicity may help create support and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive.

(16) Assign experienced interpreters, not just literal translators, on the negotiating team to assist communications and to bridge the cultural gaps. Their understanding of the cultural context of terms and gestures used can significantly affect the success of the negotiation.

(17) Study how various cultures or factions resolve conflict amongst themselves, and then consider using them in the negotiation process. Adapting US techniques with indigenous ones may help cross cultural lines and improve the prospects for a settlement.

(18) Understand negotiating styles of the various parties. Different cultures reason, negotiate, and exercise authority in different ways. Behavior in dimensions such as protocol and time may vary. Many nations are more concerned with long-term relationships, group honor, the historical context, principles, symbolism, status, and saving-face. Indirect answers and nonverbal gestures may be the only clues to relate a party's position. To ensure unintended meanings are not sent, US negotiators need to be careful with their wording and gestures as well.

(19) Conduct the negotiations professionally. Remember the customary salutations and exchanges of courtesies. Introduce the team and any advisors. Introduce the delegates by name. During the introduction, attempt to make the delegates feel at ease and assess their mood. Allow each side to state their case without interruption, premature judgements, or concessions. Make a record of issues presented by each side. If incorrect statements are made, provide evidence or proof to establish the facts. If there is a preferred solution, present it and encourage all sides to accept it. Close the meeting by explaining exactly what has been agreed to and what actions are expected to be taken. Be prepared to present this in writing for signatures if appropriate.

(20) Even if agreement cannot be reached, keep the dialogue going. At a minimum, seek agreement on when the parties will meet again. Look for something to keep the momentum alive. Go back to earlier discussions on common ground. Seek to keep trust alive in the process.

(21) Select one person on the team who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to advise the negotiating team on the progress of the meetings. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the negotiation is going. In turn, he or she may be able to coach the team in more effective negotiating techniques.

(22) Prepare a report at the conclusion of negotiations to ensure all

accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use. Consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to all participants what has taken place. This can build trust in the process if it is viewed as an honest effort to understand each side's position.

Chapter 7

Training for Small Wars

"Presence...Persistence...Patience"

-- Dr. Larry Cable's recommended buzzwords for counterinsurgency doctrine provided to MC Command & Staff College Students on 15 April 1996

*"In small wars, the normal separation of limits, both in garrison as well as in the field, requires that all military qualities be well developed in both the individual and the unit. Particular attention should be- paid to the development of initiative, adaptability, leadership, teamwork, and tactical proficiency... These qualities, while important in no small degree in major war, are exceedingly important in small wars operations."*⁶⁶

-- NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual* (1940), Chapter IV, Training

*"One cannot succeed with peace operations if one allows subordinate commanders and men in the field to give way to their natural inclinations, and act the way they are trained to act in war. With proper measures, good commanders can make the distinction understood up and down the line, and do so without losing the ability to respond fast and forcefully should there be a situation that calls for it."*⁶⁷

-- Ambassador Robert Oakley
President's Special Envoy for Somalia

Training

Readying forces for small wars requires building on the primary purpose of the Armed Forces: to fight and win the nation's wars, in small wars, military personnel adapt their warfighting skills to the situation. Training needs to be a continuing process, expanding and enhancing warrior training to take into consideration the unique aspects of small wars. Staff training, in particular, must emphasize cooperation--learning to work and operate with a diverse set of militaries and civilian organizations. Small wars training requires a two-pronged approach:

a. Professional Military Education. The first prong is the professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers. Their formal small wars education begins with basic leadership training and culminates at the senior service or academy level. The focus of small wars education is to ensure leaders at all levels understand the principles and characteristics of small wars, and can plan and conduct these operations. As leaders progress, they will learn about small wars at a level applicable to their current and next grade. Leader education will include discussions, lessons learned, and situational exercises, and should culminate with senior leaders performing in a command or staff position during a small wars exercise.

b. Training of Individuals, Units, and Staffs. The second prong is the training of individuals, units, and staffs. The focus of this training is to ensure that individuals and units have the necessary skills for a given small wars, and that the staffs can plan, control, and support the operation through all phases and shifts in levels of conflict. Commanders should consider sustainment and post-operations training, as well as joint and multinational unit and staff training.

(1) Predeployment Training. While many aspects of normal military operations apply to small wars, small wars requires an adjustment of attitude and approach. Predeployment training could include (but is not limited to) individual skill training, field training exercises, combined arms live fire exercises, mobility exercises, command post exercises, and simulation exercises to train commanders, staffs, and components. If there is

sufficient time prior to actual deployment for an operation, units should culminate their predeployment training in a joint training exercise.

(2) Training While Deployed. Once deployed, as the situation allows, commanders should continue to train in warfighting skills. Note that some training evolutions (e.g., live fire exercises) may appear offensive to the host nation or other countries involved in small wars. Forces must understand ROE and have a basic understanding of the customs, cultures, religious practices, political situation, historical background, and population of the affected country. Additionally, personnel should receive training in working with the media, negotiation skills, and language training (e.g., knowledge of key phrases). Representatives from NGOs, PVOs, and news media should also be included in staff training.

(3) Training Following Deployment. Training following redeployment should again focus on the unit's wartime mission. A force trained and ready for warfighting can adapt quickly to small wars under the leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers well educated in the conduct of small wars.

c. Negotiation and Mediation Training. Leaders participating in small wars need training in cross-cultural conflict resolution. Too many officers have had to develop this skill through on-the-job training. Predeployment training programs can ensure a basic foundation, while long-term professional development programs can build more in-depth negotiation skills. In all cases, leaders need to know that they may be placed in a position that requires them to mediate or negotiate, whether on the battlefield or during peace operations.

Conclusion. Small wars require Marines well-founded in small unit warfighting skills who are innovative, flexible, and adaptable. The complex and highly political nature of these operations demands Marines comfortable around chaos. Leaders should avoid prescriptive methods in their training and use this publication only as a stepping stone-towards understanding the small wars environment. Training should encourage Marines at the lowest level to exercise their initiative and try innovative solutions to difficult problems. Naturally, some training and operations must be guided by rules, checklists, and SOPs. What should be nurtured is the growth of a *mindset*

more than anything else. In developing small warfighters, we need to train savvy, visceral, nonlinear Marines who not only can *thrive in chaos*, but actually *seek* it for the rush it gives.

Appendix A

United States Government Agencies

US Marine forces conduct small wars in close cooperation with or under the supervision of other United States Government agencies. This appendix provides commanders and their staffs with information about possible players in small wars with whom they may be unfamiliar. It includes descriptions of these entities and their' functions and roles, but it is not an exhaustive treatment of all possibilities.⁶⁸

a. National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA is formed by the **President** and the **Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)**. ONLY the NCA can authorize military action. The NCA issues orders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

b. National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the principal forum to consider national security issues requiring Presidential decision. Membership includes the **President**, the **Vice President**, the **Secretary of State**, and **SECDEF**. The CJCS and Director of Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) serve as statutory advisors. NSC develops policy guidance for employment of military assets and conduct of operations.

c. Department of Defense (DOD). DOD plays a key role in NCA and NSC actions and is a major player in the interagency arena. DOD interacts with practically every government agency and department from the strategic down to the operational level. Under the **President**, who is also the **Commander in Chief**, the **SECDEF** exercises authority, direction, and control of the Department. DOD includes the separately organized **Military Departments** of the Army, Navy (includes Marine Corps), and Air Force; the **Joint Chiefs of Staff**; the **Unified Combatant Commands**, and various defense agencies and field activities.

d. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS consist of the **Chairman**, the **Vice Chairman**, the **Chief of Staff of the Army**, the **Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)**, the **Chief of Staff of the Air Force**, and the **Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)**. The JCS is responsible for designating the supported and supporting commands for any operation. **The Chairman, JCS (CJCS)** is the principle military advisor to the President, SECDEF, and NSC. The CJCS and his staff do not exercise military command over any combatant forces, but interpret and transmit Presidential or Secretarial decisions to the Unified Combatant Commanders.

e. Department of State (DOS). The DOS, led by the Secretary of State, advises the President in the formulation and execution of foreign, policy. DOS engages in major interagency coordination both within the US and internationally, negotiates treaties and agreements with foreign nations, speaks for the US in the UN and in more than 50 major international organizations, and represents the US at more than 800 international conferences annually.

(1) Roles. In its **diplomatic** role, DOS is the "eyes and ears" of the US Government abroad; it collects, analyzes, and provides national security and economic information and most of the data on the policies and inner workings of the countries of the world for the use of the entire government. In its **consular** function, DOS assists US travelers and citizens abroad and assists in implementing US immigration and naturalization laws. In the accomplishment of its foreign affairs mission, DOS functions both as the lead Washington-based agency and as a core of US representation abroad.

(2) Overseas Organizations. Overseas, DOS is represented by **Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)** personnel who are the core staff at every one of more than 300 US embassies, consulates-general, consulates, and missions to international diplomatic organizations. They are assisted by another 10,000 career employees who are **Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs)** working at the posts.

(3) Embassies. Embassies are the basic unit for the conduct of diplomacy overseas and are headed by an Ambassador, who is a Presidential appointee and, as the President's personal representative, the senior US official in the country. Military force commanders should be familiar with the duties of the following State Department officials and organizations normally found at US embassies.

- **Ambassador/Chief of Mission.** The Ambassador, or Chief of Mission, is the senior US official, military or civilian, at the embassy. By Presidential order, the Ambassador directs, coordinates, and supervises all US Government activities and personnel in a host country.

- **Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).** The DCM is the senior diplomatic official in an embassy below the rank of ambassador. He has the diplomatic title of minister, minister-counselor, or counselor and is nearly always a career Foreign Service officer (FSO). The DCM usually chairs the country team meetings and coordinates the embassy staff.

- **Chief of Military Mission.** The chief of military mission is the senior military person at the embassy. He maintains liaison with the host nation's military forces and is authorized by law to perform certain military functions with host country military barred to others.

- **Chief of Station.** The chief of station is the senior CIA representative responsible for gathering HUMINT and signal intelligence (SIGINT) and informing the ambassador.

- **Defense Attache Officer (DAO).** The DAO is the military person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status representing DOD. This officer can facilitate access to the daily embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written intelligence. All military personnel, even those not assigned to the embassy or under direct control of the ambassador, must coordinate their activities with the DAO.

- **Security Assistance Officer (SAO).** The SAO is the person assigned to carry out security assistance management functions, primarily logistics management, fiscal management, and contract administration of country security assistance programs.
- **Administration Officer (AO).** The AO is responsible for various activities at the embassy compound, which may include providing security at small posts; running the commissary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; and handling monetary aspects of embassy business, including foreign service national (FSN) payroll, cash collection, and budget. The AO is **third in command** in the embassy hierarchy.
- **Political Officer.** A political officer is an FSO who reports on political developments, negotiates with governments, and represents views and policies of the US Government to his contacts. The political officer maintains regular contact with host government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens of a country, as well as third country diplomats. The political officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture.
- **Economic Officer.** The economic officer analyzes, reports on, and advises superiors and DOS personnel on economic matters in the host country. Economic officers also negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues. They may also work in close contact with relief organizations.
- **Consular Officer.** The main function of the consular officer is to screen, process, and grant US passports and visas. Other duties include attending to the welfare of US citizens and performing administrative tasks such as maintaining a count of US nationals within the host country.
- **Public Affairs Officer (PAO).** The US Information Agency (USIA), or US Information Service (USIS) for overseas, representative of the country team normally serves as the PAO to provide public affairs advice to the ambassador and coordinate information efforts with other agencies.
- **Regional Security Officer (RSO).** The RSO is a security officer responsible for the security functions of US embassies and consulates in a given country or group of countries.
- **Special Security Force.** The special security force consists of DOS employees who respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security for the ambassador, the DCM, and others.
- **Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment.** The MSG detachment normally has 5 to 35 Marines assigned and is responsible for internal security, protection of classified material, and American lives. The detachment is not available for duty with incoming forces, except with the express consent of the ambassador.

- **Country Team.** The Country Team consists of the ranking representatives of embassy sections and other US Government agencies operating within a country. It meets regularly to advise the ambassador on US matters and to review current developments in the country. Included in the country team are the ambassador; the DCM; the chief of the political section; political and military affairs officers; the consular officer; the administrative officer; the economics officer; USIS representatives; DEA, AID, and Peace Corps representatives; CIA, DAO, and military assistance group (MAG); and the security assistance officer. The country team facilitates interagency action on recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of US programs and policies.

(4) Interagency Relationships. In Washington, the State Department participates in all interagency discussions that have even the slightest possible foreign affairs flavor. DOS sees its role as ensuring that no action which may have an impact on foreign affairs will occur without DOS being involved in the decision making.

f. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA coordinates the nation's intelligence activities. The **Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)** is the principal adviser to the President and the NSC on all matters of foreign intelligence related to national security. The CIA possesses a well-honed intelligence collection, dissemination, and coordination apparatus that gives technical and human intelligence support to the interagency arena. The Agency's global network of relationships, both overt and covert, enable it to provide real-time response to the quest for essential information.

g. US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID or AID is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. USAID administers and directs the US foreign economic assistance program and acts as the **lead federal agency for US foreign disaster assistance**. The Agency focuses much of its efforts on six areas of special concern--agriculture, the environment, child survival, AIDS, population planning, and basic education. Through its **Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)**, USAID coordinates emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance in response to disasters declared by appropriate authority. It has the authority to expedite interventions at the operational and tactical levels through the use of NGOs and PVOs and other sources of relief capacity.

h. Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA, which comes under AID's Bureau for Humanitarian Response, is responsible for providing prompt nonmilitary assistance to alleviate loss of life and suffering of foreign disaster victims. OFDA may request DOD assistance through the JCS during Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations.

(1) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). OFDA deploys DART teams as a method of providing rapid response assistance to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US Embassies and AID Missions with the management of USG response.

(2) Capabilities. USAID/OFDA has over thirty years experience coordinating

HA and responding to complex emergencies such as civil strife, population displacement, and other man-made disasters. From this experience, USAID/OFDA has developed a significant knowledge base of previous disasters aid' the organizations, resources, and procedures involved in the disaster responses. The Agency has gained tremendous knowledge of the international community and NGO/PVOs can often provide useful, and at times, critical information.

(3) DOD / OFDA coordination. OFDA coordinates directly with DOD concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected country and for arranging DOD transportation. When USAID/OFDA requests specific services from DOD (typically airlift), OFDA pays for those services. The military theater commanders also have a coordination linkage with OFDA to coordinate military and civilian assistance efforts.

i. US Information Agency (USIA). USIA is responsible for the US Government's overseas information and cultural programs, including the Voice of America. The Agency, known overseas as the US Information Service (USIS), helps achieve US foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes overseas. USIA/USIS monitors local attitudes on US forces conducting small wars and aids them by gaining popular support. The Agency also reports to the President and the Secretary of State on worldwide public opinion as it is relevant to the formulation and conduct of US foreign policy.

(1) Organization. USIA has a Washington headquarters but is principally an overseas agency with more than 4,600 Americans and foreign nationals (citizens of the host country) employed in 211 **posts** in 147 countries. The posts are an integral part of the US Diplomatic Mission in each country. The principal USIA foreign service positions at an embassy overseas are: Public Affairs Officer, Information Officer, and Cultural Affairs Officer.

(2) Capabilities. Agency **Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)** provide the most direct, substantive, and sustained contact with opinion leaders in other countries. They serve as spokespersons for US Diplomatic Missions and, through lectures, seminars, and symposia, promote contact between influential overseas audiences and visiting American experts. The Agency conducts a **wide range of activities overseas:** educational and cultural exchanges; English-teaching programs; Voice of America relay stations; press, radio, television, and film programs; Wireless File; magazine and book distribution; libraries and reading rooms; cultural centers; and service centers for printing, exhibits, and programs support.

j. Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA is the lead agency for food and firefighting under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) for disaster assistance operations in the US. The US Forest Service (USFS), an agency under the USDA, is responsible for leading firefighting efforts as well as protecting forest and watershed land from fire. Jointly with the Department of the Interior (DOI), the USFS controls the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, Idaho.

k. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE is the primary Federal agency for interagency issues involving the Nation's energy systems, the repair of damaged energy systems, and the

provision of temporary, alternate, or interim sources of emergency fuel and power. DOE coordinates with Federal and state agencies to bring emergency fuel and power to the scene of a disaster. In addition, DOE provides radiological assistance to situations involving radioactive materials. In its supporting role in disaster and environmental assistance operations, DOE will assign staff to temporary duty at the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Disaster Field Office (DFO). Elements of DOE are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to cope with all forms of nuclear accidents and incidents, including those that may be associated with terrorist activity. DOE also coordinates international emergency responses with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

l. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As the lead agency for hazardous material response under the FRP, the EPA has a significant role and responsibilities in both disaster and environmental assistance operations. It provides for a coordinated response by federal departments and agencies, state and local agencies, and private parties to control oil and hazardous substance discharges or substantial threats of discharges. In selected operations, it coordinates closely with the US Coast Guard, which is responsible for conducting hazardous material operations over coastal and inland waterways.

m. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA is the federal government's executive agent for implementing federal assistance to a state and its local governments. In most cases, it implements assistance in accordance with the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Organized into ten federal regions that provide support on a national basis, FEMA may be involved in either disaster or environmental assistance operations. FEMA has the authority to direct DOD assistance to state and local governments to save lives and protect property, public health, and safety. Though FEMA is primarily focused on disasters within the US, its territories, and possessions, it can also provide recommendations and assistance to agencies involved in handling overseas disasters.

n. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The DHHS is the lead agency for health and medical services under the FRP. The Public Health Service (PHS), an agency under the DHHS, leads this effort by directing the activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). The DHHS is also responsible for assisting with the assessment of health hazards at a response site and the protection of both response workers and the general public.

o. Department of Interior (DOI): As a support agency under the Federal Response Plan (FRP), DOI provides support for disaster and environmental assistance operations. It also has major responsibility for American Indian reservations and for people who live in island territories under US administration. Operating the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) jointly with the Department of Agriculture, DOI has expertise on, and jurisdiction over, a wide variety of natural resources and federal lands and waters.

p. Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ, headed by the **Attorney General (AG)**, is responsible for providing legal advice to the President, the NSC, the Cabinet, and the heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies of the US Government (USG). It represents

the USG in court, investigates crimes, enforces federal laws, operates federal prisons, and provides law enforcement assistance to States and local municipalities. The primary bureaus within DOJ are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (**FBI**), the Drug Enforcement Agency (**DEA**), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (**INS**), the **US Marshals Service**, and the **Bureau of Prisons**.

q. Department of Labor (DOL). DOL, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), conducts safety and health inspections of hazardous waste sites and responds to emergencies. It must assure that 'employees are being protected and determine if the site is in compliance with safety and health standards and regulations. The DOL can thus become a support agency for disaster and environmental assistance operations.

r. National Communications System (NCS). As the lead agency for communications under the FRP, the NCS operates under the authority of the General Services Administration (GSA). The NCS is charged with carrying out the National Telecommunications Support Plan to ensure adequate communications following a disaster. It also provides technical communications support for federal fire control.

s. National Weather Service (NWS). The NWS predicts, tracks, and warns of severe weather and floods. It plays a support role in disaster or environmental assistance operations.

t. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Responsible for the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), the NRC responds to the release of radioactive materials by its licensees. It provides advice in identifying the source and character of other hazardous substance releases when the commission has licensing authority for activities using radioactive materials. The NRC may serve in a support role in disaster and environmental assistance operations.

u. US Public Health Service (PHS). small wars forces are most likely to work with the PHS when bringing migrants or refugees into the US or US territories. PHS ensures that no health threat is posed by such immigrations. The Office of Emergency Preparedness, USPHS, works closely with FEMA and other Federal departments and agencies following major disasters, resource shortages, civil disturbances, mass immigration emergencies, and other actual or imminent crises.

v. Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT establishes the nation's overall transportation policy. DOT organizations include the **US Coast Guard (USCG)**, the **Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)**, the **Federal Highway Administration**, the **Federal Railroad Administration**, the **Maritime Administration (MARAD)**, and the **Research and Special Programs Administration**. DOT conducts-close and continuous liaison within the interagency arena, and in particular with DOD. Much of this interface has been formalized through Executive Orders and MOAs/MOUs that institutionalize joint operations during national emergencies and periods of mobilization. DOT brings to the interagency table a responsive planning and operational mechanism and a huge logistics apparatus to support strategic and operational

planning for force projection, combat operations, deterrence, crisis response, disaster assistance, humanitarian relief efforts, and strategic exercises.

w. Department of the Treasury (DOTT). DOTT recommends economic, financial, tax, and fiscal policies; manages the public debt; enforces the law; and manufactures coins and currency. Included among DOTT's twelve bureaus are the **US Customs Service (USCS)**, the **Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)**, the **US Secret Service (USSS)**, the **Internal Revenue Service (IRS)**, and the **Federal Law Enforcement Training Center**. DOTT possesses significant law enforcement skills associated with suppression and interdiction of illegal trafficking, enforcement of economic embargoes, and the seizure of foreign assets. DOTT can restrict travel into or out of the US, screen cargo shipments, and seal borders.

Appendix B

The United Nations

This appendix provides a general description of the United Nations' organization and functions. (Recommend inclusion in final draft. Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, has a good appendix on the UN.)

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- ² Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989), p. 4.
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- ⁴ NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition)* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1 April 1987), p. 1.
- ⁵ Field Manual 100-20, *Support and Stability Operations* (formerly Operations Other Than War)(Final Draft) (Washington DC: Department of the Army, October 1995), p. v.
- ⁶ Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff; 16 June 1995), p. I-1.
- ⁷ Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," *Military Review*, Nov - Dec 1995, p. 37.
- ⁸ Partially adapted from definition proposed by Major R. Scott Moore, "Looking Back at the Future: The Practice and Patterns of Expeditionary Operations in the 20th Century," *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1993, p. 74. Also includes reference to non-Western type warfare discussed in Robert J. Bunker's article, "Rethinking OOTW," *Military Review* Nov-Dec 1995, p. 35.
- ⁹ Dr. Daniel Fitz-Simons, Ph.D., *Operations Other Than War Syllabus AY 1995-96 (Course Overview)* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 1996), p. 1.
- ¹⁰ Historical Overview is a fusion of Course Overview and Introductions written by Dr. Daniel Fitz-Simons in the *Operations Other Than War Syllabus AY 1995-96 (Course Overview)*, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, April 1996, pp. 1-3, 5-6, and 9-10.
- ¹¹ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism -- Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., Maxwell Macmillan Pergamon Publishing Corporation, 1990), pp. 2-10.
- ¹² John M. Collins, *Special Operations Forces -- An Assessment* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 9.
- ¹³ M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity -- The Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 11.
- ¹⁴ Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 66-90.
- ¹⁵ Beyerchen, p. 90.
- ¹⁶ *Small Wars Supplements 1-8*, "Supplement 1 Non-State Actors" (Quantico, VA: MCCDC Wargaming Division, Mr. Bruce Gudmundsson, 1996), pp.1-4. The substance of this paragraph is taken almost verbatim from the article given the purpose of the supplements to be included in the updated *Small Wars Manual*.
- ¹⁷ Jt Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for MOO TW*, p. I-1.
- ¹⁸ These characteristics of Small Wars are a compilation of common traits I found while researching this subject. They do not come from a single source.
- ¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Ann E. Story, USAF and Major Aryea Gottlieb, USAF, "Beyond the Range of Military Operations," *JFQ*, Autumn 1995, pp. 101-102. The authors propose this concept of groupings as a step beyond the current alphabetical listing of the 16 types of

MOOTW. This model supports the Small Wars bent by providing a framework that focuses on both combat and noncombat operations.

²⁰ See Figure 2 of Story and Gottlieb's *JFQ* article. While I did not discuss in the body, their model is portrayed as being founded upon a solid base of preparation, education, training, exercises, modeling, and simulations. To me, that is SOP and does not require illustration.

²¹ NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition,)* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1 April 1987), Chapter 1, pp. 17-34.

²² Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-18, *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1989), p. 38.

²³ The first six principles are taken from existing doctrine contained in Jt Pub 3-07 and FM 100-5. The seventh principle is a personal addition based on extensive reading and the resultant conclusion that this trait is absolutely vital to exhibit in most small wars. When we intervene or personalize our operations, as we did in Somalia against Aideed, we lose credibility, legitimacy, popular support and we feed the cause of the unrest,

²⁴ FMFRP 15- (Draft), *Small Wars Manual II: The Navy-Marine Corps Experience in Operations Other Than War (OOTW)) Since World War II* (Quantico, VA: Advanced Concepts Branch, Marine Corps Experimental Unit (Wargaming Division), 10 March 1995), p. 26.

²⁵ This renaming of Strikes and Raids to Retaliatory Actions is a continuation of the Story / Gottlieb proposal in *JFQ* Autumn 1995 article "Beyond the Range of Military Operations." I think they have a good point and that we should consider changing the names to clarify.

²⁶ Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), p. 111-41

²⁷ Joint Pub 3-07, *MOOTW*, p. III-3.

²⁸ Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994), pp. 4-6.

²⁹ FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, p. 12.

³⁰ FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, pp. 2-4.

³¹ Also a Story / Gottlieb proposal from *JFQ*, Autumn 1995, p. 103.

³² This section taken almost verbatim from "US Support of Insurgencies," FMFRP 15- (Draft), *Small Wars Manual II: The Navy-Marine Corps Experience in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Since World War II* (Quantico, VA: Advanced Concepts Branch, Marine Corps Experimental Unit (Wargaming Division), 10 March 1995), pp. 34-35.

³³ Samuel B. Griffith, translated, *Sun Tzu The Art of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 82-83.

³⁴ Anthony Zinni, Lieutenant General, USMC, "It's Not Nice and Neat," *Proceedings*, August 1995, p. 30.

³⁵ Excerpt from Fleet Marine Force Manual 2-1 (draft), *MAGTF Operations*, provided to Command and Staff College students Winter, 1995 - 96. The MSTP office confirms that this publication is still in draft form, but the traveling team of trainers in the Marine Corps Planning Process teaches the use of these eight operational functions to MEF planners.

³⁶ USA White Paper (draft), *The Application of Peace Enforcement: Operations at Brigade and Battalion* (Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School, 31 August 1993), p. A-1-1.

³⁷ USA White Paper (draft), *Peace Enforcement*, p. A-2-2.

³⁸ USA White Paper (draft), *The Application of Peace Enforcement: Operations at Brigade and Battalion* (Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School, 31 August 1993), p. 15.

³⁹ Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), p. 2-13.

⁴⁰ Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights," *International Affairs*, 69, 3, July 1993, p. 448.

⁴¹ USA White Paper (draft), *Peace Enforcement*, p. 19.

⁴² *MAGTF Staff Training Program* Brief titled "Marine Corps Command and Staff College -- Marine Corps Planning," Quantico, VA, 12-16 February 1996, p. 10.

⁴³ *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington DC: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995), p. 59.

⁴⁴ *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington DC: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995), p. 35. Idea adapted for small wars in this draft; the thought is essentially the same.

⁴⁵ Alan B. Siegel, "Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies," *Research Memorandum 94-74* (Annapolis, MD: Center for Naval Analysis, March 1995), p. 141

⁴⁶ John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p.50.

⁴⁷ *Media Skills Training Guide -- A Media Primer*, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps Division of Public Affairs, Rev 11-95, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Alan B. Siegel, "Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies," *Research Memorandum 94-74* (Annapolis, MD: Center for Naval Analysis, March 1995), p. 16.

⁴⁹ Cohn L. Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/93, p. 33.

⁵⁰ Anthony Zinni, Lieutenant General, USMC, "It's Not Nice and Neat," *Proceedings*, August 1995, p. 30.

⁵¹ *JTFCHPO*, p. 39

⁵² FMFRP 15- (Draft), *Small Wars Manual II: The Navy-Marine Corps Experience in Operations Other Than War (OOTW,) Since World War II* (Quantico, VA: Advanced Concepts Branch, Marine Corps Experimental Unit (Wargaming Division), 10 March 1995), p. 47.

⁵³ S.L. Arnold, Major General, USA, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review*, December 1993, p. 26.

⁵⁴ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism -- Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., Maxwell Macmillan Pergamon Publishing Corporation, 1990).

⁵⁵ Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for MOOTW* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), p. GL-3.

⁵⁶ Joint Warfighting Center, *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, (Washington DC: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995), p. 11.

⁵⁷ *JTFCHPO*, p. 13.

⁵⁸ *JTFCHPO*, p. 15-16.

⁵⁹ *JTFCHPO*, p. 18.

⁶⁰ *JTFCHPO*, p.18.

⁶¹ NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition,)* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1 April 1987), Chapter 2, pp. 19-32.

⁶² *JTFCHPO*, p. 51.

⁶³ Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for MOO TW*, p. IV-9.

⁶⁴ Field Manual 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, July 1993), pp. 3-0 to 3-6.

⁶⁵ This section is a synthesis of recommendations found in various articles on OOTW and the section on Negotiation and Mediation in the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, pp. 46-50.

⁶⁶ NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition,)* (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 1 April 1987), p. 4-1.

⁶⁷ *JTFHPO*, p. 35.

⁶⁸ Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994), pp. 76-82. Also used USACOM "Genesis" Handbook provided to me by Colonel Pratt at Command and Staff College, 1995.